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Abstract 
This thesis describes the Omnibus language and its supporting framework of tools. Omnibus 
is an object-oriented language which is superficially similar to the Java programming 
language but uses value semantics for objects and incorporates a behavioural interface 
specification language. Specifications are defined in terms of a subset of the query functions 
of the classes for which a frame-condition logic is provided. The language is well suited to the 
specification of modelling types and can also be used to write implementations. An overview 
of the language is presented and then specific aspects such as subtleties in the frame-condition 
logic, the implementation of value semantics and the role of equality are discussed. The 
challenges of reference semantics are also discussed. 
The Omnibus language is supported by an integrated verification tool which provides 
support for three assertion-based verification approaches: run-time assertion checking, 
extended static checking and full formal verification. The different approaches provide 
different balances between rigour and ease of use. The Omnibus tool allows these approaches 
to be used together in different parts of the same project. Guidelines are presented in order to 
help users avoid conflicts when using the approaches together. The use of the integrated 
verification approach to meet two key requirements of safe software component reuse, to have 
clear descriptions and some form of certification, are discussed along with the specialised 
facilities provided by the Omnibus tool to manage the distribution of components. The 
principles of the implementation of the tool are described, focussing on the integrated static 
verifier module that supports both extended static checking and full formal verification 
through the use of an intermediate logic. 
 iv 
The different verification approaches are used to detect and correct a range of errors in a 
case study carried out using the Omnibus language. The case study is of a library system 
where copies of books, CDs and DVDs are loaned out to members. The implementation 
consists of 2278 lines of Omnibus code spread over 15 classes. To allow direct comparison of 
the different assertion-based verification approaches considered, run-time assertion checking, 
extended static checking and then full formal verification are applied to the application in its 
entirety. This directly illustrates the different balances between error coverage and ease-of-use 
which the approaches offer. Finally, the verification policy system is used to allow the 
approaches to be used together to verify different parts of the application. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
The software development industry is plagued by massive failures [6, 7, 25, 44, 45, 52, 65]. 
Examples of failed software projects include the crash of the Ariane 5 rocket in 1996, 40 
seconds after launch, with a reported cost of $500 million [52, 83]; the abandonment of a 
$526 million supply-chain management system by J Sainsbury plc in 2004 [25]; and the 
ongoing saga of the UK’s NHS IT system [6]. The U.S. Department of Commerce has 
estimated the economic cost of faulty software in the U.S. alone at $22.2-$59.5 billion per 
annum [45]. Other estimates for this figure are as high as $60-$70 billion per annum [25]. 
People have also lost their lives as a result of software failures. For example, between 1985 
and 1987 a software error in a computer-controlled radiation therapy machine led to patients 
receiving massive overdoses, killing at least three people [65]; a similar mishap between 2000 
and 2001 led to another eight fatalities [65]. 
It is widely acknowledged that this situation is something we should look to address. 
Edsger Dijkstra had the following comment [38]: 
“The average customer of the computing industry has been served so poorly 
that he expects his system to crash all the time, and we witness a massive 
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worldwide distribution of bug-ridden software for which we should be deeply 
ashamed.” 
While it is widely accepted that there is no single silver bullet [18] to the problems of the 
software development industry, we can still look for areas of improvement. Increasing the 
level of software component reuse could help address some of the problems of software 
development by allowing developers to make more use of existing components rather than 
implementing their own. 
Studies have suggested that on average as much as 85% of a typical new application could 
be developed by reusing existing software, meaning as little as 15% application-specific code 
may be required if reuse is fully exploited [85, 92]. Reuse can save time and money since, 
given a suitable framework, it is quicker and cheaper to reuse an existing component than it is 
to write your own. If the components are rigorously ensured to be correct then component 
reuse can also improve reliability. 
There is a range of dedicated frameworks for component reuse that are used in practice 
including JavaBeans, .NET and CORBA. In these frameworks, software components are 
described using type signature interfaces supplemented by interface documentation (e.g. 
javadoc, docgen). Typically, no quantifiable assurances of the correctness of the components 
are provided. 
The level of software component reuse is currently considerably below the theoretical 
threshold. The most cited barrier to reuse in a 2005 NASA survey on software reuse practices 
in the Earth science community was that components were “difficult to understand/poorly 
documented” [5].  
Another often-cited barrier to reuse is the so-called not-invented-here syndrome [15] 
where software developers favour re-implementation over reuse. This syndrome has acted to 
limit the reuse of software components. The not-invented-here syndrome, in this context, may 
be a natural human defence mechanism that programmers develop through experience to 
protect them from the dangers of reuse. Without any dependable assurances of correctness, 
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developers have to resort to the use of informal information, like the reputation of the vendor 
that produced the component, to decide whether they can trust the hidden implementation to 
work. The reality is that reuse without adequate support can lead to results that are worse, not 
better, than without reuse [52]. 
1.1   Formal methods and assertion-based verification 
Techniques that exploit the mathematical properties of software systems in order to formally 
reason about their correctness are referred to as formal methods. In this thesis we consider the 
use of formal methods to help address some of the problems within the software development 
industry. 
Formal methods require the production of a formal specification which defines precisely 
the desired behaviour for a software application or component. The specification can then be 
used as a basis for checking the correctness of an implementation. Formal verification is the 
process of formally ensuring that specifications are internally consistent and satisfied by an 
implementation. There is a range of different formal verification approaches. 
We focus on a class of formal methods called assertion-based verification, built around the 
use of special expressions called assertions which are embedded within program code. 
Assertions define properties that must hold at different points during the execution of 
software applications. If an assertion does not hold at the point at which it is reached then this 
corresponds to an error. Assertions can be used to provide a specification for formal 
verification or as an oracle of correctness for software testing. 
In assertion-based verification approaches, assertions are used to specify the interfaces 
between classes and methods. The assertions define the separate obligations on the callers and 
implementers of each method. Methods are annotated with special assertion annotations 
called: pre-conditions, post-conditions and frame conditions. A pre-condition defines 
properties that should be established by the caller of a method before the method is called. A 
post-condition defines properties that should be established by the implementer by the end of 
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the execution of the method, assuming that the pre-condition was satisfied by the caller. Post-
conditions are typically supplemented by a frame condition which defines some restrictions 
on the data that the method can change. In addition to describing the individual methods, 
assertion-based object-oriented verification approaches also support the concept of class 
invariants. A class invariant is an assertion that should hold throughout the lifetime of all 
instances of that class. More specifically, they should be established by constructor methods 
and maintained by instance method calls of the object. 
Formal methods can be used to assess different aspects of software. For example, when 
asked to perform a specific action, we may wish to demonstrate that the software: will always 
terminate, will terminate within some maximum time period, and/or if the software 
terminates, the state that it terminates in will satisfy the specification. The work described in 
this thesis is restricted to the demonstration that if a specific action of the considered software 
terminates that it will do so in a state which satisfies the formal specification. This is referred 
to as partial correctness. Where the software is also shown to always terminate, this is called 
total correctness but that is beyond the scope of this thesis. Likewise, the thesis does not 
consider techniques to show that software will always terminate within a specified time 
frame. We also restrict our attention to a specific type of software: sequential object-oriented 
code. We do not consider concurrency or non object-oriented systems. 
1.1.1   Current realities and future promise of formal methods 
Formal methods could help address some of the current failings of the software development 
field. The use of formal methods can reduce the amount of testing that is needed by catching 
errors earlier in the development process. For example, the use of the SPARK formal method 
in the implementation of the control system for the Lockheed C130J aircraft (commonly 
known as “Hercules”) assisted in a reduction of the required testing budget by 80% [24]. 
Increased levels of reuse of verified components could also help the situation. Two key 
technical problems that are inhibiting the reuse of software components are: 
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1. software components need to be properly documented with clear and precise 
descriptions of what they are intended to do [71], and 
2. justification needs to be provided that the hidden implementation of a software 
component satisfies its descriptions [70]. 
Formal methods provide the facilities to address these failings [69]. Formal specifications 
can help provide clear and precise descriptions of what a component should do and formal 
verification can provide a basis for trusting that a hidden implementation satisfies its 
interface. Furthermore, economies of scale can justify the additional costs of formal methods. 
The formal verification of software has been a long-standing goal of computing science. In 
recent years, improvements in computer hardware and in areas such as automatic and 
interactive theorem proving, model-checking, and static analysis have led to a situation where 
formal verification of industrial-scale software is now a realistic prospect. There have been 
some notable successes in the development of safety-critical systems [13, 16, 24, 28, 50, 93]. 
However, formal methods have had limited impact outside the conventional safety-critical 
domain. 
This thesis aims to provide formal methods that can be applied to the wider commercial 
software development industry. In our work we have attempted to identify areas which were 
not being focussed on by the leading verification projects. We developed a new language and 
set of tools to give us complete freedom to explore the area without being too heavily 
influenced by the handful of leading international projects that are so dominant. We did not 
fix on a definition for the language early in the project, formally describe it (its semantics and 
type system), and stick to it. Instead, the language and tools were radically re-developed to 
incorporate new ideas as the project progressed. The drawback of this approach is that we do 
not have a succinct formal definition of the language in its current state which we can present. 
To produce such a definition is a key item of future work. 
The intended audience for our work is researchers in the assertion-based verification 
community and we hope that these researchers can take aspects from our work and 
incorporate them into their own languages and tools. The project is intended more as a 
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research vehicle to explore alternative ideas than as an approach to be used immediately in 
large-scale commercial software development. 
1.1.2   Assertion-based verification approaches 
In this thesis we focus on three assertion-based verification approaches. They are: run-time 
assertion checking (RAC), extended static checking (ESC) and full formal verification (FFV). 
RAC is a dynamic verification approach built around testing, while ESC and FFV are 
static verification approaches which involve the generation of obligations called Verification 
Conditions (VCs) which must then be proved using a theorem prover. There are automatic 
theorem provers which decide the truth of the specified correctness properties automatically 
without involving the user, and interactive theorem provers which allow the user to assist in 
the proof process. The theorem proving problem is undecidable for the types of logics we 
consider and so automated theorem provers cannot prove all VCs that are valid. 
FFV involves the production of a heavyweight specification which should provide a 
comprehensive characterisation of correctness, while RAC and ESC use only lightweight 
specifications which simply describe some properties that should hold. There is no formally 
quantifiable difference between lightweight and heavyweight specifications. The difference is 
in the mindset of the writer.  When writing a heavyweight specification the developer should 
attempt to describe the interface of the component as completely as possible with the assertion 
language. This will typically involve the use of quantifiers and recursion. When using 
lightweight specifications, practical concerns must be kept at the forefront of the developer’s 
thinking in order to keep run-time checking overheads down or theorem proving difficulty 
within the scope of automated proving. This will require constructs such as quantifiers and 
recursion to be used sparingly. The completeness of post-conditions and frame-conditions can 
be compromised but, even in lightweight specifications, the pre-conditions should be 
described as completely as possible so that it is always possible to identify when a method 
call is invalid. 
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Run-time assertion checking 
The run-time assertion checking approach takes a program with a set of lightweight assertion 
annotations written in an extension of the expression language and produces an executable 
implementation incorporating run-time checks of those assertions. The application can then be 
tested in a traditional manner, and violations of the assertion annotations will be detected and 
reported. 
A big advantage of RAC is that it avoids the theoretical complexities of theorem prover-
based verification. The contribution of RAC to the testing process is that the failures 
encountered during the execution of the program are detected close to source, aiding analysis 
and correction. The assertion failure messages that are generated are also far more informative 
than the stack trace error message that may have otherwise revealed the failure when the flaw 
triggered the generation of an uncaught exception at some later stage in the execution. The 
assertion annotations can provide a form of test oracle for the testing process. 
A limitation of the approach is that its error coverage is closely associated with the 
coverage of the corresponding test suite. The approach also uses lightweight specifications, so 
only the behaviour characterised in these assertions will be checked. Of course, it also impacts 
run-time performance. 
The run-time assertion checking approach was popularised by Bertrand Meyer, who 
designed the Eiffel language [68] around this principle. RAC tools are now also available for 
most other mainstream programming languages. For example, tools supporting RAC for Java 
include Jass [11], iContract [58], jContractor [53] and the JML run-time assertion checker 
[27]. 
Extended static checking 
Extended static checking uses static verification techniques to detect a range of possible run-
time errors and violations of lightweight specifications without the need for user interaction. 
The VCs produced by ESC tools are discharged by a fully automated theorem prover. 
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Spurious warnings reported by ESC tools (frequently caused by incompleteness in either the 
lightweight specifications or the theorem prover) can be suppressed by using a range of 
assumption constructs that allow programmers to trade these spurious warnings for possible 
unsoundness. A prominent example is the assume statement which allows users to provide 
an assertion which should be taken as true without further justification. There are different 
techniques for the handling of loops including unravelling them a finite number of times to 
avoid the need for loop invariants. 
ESC is presented to those outside the formal methods field as an extension of the static 
checking (i.e. type checking, basic flow analysis, etc.) performed by programmers using 
standard language compilers. ESC tools produce error messages similar to those produced by 
standard compilers. This makes it easier to market the approach since software developers are 
more receptive to “type checkers” than formal methods tools. Like RAC, ESC also uses 
lightweight specifications that are easier to write than their heavyweight equivalents. ESC 
helps to find errors earlier in the development process than RAC, when they are easier to 
correct, and does not require the production of a test suite. 
A crucial problem of ESC is that the specifications must be sufficient to act as a basis for 
modular verification. This is illustrated in chapter 5. The specifications must also be adjusted 
to fit within the capabilities of the associated automated theorem prover. If specifications are 
used which are too complex, the tool may do something undesirable like report an error where 
there is none. 
The extended static checking approach was developed by a team at DEC who produced the 
original ESC tools: ESC/Modula-3 [35] and ESC/Java [41]. More recently Kiniry and Cok 
have produced the ESC/Java2 tool [30]. 
Full formal verification 
Full formal verification, or full functional program verification, is a static verification 
approach that allows the correctness of an application relative to some specification to be 
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fully mathematically demonstrated, allowing the production of software that is, in principle, 
completely correct. FFV can utilise either fully automated or interactive theorem provers.  
Interactive theorem provers enable the use of more sophisticated specifications since the 
producer of the specification does not need to remain within the bounds of what can be 
proved using an automated theorem prover. The interactive proofs can be saved, distributed 
with the component and then re-run by clients to re-verify the component. 
Fully automated theorem provers are far more desirable because typical users frequently 
have neither the mathematical training nor time to assist in the proof process. Unfortunately 
as Jacobs et al note that full formal verification of languages like Java requires user assistance 
[51]: “The semantical complexity of languages like Java... means that code verification is still 
very complicated and requires a substantial amount of user interaction.” However, Crocker 
[34] believes that by using a cleaner language and utilising advances in theorem proving and 
new levels of processing power, fully automated FFV is now possible in practice. 
Unfortunately even if the proof process can be fully automated, FFV is still very costly since 
it requires the production of heavyweight specifications formalising the full details of each 
component being verified. This involves extra effort that, to make matters worse, should be 
performed before the implementation is written, increasing time to market. Finally, the full 
formal verification of implementations incorporating loops requires the production of a loop 
invariant assertion for each loop. Determining suitable loop invariants is a non-trivial 
exercise. 
Projects supporting full formal verification include B [2], SPARK [9], PerfectDeveloper 
[34], KeY [3], LOOP [49], JACK [19], Jive [72] and Krakatoa [66]. 
1.2   Thesis contributions 
This thesis makes contributions in two areas which are discussed in this section. They are: 
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1. investigation of the use of a new language loosely based on Java, but using value 
semantics and containing an operational specification language with frame 
conditions, and 
2. investigation of how different assertion-based verification approaches can be used 
together in an integrated fashion in different parts of a single software application. 
1.2.1   The Omnibus language 
The thesis presents a new language called Omnibus. It is designed to use similar concepts to 
Java but with value semantics for objects. Specifications can be provided in terms of the 
methods and attributes in the interface of the class with a frame condition logic provided. 
The contributions in this work are: 
a. a presentation of a specification technique based upon type signature interfaces with 
support for frame conditions, and a discussion of the problems in providing such 
support, 
b. a discussion of techniques to implement an object-oriented programming language 
with value semantics, 
c. a discussion of the concept of equality with its increased importance in value 
semantics, and presentation of an automatic lightweight definition and patterns for 
manual definitions, and 
d. an illustration of the challenges in reasoning with reference semantics and a 
discussion of existing techniques. 
Two of the most important language design decisions taken in the development of the 
Omnibus language are the use of value semantics and an operational specification style. 
Justification for these choices is given in the following sections. 
Why value semantics is used 
Objects may either be accessed via references or treated as values. Reference semantics is 
where objects are accessed via references. Java is an example of a language which uses 
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reference semantics. The concepts of reference semantics are familiar to most programmers 
and are very expressive, providing a powerful mechanism for describing programming 
solutions. However, they are relatively complicated to reason about and harder to formally 
model. In value semantics, objects are accessed directly, not by reference. SPARK is an 
example of a language that uses value semantics. Value semantics is less expressive and 
cannot model certain complex design patterns efficiently. However, it is far easier to reason 
about and formally model. 
The Omnibus language uses value semantics for objects and does not provide any support 
for reference semantics. We chose to concentrate on value semantics because reference 
semantics is one of the biggest causes of complexity in verification of languages such as 
Java/JML. The difficulty of verification of languages built on reference semantics makes the 
techniques less accessible, increasing the need for user interaction in the theorem proving 
process. Value semantics offered the possibility of verification techniques that are more 
accessible. Other projects have used value semantics for the same reason. A prominent 
example is PerfectDeveloper, which uses a language primarily based on value semantics in 
order to reduce theorem proving difficulty to the extent that fully automated provers can be 
used. We wanted to explore the use of value semantics as the basis for a language supported 
by a range of verification approaches. 
Value semantics is also of critical importance even for languages primarily built around 
reference semantics such as Java/JML. To perform formal verification, the classes in a system 
must be translated into mathematical logic, and mathematics itself uses value semantics. 
Value semantics classes can be used to describe the classes in an implementation in a manner 
that can be directly translated into the underlying logic. Special modelling types of this kind, 
expressed using value semantics, are used widely in Java/JML. A basis for the specifications, 
like our value semantics logic, is an important component. This is discussed further in the 
next section. 
There are limitations to value semantics and many of the most interesting outstanding 
research challenges in software verification are concerned with reference semantics, so a 
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thesis which does not consider reference semantics at all would be somewhat unsatisfactory 
even under these circumstances. As such we do discuss some of the key challenges in the 
verification of languages that use reference semantics and promising current approaches for 
addressing these challenges. 
Support for reference semantics could be added to the Omnibus language or the techniques 
for value semantics presented here could be incorporated into an existing language such as 
JML which focuses on reference semantics. Reference semantics could be used to provide 
expressiveness and efficiency with value semantics being used for modelling types and 
implementations of selected classes. 
Why we use operational specifications 
Another key language design question is what the base level of the specifications should be. 
Of course, classes can be specified in terms of other classes, but this process must stop 
somewhere. Leading projects such as JML and Spec# use a set of core types as the base level 
for specifications. These core types are often referred to as modelling types [60]. The problem 
is then how these modelling types are specified. As Leavens, Leino and Müller say [60]: 
“Modelling types can, of course, be specified using other modelling types, but 
ultimately some modelling types must be specified in some other way.” 
The first challenge they discuss in their recent paper [60] is to “develop a technique for 
formally specifying modelling types in a way that is useful for verification”. Modelling types 
can be provided in a library and should provide core mathematical specification apparatus 
such as sets and sequences. The types should obey value semantics to be compatible with the 
underlying mathematical theories used for verification. 
Their paper describes four candidate solutions to this problem. Their first candidate 
solution is to use algebraic specification techniques. Such approaches can be used to describe 
the methods of a class inductively. This approach is similar to the base-function specification 
technique of Eiffel [68]. Such specifications are described by Müller [76] as operational 
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interface specifications and are frequently used in run-time assertion checkers. This approach 
is used extensively in JML, where an operational specification style can be achieved through 
the careful definition of pure classes. However, no support for frame conditions is provided. 
Ordinarily in JML, modifies clauses can be used to describe the state elements that can be 
changed, from which the tool can deduce what state elements cannot be changed. However, 
when writing pure classes in JML, the programmer must implement methods to update the 
state of the class by returning the new object from the method. This is because, to obey value 
semantics, the object to which the method is being applied cannot be mutated. The 
modifies clause cannot be used in this circumstance: it can only be used where the target 
of the method call is being changed. 
In this thesis we present an operational specification technique with a frame condition 
logic to make it more suitable for static verification. 
The second proposed solution is to provide an algebraic specification through an 
equational theory. These kinds of specifications are also used for many JML modelling types. 
However, among other problems, this technique is unsuitable for run-time assertion checking, 
which is one of our key interests in this thesis. 
The final two proposed solutions are to specify the modelling types in the logic of some 
standard prover, or to define the modelling types as built-in value types with a pre-defined 
notion of equality. It is not clear to Leavens, Leino, Müller, or us, how helpful the 
specifications of the modelling types in the logic of a standard prover would be. The clear 
problem with using built-in model types is that they would not be easily extensible. 
1.2.2   The Omnibus integrated verification approach 
The thesis describes how the assertion-based verification approaches RAC, ESC and FFV can 
be used together in an integrated fashion. Verification tools are usually built to support a 
single verification approach. This thesis discusses the use of these approaches together in a 
flexible way, enabling an application to be broken down into sections and different 
verification approaches used in each section. 
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The contributions in this work are: 
a. a presentation of the case for supporting different approaches for different parts of a 
single software application, 
b. a discussion of the challenges in using the different approaches together, and 
presentation of guidelines to meet them, 
c. a presentation of the concept of verification policies that can be used to manage the 
use of the approaches together, 
d. a discussion of how the integrated verification approach can be used together with 
the documentation generator and verification certificate system to help support safe 
reuse of software components, and 
e. a discussion of the integrated tool support provided by the Omnibus IDE, focussing 
on the integrated static verifier which provides support for both extended static 
checking and full formal verification. 
The following sections explain why it is desirable to use the different verification 
approaches together and why additional support is required to support the safe reuse of 
software components. 
Case for using the approaches together 
Integration of verification approaches is desirable because the different approaches provide 
different balances between rigour and ease of use, matching the different balances between 
reliability requirements and development resources in different parts of a software 
development project. Software developers also have varying abilities and do not always have 
the mathematical training to perform interactive theorem proving as is generally required for 
FFV. Integrated support for these approaches allows developers with different mathematical 
training, developing code for different purposes, to use verification at a level of rigour that 
most suits their needs. The extended static checker and run-time assertion checker, together 
with the unit testing framework, provide push-button techniques that software developers 
producing non-critical application-specific code can use relatively cheaply. Our system also 
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supports full formal verification which developers may choose to use if the reliability of their 
code is critical and they have the required skills. 
Why additional specialised support for reusable components is needed 
Assertion-based verification provides for two of the basic needs of safe software component 
reuse: a mechanism for providing clear descriptions and a basis for trusting the hidden 
implementations. However, assertion-based verification alone is not sufficient to support the 
safe reuse of software components. Without specialised support, the users of a component 
will have to inspect the source code of the component in order to view its specification, and 
will have to re-verify the component’s implementation in order to ensure that the 
implementation is correct. This is not practicable. For the potential advantages of component 
reuse to be realised, the users must have separate, clear descriptions of how to use the 
component, and a basis for trusting the implementation without having to manually re-verify 
it themselves. They should ideally be isolated from the implementation, i.e. the 
implementation should be hidden. Our specialised support provides additional facilities to 
allow this to be achieved. 
1.2.3   Strengths and weaknesses of Omnibus 
The specification mechanisms of the Omnibus language were specifically designed to support 
the definition of modelling classes and the language seems to be quite effective at expressing 
these. The language can also be used to implement applications in their entirety but the 
limitations of value semantics make it awkward to do so. 
Our integrated verification approach appears to hold some promise. Our case study 
illustrates that the different verification approaches that we support do provide different 
balances between error coverage and ease of use. The verification policy system allows them 
to be used together in a highly integrated fashion. 
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1.3   Related work 
This section presents some related languages and verification tools. 
1.3.1   Related languages 
In this section we review the languages used in the state-of-the-art verification projects. We 
classify them in terms of two dimensions: whether they use reference or value semantics and 
the bases for the specifications. 
Reference or value semantics as default 
Many of the leading verification projects are built around existing programming languages. 
For example, the JML project is built upon Java and the Spec# project is built upon C#. 
Facilities are added to support the definition of assertion annotations, but the structure of the 
packages/classes/methods and the use of reference semantics by default is retained. Classes 
obeying value semantics are supported via the pure modifier. The Eiffel language was 
designed with assertion-based verification in mind, specifically run-time assertion checking. It 
also supports reference semantics. 
Examples of languages that use value semantics are SPARK, B and Perfect. The SPARK 
project uses a subset of Ada. B and Perfect are languages designed specifically with formal 
verification in mind. 
Different base levels of specifications 
In this section we consider the different techniques used for the specification of modelling 
types by the different state-of-the-art assertion-based verification projects. We follow Müller 
[76] in using the classifications: declarative and operational specification languages. In 
declarative specification languages, specifications are defined in terms of a separate 
mathematical model. In operational specification languages, specifications are defined in 
terms of Boolean expressions over the type signature interface of the class. 
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A prominent example of a declarative specification language is Larch. Using Larch, a 
program-independent specification, referred to as a universal specification, is defined which 
provides a collection of mathematical constructs for describing the class. A program-
dependent specification of the interface of the class can then be given in terms of the 
constructs provided in the universal specification. The abstract state of the class will be 
defined in terms of constructs from the universal specification, and the behaviour of the 
methods will be specified using pre-conditions, frame conditions and post-conditions over this 
state. Such languages are not well suited to run-time assertion checking, since the 
specifications are defined over abstract mathematical constructs that are not directly 
executable. 
Eiffel was one of the first languages to incorporate an operational specification language. 
In Eiffel, a subset of the query methods of each class are selected as base methods and the rest 
of the methods in the class are defined in terms of them. Eiffel lacks support for frame 
conditions and so these must be manually encoded in the post-condition if static verification is 
to be performed. 
There are a number of operational specification languages available for Java associated 
with the many run-time assertion checking tools, e.g. iContract [58]. However, crucially, most 
of these still lack frame conditions. An operational specification language which does support 
frame conditions is the Java Interface Specification Language (JISL) [73]. Frame conditions 
are supported through a mechanism to explicitly mark areas of the heap that should remain 
unchanged. This approach requires the programmer to explicitly specify what should remain 
unchanged, in contrast with the more common modifies-list or changes-list approach, where 
the programmer specifies what can be changed, and from which the frame condition is then 
deduced. 
Newer languages like JML and Spec# use a hybrid of operational and declarative 
specifications. The main specification style within these languages is declarative in nature, 
with specifications written over abstract fields holding values of special modelling types.  
Once sufficient modelling types have been defined, it is easy and natural for users of the 
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language to define their specifications in terms of fields holding values of these models. 
However, unlike conventional declarative specifications, the modelling types are defined in 
an operational style using the source language (i.e. Java/C#) rather than some separate, non-
executable mathematical logic. The modelling types are defined using classes written to obey 
value semantics so that they can be directly translated into mathematics to support static 
verification. In addition, because they are defined using the source language, they can be 
executed, thus also facilitating run-time assertion checking. The use of the approaches 
together in this hybrid fashion enables both formal verification and run-time assertion 
checking. 
The hybrid approach was pioneered by the JML project. JML supports the concept of pure 
classes which obey value semantics. A library of pure classes is provided with the JML 
distribution which can be used to express specifications for user classes. The library includes 
common modelling types such as sets and sequences. Programmers can also define their own 
modelling classes by writing new pure classes. Programmers can then write specifications for 
their classes in a declarative style using abstract fields of these modelling types. 
Unfortunately, little specialised support is provided in JML for the specification of the pure 
classes that are used for modelling types. Update operations for these classes must be written 
as methods which return new instances, which means that the programmer receives none of 
the luxuries of a modifies-list. Instead, they must manually specify how all the state elements 
of the newly created object relate to the state elements of the original object. The advantages 
of the hybrid approach can still be achieved within Omnibus by using model functions of no 
parameters in place of fields. This technique is used extensively in the case study in chapter 8. 
1.3.2   Related verification tools 
This section presents a survey of related projects which use the assertion-based verification 
approaches discussed in this thesis. 
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Eiffel 
Eiffel [68] is an object-oriented programming language built around the assertion-based 
Design-by-Contract (DBC) approach. It was originally developed by Bertrand Meyer in 1985. 
Support for assertions was built directly into the language from its inception. A run-time 
assertion checking mechanism is used to detect violations of the specifications provided in 
Eiffel contracts. 
While the Eiffel language was designed to accommodate assertion-based verification, it 
uses reference semantics and so is closer to conventional programming languages like Java 
and C#, with assertion annotations, than Omnibus. The supporting tools have also been built 
around the use of run-time assertion checking rather than static verification although we note 
that there have been moves towards supporting static verification of Eiffel code [90]. 
Jass and other Java DBC tools 
Jass (Java with ASSertions) [11] is one of a number of RAC tools for Java. It supports an 
Eiffel-style DBC approach for Java. Assertion annotations are provided in special comments 
within the source of the class, and the supporting tool generates bytecode implementations 
containing run-time checks of these assertions. Other RAC tools for Java include iContract 
[58], jContractor [53] and the JML run-time assertion checker [27] which is discussed below. 
Excluding the JML run-time assertion checker, these RAC tools are relatively lightweight 
extensions of the Java language. They generally do not have a full range of specification 
constructs (such as frame conditions) to support static verification. 
ESC/Java 
The original ESC/Java tool [41] was developed by a team at DEC who also produced a tool 
for Modula-3 called ESC/Modula-3 [35]. The tools use a powerful fully automated theorem 
prover called Simplify [36]. ESC/Modula-3 and ESC/Java take as input programs written in 
the Modula-3 and Java languages, respectively, with a range of annotations included in 
special comments. The ESC/Java tool has been relatively well received by those that have 
used it in industrial case studies [62]. 
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The ESC/Java tool made an important contribution to the assertion-based software 
verification field. However, it was quite limited in a number of ways. For example, there was 
limited support for abstraction in the specifications and the frame conditions logic was 
primitive. These make it unsuitable for large scale systems. 
B 
B [2] is a mathematical language and set of associated tools supporting automated and 
interactive verification. B was developed by Jean-Raymond Abrial and aims to allow 
mathematically-minded people to develop verified software. B has a software development 
method associated with it, called the B method, which is built around specification refinement. 
B was used by the French transport industry to develop their safety critical control software.  
Other than using value semantics, the Omnibus language is a fairly conventional object-
oriented programming language. In contrast, the B language is fundamentally different from 
conventional object-oriented programming languages and requires different development 
methodologies. 
SPARK 
SPARK [9] is a language created by Praxis High Integrity Systems and supported by a range 
of formal verification and conventional analysis tools. The SPARK language is a subset of 
Ada, including only features deemed necessary for writing reliable software and permitting 
analysis and proof. Bounded space and time requirements are imposed by the language, 
prohibiting dynamic storage allocation, recursion and arrays with arbitrary bounds. 
As well as supporting assertion-based verification, SPARK provides comprehensive 
support for a generalisation of data flow analysis called information flow analysis. 
Information flow analysis incorporates the normal data flow analysis checks that variables are 
initialised before being read along with checks of how values are used to derive other values. 
The SPARK approach has been used since the early nineties and has been extensively used to 
develop systems for the military as well as in the aerospace, rail and security areas. It is 
particularly well-suited to the development of safety critical systems. 
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The restrictions that make SPARK so well-suited for the development of safety-critical 
systems limit its applicability to wider software development. For example, the concept of 
dynamic binding from object-oriented programming is not supported because it would greatly 
complicate the bounded memory usage assurances. 
PerfectDeveloper 
PerfectDeveloper [34] is a formal verification tool produced by Escher Technologies, built 
upon a new language called Perfect and using a fully-automated theorem prover. It aims to 
allow everyday programmers to perform full formal verification. The Perfect language is 
specifically designed with verification in mind. It uses value semantics by default to make 
verification more amenable to automation. Programmers write stylised specifications from 
which the tool attempts to generate code automatically. PerfectDeveloper uses an in-house 
fully automated theorem prover. The code generation and automated theorem proving 
problems are undecidable, in general, but heuristics can be used to help solve the problem for 
a wide range of cases. The PerfectDeveloper tool was itself implemented in Perfect (apart 
from the GUI) in a bootstrapping approach. This has provided a useful case study for the 
approach [33, 34]. 
The Perfect and Omnibus languages are quire similar. Both are object-oriented languages 
primarily built on value semantics. However, the modelling types within Perfect are built into 
the language and so are not as easily extensible as those in the Omnibus language. The 
PerfectDeveloper verification tool also aims to support fully automated FFV. We chose to 
support a range of verification approaches of different levels of rigour in order to cope with 
the undecidability of the problem. 
KeY 
KeY [3] is a formal verification tool that is being developed by the Universities of Karlsruhe 
and Koblenz and Chalmers University of Technology in Gothenburg. It is built upon a 
commercial Computer Aided Software Engineering (CASE) tool called the Together Control 
Center (TogetherCC) and targeted specifically at the commercial world. As its input, it 
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accepts UML designs with formal specifications given via UML’s Object Constraint 
Language (OCL) [98] and implementations in JavaCard [26], a subset of Java for developing 
smart card applications. The KeY tool now also accepts JML. Both interactive and fully 
automated theorem proving are supported through the KeY prover. The interactive theorem 
prover has a graphical front-end which can be used to visualise the proof process. Crucially, it 
retains an OCL/Java-style notation so that users can more easily understand the VCs that are 
presented to them. A number of case studies have been carried out using the KeY tool [3]. 
The approach has been applied to parts of the Java Collections Framework, used to develop 
realistic JavaCard applications and used to verify part of a German rail company’s control 
system. 
The KeY tool is built upon the assumption that the fully automated verification of 
commercial applications is an unachievable goal. To account for this, the tool attempts to 
provide an accessible interactive verification tool which includes a graphical proof tool and 
presents the VCs to be proved in the source language instead of some other formalism. These 
aspects could both be incorporated into Omnibus to make its interactive static verification 
approach more accessible. However, the KeY project does not address the other goals of 
Omnibus. 
Spec# 
Spec# [10] is a programming system under development by Microsoft which consists of the 
object-oriented Spec# programming language, the Spec# compiler and the Boogie static 
verifier. The Spec# language is a superset of C#, which is part of Microsoft’s .NET platform. 
The Spec# programming system supports both run-time assertion checking and static 
verification. A combination of dynamic and static checking is used to implement the 
verification process. Static verification is supported through the Boogie tool. Spec# is still in 
the relatively early stages of development and has not been applied extensively yet, but it 
holds great promise because of its backing by Microsoft and integration with the Visual 
Studio.NET IDE. 
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JML 
The Java Modelling Language (JML) [20, 59] is a Behavioural Interface Specification 
Language (BISL) which can be used to annotate Java source files. JML was first developed 
by Gary Leavens with colleagues and students at Iowa State University, but is now a free 
software project to which many groups are contributing. JML annotations are written within 
specially tagged comments. 
There is a wide range of tool support for the language including a type checker, a 
documentation generator [87], a run-time assertion checker [27], a unit testing framework, a 
range of formal verification tools [19, 49, 66, 72] and an extended static checker [30]. These 
tools have been used to apply JML to a number of problems, many involving JavaCard. One 
case study [51] investigated the application of a number of JML verification approaches to a 
realistic smart card applet from the company SchlumbergerSema. The tools allowed a number 
of previously unknown problems to be detected, and there was particular enthusiasm towards 
the ESC/Java2 tool which is discussed below. JML has also been used to verify vote-counting 
software. Due to tight time constraints, the team that undertook this project did not use any of 
the formal verification tools for JML, instead opting for a combination of run-time assertion 
checking and extended static checking. 
The JML language is different from the Omnibus language in that it is designed to be fully 
backward compatible with Java. All aspects of Java are retained, including those that are 
difficult to statically verify. The Omnibus language does not have to work within this hard 
requirement and so can explore other areas of the language design space. The different tools 
in the JML community together cover the range of different verification approaches that 
Omnibus does. However, they have typically been implemented separately and cannot easily 
be used together directly. 
Run-time assertion checking with JML using the JML compiler 
The JML compiler (jmlc) [27] accepts JML-annotated programs and compiles them to Java 
bytecode instrumented with run-time checks of the assertion annotations. This tool is one of 
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the leading run-time assertion checkers. It incorporates facilities normally seen in full formal 
verification tools but not run-time assertion checkers that are generally more lightweight. 
LOOP 
LOOP [49] is a full formal verification tool developed at the University of Nijmegen which 
translates JML-annotated Java code into theories for the semi-automatic PVS theorem prover 
[81]. This translation is built upon a formal semantics for sequential Java and JML. This gives 
LOOP the ability to reason about unannotated code like the KeY project. As a consequence of 
the use of a semi-automatic theorem prover, verification using LOOP requires skilled user 
assistance but allows more complicated properties to be handled than any fully automated 
theorem prover. 
JACK 
The JACK (Java Applet Correctness Kit) tool [19] has been developed at the research lab of 
Gemplus, a smart card manufacturer. It supports the Simplify and PVS theorem provers along 
with the Atelier B toolkit’s automated and semi-automated theorem provers. JACK aims to be 
usable by normal Java developers and attempts to hide the underlying mathematical concepts 
from the user. This is achieved by presenting VCs in Java/JML-like notation. JACK is 
available as a plug-in for the Eclipse IDE. 
Jive 
Jive [72] is a formal verification tool developed by the Universities of Hagen and 
Kaiserslauten. It can be used in conjunction with either of the interactive theorem provers, 
PVS and Isabelle/HOL. Jive originally used its own specification language but has been 
adapted to work with JML. Unlike most of the tools which automatically generate VCs, in 
Jive, Hoare rules are either applied manually or via strategies (Java programs that 
automatically apply several Hoare rules). The Jive tool incorporates a GUI which gives users 
full visual control over the verification process. 
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Krakatoa 
Krakatoa [66] is another formal verification tool for JML developed at Université Paris-Sud. 
It generates VCs through an external tool called WhY and then uses the Coq theorem prover 
(among others) to prove them. The input language for the WhY tool is an ML-like minimal 
language with very limited support for imperative features like references and exceptions. The 
translation process centres on a formalisation of the heap. 
Extended Static Checking with JML using ESC/Java2 
The ESC/Java tool used an assertion annotation language similar to JML, but simpler. Work 
on the tool halted when the Compaq SRC group was disbanded. The project was re-launched 
as an Open Source project by Joe Kiniry and David Cok under the name ESC/Java2 [30]. The 
new tool accepts the JML syntax and has been re-packaged in a more accessible form. The 
current state of this work is reported in the implementation notes distributed with the tool 
[31]. 
Functional Programming Languages 
Finally, we consider some functional programming languages which have support for formal 
verification. 
ACL2 
ACL2 (A Computational Logic for Applicative Common Lisp) [54] is a functional 
programming language, based on Common Lisp, incorporating support for formal 
verification. The associated tool support centres on an automated prover which was developed 
as a successor to the Boyer-Moore theorem prover. The logic of the prover is an extension of 
the standard first-order predicate calculus with equality to include recursive function 
definitions and the concept of mathematical induction. Users of the language can assist the 
proof process by supplying lemmas to guide the theorem prover in the proof of tricky 
conjectures. This is particularly important for the handling of inductive assertions. 
In being a pure functional programming language, ACL2 is built on value semantics, like 
Omnibus. However, there is no object-oriented support. The approach of supplying lemmas in 
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order to assist an automated prover can also be used in most other automated verification 
tools, including Omnibus. The support for recursive function definitions and mathematical 
induction is a key strength of ACL2 because it enables more sophisticated properties to be 
specified and verified than a pure first-order logic with equality. 
EML 
EML (Extended ML) [89] is a framework for the specification and formal development of 
SML (Standard ML) programs. The EML language is a generalisation of SML which allows 
unexecutable constructs, that are useful for writing specifications, to be used in addition to the 
executable constructs of SML. SML can then be thought of as an executable subset of EML. 
This arrangement allows abstract specifications to be defined using the unexecutable 
constructs. Implementations can be defined by using only executable constructs. As such, 
EML can be used to cover the full development process from specification to implementation. 
An abstract EML specification can be produced initially and then a system of refinement 
carried out until executable SML is obtained. Proof obligations can be generated to ensure 
that each refinement step is consistent with the level above. 
Unfortunately, there is limited tool support for EML consisting of just basic parsing and 
type checking. Crucially, no tool support integrated with a theorem prover is available. 
RAISE 
RAISE (Rigorous Approach to Industrial Software Engineering) [43] is an industry-focussed 
formal method which has run for over 20 years. It covers the whole development process, 
from specification, through design to implementation via a step-wise refinement paradigm. 
The project uses a language called RSL (RAISE Specification Language) which supports 
many different language styles including functional programming (e.g. Lisp-style) and 
imperative programming (e.g. Java-style). The process covers most activities associated with 
software development, including requirements capture, documentation, and project 
management. An integrated set of tools is provided to support the language and method. 
These include formal verification tool support but less formal justification approaches are also 
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supported, where rigorous arguments can be provided in place of a formal proof. A rigorous 
argument informally describes how a proof for a property could be constructed. 
The RSL language is large and allows the use of many different styles. However, it does 
not fully support object-oriented programming. There is no concept of dynamic binding and 
no support for the dynamic instantiation of objects within the language. The tool support also 
does not cover all aspects of the verification process. The formal conditions, needed to prove 
the refinement is valid, must be generated manually. However, the idea of informal proof 
justification could be incorporated into other projects, including Omnibus. 
Clean/SPARKLE 
Clean is a pure functional programming language which has verification support provided by 
the SPARKLE tool [106]. A key strength of the Clean language is the inclusion of the concept 
of uniqueness typing, which allows mutation and destructive updates to be used without 
violating value semantics. This technique works by ensuring that values which can be mutated 
are clearly identified and the aliasing of these values monitored closely. SPARKLE is an 
interactive theorem prover for Clean. It can be used to formally verify properties of Clean 
programs. It has a graphical proof tool with a sophisticated window-based user interface. 
Verification conditions are presented in a subset of the Clean language so are easily 
understandable to users. Some automation is possible through a system of proof tactics. 
The Clean language is a pure functional programming language and so quite far from the 
object-oriented Omnibus language. The SPARKLE proof tool is attractive and shares many of 
the strengths of KeY. 
1.4   Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. 
Chapters 2 to 4 are mainly concerned with the Omnibus language. Chapter 2 gives an 
overview of the language. Chapter 3 discusses some particular aspects of the language in 
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more detail including our frame condition logic, the implementation of value semantics and 
equality. Chapter 4 outlines some of the challenges of reference semantics. 
Chapters 5 to 7 are mainly focussed on the Omnibus integrated verification approach. 
Chapter 5 illustrates why it is desirable to use the approaches together and how this can be 
safely achieved through the use of verification policies. Chapter 6 discusses how the 
framework can allow software components to be reused safely. Chapter 7 describes how our 
integrated verification tool supports the different approaches. 
Chapter 8 presents a case study of the use of our language and verification approach. 
Chapter 9 presents our conclusions and discusses possible future directions for our work. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Overview of the Omnibus language 
This section presents an overview of the Omnibus language. Specific aspects are discussed 
further in Chapter 3. Full details of the syntax including an explanation of the style of EBNF 
used to describe the syntax in this chapter are given in appendix A. 
2.1   Fundamental concepts 
Omnibus is an object-oriented language designed to be amenable to formal analysis. It is 
superficially similar to Java, using similar concepts of packages, classes, methods, 
expressions, statements, accessibility levels, name-declaration binding, etc. but incorporates a 
behavioural interface specification language and uses value semantics for objects. 
An Omnibus project consists of a set of class definitions. Each class can contain 
declarations of attributes, a range of static and instance methods and test cases. Attributes 
allow the internal state of a class to be defined. There are three main types of method 
declaration: constructors, functions and operations. Constructors allow objects to be created, 
functions allow objects to be queried without side-effects, and operations allow objects to be 
updated. Static functions can be used to define methods which are not applied to any object. 
The declaration of a method starts with a keyword identifying the type of method. 
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Constructors and static functions are class methods whereas functions and operations are 
object methods. Test cases can also be defined within a class. These can be used to describe 
how object instances of the class should behave for specific concrete values. Omnibus 
supports public, protected, and private modifiers which change the accessibility 
level of language constructs in the same way that they do in Java. 
In Omnibus, all objects are immutable with the system. New objects are created behind-
the-scenes as needed to preserve value semantics. This is hidden from the programmers, who 
are allowed to think in terms of updating objects. There is a single equality operator which 
represents deep equality and has a default definition provided for every object. 
Method implementations can be defined using a Java-style implementation language 
containing an assignment statement, operation call statements, a declaration statement, an 
assert statement, an if statement, a for loop, a foreach loop and a while loop. These 
statements can be used to manipulate local variables and the attributes of the containing class. 
Loops can be annotated with loop invariant assertions. Omnibus is a block-structured 
language with static typing, like Java. 
Full details of these core elements of the Omnibus language are discussed in more detail in 
appendix A. 
2.2   Behaviour specifications 
The aspects of the Omnibus language discussed in appendix A are largely concerned with 
replicating support for facilities that are present in languages such as Java. In this section we 
discuss the support for the specification of the behaviour of methods using the Omnibus 
language. 
2.2.1   Principles of Omnibus behaviour specifications 
In Omnibus the behaviour of methods can be described using behaviour specifications which 
are constructed in the conventional style from requires, changes and ensures clauses 
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which give pre-conditions, frame conditions and post-conditions, respectively. There can be 
different levels of specifications for the different accessibility levels in an Omnibus class. In 
this section we consider specifications at a single level of accessibility and generalise the 
concept to multiple levels in section 2.2.3. 
In Omnibus, as in Java, the current state of an object instance of a class consists of the 
values of the attributes used to implement the class. We refer to this as the concrete state. The 
behaviour specifications of the methods in the class are described in terms of the attributes 
and other methods. Methods can be specified in terms of other methods, but this process must 
stop somewhere with some methods not specified in terms of other methods. The attributes 
provide such a means of halting this recursive definition process because they themselves are 
not defined in terms of any other elements. Some methods can be defined in terms of the 
attributes, then other methods can be defined in terms of them. However, it is good practice 
for the attributes that are used to implement a class to be declared as private or protected to 
hide the details of the implementation from users of the class. In such cases, the public 
behaviour specifications cannot refer to these attributes because they are not publicly 
accessible. So we again have the problem that some methods must not be specified in terms of 
other methods but can no longer define these methods in terms of the attributes. What is done 
instead is that some of the functions in the class can be declared with the special model 
modifier and are not described in terms of the other methods, i.e. they must not have post-
conditions. Functions declared with the model modifier are referred to as model functions. 
Just as the attributes that are used to implement a class together form a representation of the 
concrete state of the class, the attributes and model functions that are visible at a particular 
level are said to represent the abstract state of the class. The behaviour of the other methods 
(the remaining functions along with the constructors and operations) is then defined at that 
level in terms of them. 
This is the same technique as used by Eiffel. In Eiffel the functions that are part of the 
abstract state are called base functions but are not specifically declared with a separate 
modifier. 
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2.2.2   Notes on the specifications of class body elements 
In this section we discuss some points about the specifications of different class body 
elements. 
The attributes of an Omnibus class are an implementation detail and should ideally play no 
part in the specification of a class. There is currently no support for specification-only 
attributes within Omnibus. In other words, it is not possible to express that an attribute should 
be part of a public abstract state of the class but not its private concrete state. Public model 
functions can be coupled with private attributes for that purpose. 
Functions can be divided into three categories: static functions, model functions and 
derived functions. The behaviour of static functions is specified via an ensures clause (and 
a requires clause, if required). The behaviour specification of a model function may 
include a requires clause if appropriate but not an ensures clause. Instead, the 
behaviour specifications for the constructors and operations of the class will describe how the 
values of the model functions change over the lifetime of an object. Invariants (which will be 
discussed in section 2.3) can be used to express properties of the results of model functions 
that would usually be given in an ensures clause. Derived functions are declared without 
the static or model modifiers. Their behaviour must be specified in terms of the attributes 
and functions via an ensures clause (and a requires clause, if required).  
Constructors are used to create instances of classes. The resulting object should be 
described in terms of the value of the model functions and attributes via an ensures clause. 
A constructor should not be specified with a changes clause since the values of all fields 
and model functions are undefined before the constructor executes, so all components of the 
state must be changed by the constructor. This is taken as implicit. 
When specifying operations, the changes clause should be used to describe which 
attributes and model functions have their values changed. An ensures clause must be used 
to describe how they are changed. 
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2.2.3   Levels of specification 
As is conventional within object-oriented languages that are used for verification, Omnibus 
requires that, where inheritance is used, the principle of substitutability [63] is respected. This 
principle states that any property which is provable about objects x of type T must be true for 
objects y of type S where S is a subtype of T [64]. This is essential in order to ensure that the 
principle of polymorphism from object-oriented programming, the ability to treat instances of 
a class S as if they were instances of a superclass T, does not introduce the possibility of 
errors. We will consider the details of how this is checked in section 2.3.2, but the basic 
principle is to check that the behaviour specification of each of the overridden methods is 
consistent with the corresponding method specification in the superclass. 
It can also be desirable to have different specifications for a method within a single class 
for different accessibility levels. For example, we may want a particular method to be a model 
function at the public level and used as part of the abstract state, but then redefine that 
function in terms of private concrete fields at the private level. 
The principles involved in providing different specifications for a method at different 
accessibility levels are the same as those for overriding a method from a superclass. In both 
cases, the specification at the lower level (i.e. the lower accessibility level or the subclass) 
must be consistent with the specification at the higher level (i.e. the higher accessibility level 
or the superclass). Both cases also need facilities for handling inheritance of portions of 
specifications and to ensure that requirements from higher levels of the hierarchy are 
respected. This has led us to unify the two concepts. 
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Consider the following inheritance hierarchy where Rectangle isa Shape and 
Square isa Rectangle. 
 
The following diagram shows the Shape hierarchy with the different levels of the 
specification for each class shown. The key point is that all directed arrows are treated 
equivalently regardless of whether they are concerned with inheritance between classes or the 
different levels of specification within a single class. 
 
To describe how these relationships are handled, we can abstract away from the type of the 
relationship. All we need to know is that there are two levels of specification in the hierarchy, 
connected by an arrow. 
public 
Shape 
protected 
Shape 
private 
Shape 
public 
Rectangle 
protected 
Rectangle 
private 
Rectangle 
public 
Square 
protected 
Square 
private 
Square 
Shape 
Rectangle 
Square 
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Such a relationship is then interpreted as follows: 
1. Instances of B are acceptable wherever an instance of A is expected. This makes 
logical sense since this is part of the definition of inheritance. Similarly, if you have a 
private level view of an object then you can also interact with it through the public 
interface. 
2. Instances of A may or may not also be instances of B but, if they are, then they can be 
cast so that their static types are B. Just as if you have a Shape it may or may not be 
castable to a Rectangle (it could be a Circle, not a Rectangle or Square), if 
you have a public Rectangle it may or may not be castable to a private 
Rectangle (it could be a Square, not a private Rectangle). 
3. All the requirements (i.e. invariants, constraints and initiallys discussed in section 
2.3.1) of A are inherited by B. Again, this makes sense for both inheritance and 
moving between views of an object. In both cases the invariants that were assumed to 
be true in proofs at higher levels must also be true at the current level. 
4. Methods are either introduced, inherited or overridden. 
a. Introduced methods: A method is introduced if it is defined in B and it is not 
defined in A (either in A itself or inherited from a level somewhere above A). 
Constructors are always introduced methods: they cannot be inherited or 
overridden. Constructors must be shown to establish all the invariants and 
initiallys, either defined locally in B or inherited from A. Introduced operations 
must be shown to maintain the truth of all the local and inherited invariants, and to 
satisfy all the local and inherited constraints. These laws are discussed in section 
2.3.2.  
b. Overridden methods: A method is overridden if it is defined in both B and A (either 
in A itself or inherited from a level somewhere above A). The specification of the 
A B
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method in B must be compatible with the specification of the method in A. 
Specifically, the pre-condition can be maintained or weakened, but not 
strengthened and the post-condition can be maintained or strengthened but not 
weakened. Overridden operations must be shown to maintain the truth of all the 
local and inherited invariants, and to satisfy all the local and inherited constraints. 
These laws are discussed in section 2.3.2. 
c. Inherited methods: A method is inherited if it is defined in A (again, either in A 
itself or inherited from a level above A) and not redefined in B. Through the 
verification of A, the inherited operation can be assumed to satisfy the invariants 
and constraints of A. We need only show that it also satisfies the invariants and 
constraints defined locally in B. These laws are discussed in section 2.3.2. 
The situation becomes more complicated when B extends or redefines the abstract 
state of A, but these complications are the same for both forms that the relationship 
can take. 
2.2.4   Light and full behaviour specifications 
There are two syntaxes for behaviour specification supported by Omnibus. These are referred 
to here as light behaviour specification and full behaviour specification. Light behaviour 
specifications provide a single behaviour specification for a method at a single accessibility 
level, while full behaviour specifications allow multiple behaviour specifications to be 
provided for different accessibility levels. JML has similar concepts and refers to them as 
lightweight and heavyweight specifications, but we use the terms lightweight and 
heavyweight specifications to refer to expressiveness of the specifications. 
Lightweight specifications are useful for simple examples where the behaviour of the 
public derived methods in a class will be described in terms of public model functions. 
However, in more complicated examples involving inheritance, a class may have a high-level 
public behaviour definition for clients purely in terms of model functions, a medium-level 
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protected definition exposing some concrete attributes to subclasses, and a low-level 
implementation entirely in terms of the concrete attributes. Thus, it may be desirable to define 
some functions as model functions at one accessibility level and derived functions at another. 
Full behaviour specifications make this possible. Light behaviour specifications are de-
sugared, by the verification tool, to full behaviour specifications with a single behaviour level 
with the same accessibility as the method itself. This is a model if and only if the method 
itself was declared with the model modifier. 
For example, the following is an example of light behaviour specifications for the public 
level of methods from a Map class: 
public model function contains(k:Key):boolean 
   
public model function value(k:Key):Value 
 requires contains(k) 
For convenience, the requires, changes and ensures clauses are written 
immediately after the method header and provide a specification for the accessibility level 
which the method is declared with. 
The light behaviour specification of the contains method is translated by the 
verification tool into a full behaviour specification with a single public behaviour 
specification containing the model modifier and no requires, changes or ensures 
clause. The light behaviour specification of the value function is translated into a 
specification with a single public behaviour specification containing the model modifier and 
the specified requires clause. 
If we were to produce an implementation of this class, we would be required to give a 
private specification for the public model functions. This would require the use of full 
behaviour specifications such as the following: 
public model function contains(k:Key):boolean 
 private ensures result = (exists (p:Pair[Key,Value]  
                  where col.contains(p)): 
                            p.first() = k) 
   
public model function value(k:Key):Value 
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 public requires contains(k) 
 private requires contains(k) 
           ensures exists (p:Pair[Key,Value] 
                  where col.contains(p)): 
                    p.first() = k && result = p.second() 
Here public and private behaviour specifications are provided for the methods. These are 
identified by placing the appropriate accessibility modifier before the requires, changes 
and ensures clauses. 
There is also a certain amount of de-sugaring involved when using full behaviour 
specifications. If the method is declared with the model modifier then the behaviour 
specification with the same accessibility as the method is set to be a model. If there is no 
specification with the same accessibility as the method then one is created with no 
requires, changes or ensures clause. 
In its second definition, the contains function is declared with the model modifier so 
the specification with the same accessibility as the method itself is changed to be model. 
There is no public behaviour specification given so one is created. In the value function, 
there is already a public behaviour so the model modifier is simply added to it. 
2.2.5   Calculation of pre- and post-conditions 
The requires and ensures clauses are used to give the pre- and post-conditions of a 
method. These clauses consist of a comma-separated list of optionally labelled assertions. 
These assertions are then conjoined (i.e. logically ANDed). The changes clause is used to 
provide a frame condition and can only be used in behaviour specifications for operations. 
Frame conditions define a bound on what a method can change. These should contain a 
comma-separated list of model function names, attribute names and model functions applied 
to some concrete parameters. The changes clause should be used to say what an operation 
can change, and the ensures clause should describe how those things are changed. 
Together, they give a complete description of the manipulation of an object. Further details of 
the calculation of the frame condition from changes clauses are given in the next section. 
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2.2.6   Calculation of frame conditions 
The Omnibus verification tool translates changes clauses into a nochange predicate over 
the initial and final states of the object to which the operation is being applied. This predicate 
expresses that all elements of the state that are not mentioned in the changes clause do not 
change. Elements in the changes list are either model function names, attribute names or 
model functions applied to some concrete parameters. The calculation of the nochange 
predicate is carried out by considering each of the model functions and attributes in the class 
and checking whether it is in the changes list. 
The nochange predicate is initialised to the boolean literal true and then the algorithm 
proceeds by conjoining assertions to this value. 
For each attribute 
 attribute att:type 
If att appears in the changes list, no changes are made to the nochange predicate. 
If att does not appear in the changes list, the following assertion is conjoined to the 
nochange predicate: 
 this.att = old this.att 
For each model function 
 model function func(params):type 
  requires func_pre 
  ensures func_post 
where func is the name of the function, params is the list of formal parameters and 
func_pre and func_post are the requires and ensures assertions which are 
translated into special boolean-returning methods of the class during the static verification 
process. 
If func appears in the changes list without any parameters, no changes are made to the 
nochange predicate. 
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If func does not appear in the changes list, the following assertion is conjoined to the 
nochange predicate: 
 forall (params): 
  old this.func_pre(params) 
  && this.func_pre(params) 
 ==> 
  old this.func(params) = this.func(params) 
This expresses that for all parameters that satisfy the pre-conditions of the function for the 
old and new objects, the corresponding values returned by the function are equal. The syntax 
used is that of the Omnibus language and is described in appendix A. 
If func appears in the changes list as func(actparams), the following assertion is 
conjoined to the nochange predicate: 
 forall (params): 
  params != actparams 
  && old this.func_pre(params) 
  && this.func_pre(params) 
 ==> 
  old this.func(params) = this.func(params) 
This expresses that for all parameters, other than those specified, that satisfy the pre-
conditions of the function for the old and new objects, the corresponding values returned by 
the function are equal. Note that the assertion params != actparams corresponds to a 
number of not equals assertions for each of the formal parameter/actual parameter pairs. 
We now define the post-condition of the operation by conjoining the values of the 
ensures clause with the nochange predicate. 
2.2.7   Example of calculation of pre- and post-conditions 
The following example presents part of a heavyweight specification for a simple Omnibus 
class for modelling a sequence of elements. This is achieved through the definition of a 
Sequence class with an Element template parameter. One of the model functions in this 
specification, elementAt, has a parameter and is defined for values of that parameter 
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between 0 and one less than the size of the Sequence. The example helps illustrate our 
handling of the changes clause in more detail. 
spec class Sequence[Element] { 
 model function size():integer 
 model function elementAt(i:integer):Element 
  requires i >= 0 && i < size() 
 function isEmpty():boolean 
  returns size() = 0 
 constructor empty() 
  ensures size() = 0 
 operation add(e:Element) 
  changes size 
  ensures size() = old size() + 1,  
    elementAt(size()-1) = e 
 operation set(i:integer, e:Element) 
  requires i >= 0 && i < size() 
  changes elementAt(i) 
  ensures elementAt(i) = e 
 operation addAt(i:integer, e:Element) 
  requires i >= 0 && i < size() + 1 
  changes size, elementAt 
  ensures size() = old size() + 1, 
   forall (j:integer := 0 to i – 1): 
    elementAt(j) = old elementAt(j), 
   elementAt(i) = e, 
   forall (j:integer := i+1 to size()-1): 
    elementAt(j) = old elementAt(j-1) 
} 
The values of the pre- and post-conditions of these methods are a follows: 
The pre- and post-conditions of the size, elementAt, isEmpty and empty methods 
are relatively straightforward since they do not involve any changes clauses. 
function size():integer 
pre-condition  := true 
post-condition  := true 
 
function elementAt(i:integer):Element 
pre-condition  := i >= 0 && i < size() 
post-condition  := true 
 
function isEmpty():boolean 
pre-condition := true 
post-condition := result = (size() = 0) 
 
constructor empty() 
pre-condition  := true 
post-condition  := size() = 0 
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The specification of the add operation is a bit more complicated. The changes clause 
includes the size model function without any parameters and so, as laid out in the previous 
section, no reference is made to this in the generated frame condition. The elementAt 
model function is not referred to in the changes clause and so the frame condition defines 
that, for all parameters values which satisfy the pre-condition of the function, it should remain 
unchanged. The ensures clause describes that the size increases by one and so the value 
size()-1 satisfies the pre-condition of elementAt after the operation whereas it did not 
before the operation (there was no old elementAt(size()-1), i.e. no old 
elementAt(old size())). 
operation add(e:Element) 
pre-condition := true 
post-condition := 
size() = old size() + 1 
&& elementAt(size()-1) = e 
&& (forall (j:integer): 
 old this.elementAt_pre(j) 
 && this.elementAt_pre(j) 
==> 
 old this.elementAt(j) = this.elementAt(j) 
) 
In the specification of the set operation, the changes clause describes that the 
elementAt model function is changed for the value i. This leads to the generation of a 
frame condition that the size function is not changed and that the value of the elementAt 
model function is unchanged for all values which are not equal to i, and do not satisfy the 
pre-condition of elementAt before and after the operation. 
operation set(i:integer, e:Element) 
pre-condition := i >= 0 && i < size() 
post-condition := 
elementAt(i) = e 
&& size() = old size() 
&& (forall (j:integer): 
 i != j 
 && old this.elementAt_pre(j) 
 && this.elementAt_pre(j) 
==> 
 old this.elementAt(j) = this.elementAt(j) 
) 
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In the addAt operation, the parameter values for which the elementAt function is 
changed cannot be enumerated and so the function is listed without parameters along with the 
size function. This means no frame condition is added. 
operation addAt(i:integer, e:Element) 
pre-condition := i >= 0 && i < size() + 1 
post-condition := 
size() = old size() + 1, 
&& (forall (j:integer := 0 to i – 1): 
 elementAt(j) = old elementAt(j) 
) && elementAt(i) = e 
&& (forall (j:integer := i+1 to size()-1): 
 elementAt(j) = old elementAt(j-1) 
) 
2.3   Requirements specifications and their verification 
In this section we explain the use of requirements and then present the laws for their 
verification using FFV. For RAC and ESC, checks of the requirements are embedded within 
the bodies of the methods and so are verified using an extension of the techniques used for 
implementations which are described in appendices D and E. 
2.3.1   Requirements specifications 
In the preceding sections we have considered the mechanisms provided within the Omnibus 
language for the specification of the intended behaviour of methods using requires, 
changes and ensures clauses. These specifications are used to give a basis for the 
checking of implementations. However, behaviour specifications can be difficult to write and 
prone to errors themselves. The standard approach to this problem is to provide a higher level 
of specification construct for providing assertions that should hold over groups of methods. 
This simply provides another level of redundancy which can be checked against. The term we 
use to refer to these higher level specifications are requirements specifications. 
Three types of requirements are supported by Omnibus: invariants, constraints and 
initiallys. These should be declared within the body of a class, alongside the methods and 
attributes. All requirements can be declared with an accessibility modifier. 
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Requirements specifications like invariants, constraints and initiallys are used in most 
assertion-based languages like Eiffel and JML. Our use of requirements specifications to 
verify properties of behaviour specifications is based on Aslan [8]. In contrast, JML does not 
require that the behaviour specifications themselves satisfy the requirements specifications. 
Instead, for all verification approaches with JML, the requirements are checked as part of the 
verification of the implementations. The advantage of this is that there is a single 
interpretation of requirements specifications for all the approaches. However, we will see in 
the chapter 8 that our approach can uncover further errors. It also allows properties of the 
behaviour specifications to be verified before an implementation is produced. 
Invariants 
Invariants are assertions that should hold over an object at all times. More correctly, 
invariants should hold over the internal state of an object at all times when it is externally 
accessible. An object is externally accessible after it is created via a constructor call and after 
each operation call. The reason we use this looser definition is that we allow an invariant to be 
temporarily invalidated during the execution of a constructor or operation. However, the 
invariants must also hold when one local method calls another local method which has the 
invariants as part of its pre-condition, as discussed in section 3.1. All the constructors of a 
class should establish the truth of the invariants, and all the operations should maintain their 
truth.  
Constraints 
Constraints are assertions that should hold over any two consecutive, externally accessible 
states of an object. They can refer to methods and attributes in the earlier of the consecutive 
states using the old keyword and to those in the later by omitting this prefix. The only 
method which the constraint is concerned with is the operation since it is the only method that 
can update the value of an object. 
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Initiallys 
Initiallys should hold over freshly constructed objects where a freshly constructed object is an 
object which has been created by a constructor but has not yet been updated via an operation. 
As such, all constructors should establish the truth of these assertions. 
2.3.2   Laws 
In the previous section we introduced Omnibus requirements. In this section, we present a set 
of basic rules for checking that the methods of a class satisfy these requirements. We start by 
presenting the basic laws for specifications at a specific level in a class and then discuss how 
the laws can be extended to handle inheritance and specifications at different accessibility 
levels. These laws are based upon those used in the Aslan [8] system. 
Basic laws 
Informally, initiallys should be satisfied by the constructors, invariants should be established 
by constructors and maintained by operations, and constraints should hold across operations. 
For convenience, let us assume that the symbols init, inv and con contain the 
conjunctions of all the initiallys, invariants and constraints, respectively, of the class being 
considered. In our tool implementation, these are checked separately so that more specific 
error messages can be generated, but that is not relevant from a logic point of view. 
To further simplify the presentation of the following rules, let us also require that a de-
sugaring algorithm is applied to all assertions as a preliminary stage. This de-sugaring 
algorithm consists of two steps: the implicit ‘this.’ is added to local methods and attributes, 
and assertions of the form ‘old this.member...’ are then translated to 
‘old_this.member...’. We can then model Omnibus operations as mathematical 
functions from an old_this object and some parameters to a this object, Omnibus 
functions as mathematical functions from a this object and some parameters to a result 
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and Omnibus constructors as mathematical functions from some parameters to a this object. 
We can express the pre- and post-conditions as predicates over these parameters and objects. 
Now, consider the generalised description of a constructor given below 
constructor con(params) 
 requires pre 
 ensures post 
The constructor is described using a pre-condition given in the requires clause and a 
post-condition given in the ensures clause. We should then check that it establishes the 
initiallys and invariants of the class. We can express this as follows: 
Constructor invariant establishment and initially satisfaction 
law: 
forall (params, this): 
 pre(params) && post(params, this) 
==> 
 init(this) && inv(this) 
This states that if the pre-condition holds over the parameters of the constructor, and the 
post-condition holds over the parameters and the created object, then the initiallys and 
invariants hold over that object. The params word is italicised to remind the reader that it 
should be replaced by the zero or more parameters of the constructor. 
Now, consider the generalised description of an operation: 
operation op(params) 
 requires pre 
 changes chgs 
 ensures ens 
The pre-condition is given by the requires clause. The post-condition is given by the 
changes and ensures clauses, with the changes clause describing what aspects of the 
state change and the ensures clause describing these changes. 
We now define the post-condition of the operation by conjoining the values of the 
ensures clause, ens, with the nochange predicate: 
post(old_this, params, this) := 
                ens(old_this, params, this) 
                && nochange(old_this, this) 
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These pre- and post-conditions should maintain the invariant and satisfy the constraints of 
the class. We can express this as follows: 
Operation invariant maintenance and constraint satisfaction 
law: 
forall (old_this, params, this): 
 inv(old_this) && pre(old_this, params) 
 && post(old_this, params, this) 
==> 
 inv(this) && con(old_this, this) 
This states that if the invariant holds over the initial object, the pre-condition holds over 
that object and the parameters, and the post-condition holds over the initial object, the 
parameters and the resulting object, then the invariants hold over the resulting object and the 
constraint holds over the two objects. 
Inheritance laws 
Omnibus allows classes to be declared as subclasses of other classes using the isa clause. 
Such classes can then inherit or override the members of the superclass, and instances of these 
classes can be used whenever an instance of the superclass is expected. Similar checks are 
required for consistency between different levels of specification within a single class. For 
convenience, in the rest of the section we focus on inheritance, but the same laws apply for 
different levels of specification in a single class. 
To ensure that we can safely use the specification of a class in place of the specification of 
its subclass, we must make sure that the two class definitions are compatible. We must ensure 
two things: that the requirements of the superclass hold over the class, and that methods 
which override a superclass method are compatible with the method they override. 
Requirements (i.e. the invariants, constraints and initiallys) give a high-level definition of 
some essential characteristics of a class. If a class is going to be usable in place of its 
superclass then the requirements of the superclass should hold over the class. Of course, the 
requirements introduced in the subclass should also hold over the methods inherited from the 
superclass. 
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We have already seen that methods which override a method from the superclass should 
have a specification which is consistent with the specification of the method they override. 
More specifically, their requires clause should not be more restrictive than the one in the 
superclass. If it were, when the specification from the superclass is used in place of the 
specification from the subclass, values would be accepted that violated the requires clause 
of the subclass specification. Conversely, the changes and ensures clauses of the 
specification of the method in the subclass should imply the changes and ensures clauses 
of the overridden method. If this were not the case, then when using the specification from the 
superclass, the system would conclude consequences of calling the method which were not 
valid. 
For convenience, let us introduce three symbols super_init, super_inv and 
super_con to represent the conjunctions of all the initiallys, invariants and constraints, 
respectively, from all the superclasses of the class being considered. 
Let us now consider the checks we need to make to ensure these properties. Firstly, 
constructors should establish the invariants and initiallys from the superclass (and all of its 
superclasses) as well as the local ones. 
New Constructor invariant establishment and initially 
satisfaction law: 
forall (params, this): 
 pre(params) && post(params, this) 
==> 
 init(this) && inv(this) 
 && super_init(this) && super_inv(this) 
We will now consider operations. There are three types of operations: introduced 
operations, inherited operations and overridden operations. Introduced operations are 
operations for which there is no definition in the superclass. Before we added inheritance, all 
operations were introduced operations. In the presence of inheritance, introduced operations 
should satisfy the invariants and constraints of the superclasses as well as the local ones. 
Introduced Operation invariant maintenance and constraint 
satisfaction law: 
forall (old_this, params, this): 
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 inv(old_this) && super_inv(old_this) 
 && pre(old_this, params) && post(old_this, params, this) 
==> 
 inv(this) && con(old_this, this)  
 && super_inv(this) && super_con(old_this, this) 
Note that we can also assume the superclass invariants hold over the starting object. 
Inherited operations are operations which are defined in the superclass but have no 
corresponding definition given in the subclass. These operations are implicitly inherited by 
the subclass and can be used as if they were identically redefined in the subclass. The 
invariants and constraints of the subclass and superclass should hold over all operations, 
including the inherited ones. However, the verification of the superclass has already ensured 
that the operation satisfies the invariants and constraints of the super classes. We need only 
check that it also satisfies the local invariants and constraints. 
Inherited Operation invariant maintenance and constraint 
satisfaction law: 
forall (old_this, params, this): 
 inv(old_this) && super_inv(old_this) 
 && pre(old_this, params) && post(old_this, params, this) 
==> 
 inv(this) && con(old_this, this)  
Overridden operations are operations which are defined in both the subclass and 
superclass. In that case, the method in the subclass is said to override the method in the 
superclass and when instances of the subclass are used in place of the superclass, the method 
definition in the subclass will be the one that is actually invoked. Once again, we must ensure 
that the invariants and constraints of the sub- and super classes hold over the operation. This 
time, we must also ensure that the specification of the method in the subclass is compatible 
with the specification in the superclass. Firstly, any values that satisfy the pre-condition in the 
super class method should satisfy the pre-condition in the subclass. 
Overridden operation application law: 
forall (this, params): 
 super_pre(this, params) && inv(this) && super_inv(this) 
==> 
 pre(this, params)  
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Secondly, any values that satisfy the post-condition of the local method should satisfy the 
post-condition of the superclass. We also need to ensure that the method in the subclass 
satisfies the requirements of the subclass and superclass. However, the verification of the 
superclass will already have ensured that the specification of the superclass method satisfies 
the requirements of the superclass. Since we have already proved the new specification 
implies the overridden one, we need only check the local invariants and constraints. 
Overridden operation refinement, invariant maintenance and 
constraint satisfaction law: 
forall (old_this, params, this): 
 super_pre(old_this, params) && inv(old_this) 
 && super_inv(old_this) && post(old_this, params, this) 
==> 
 super_post(old_this, params, this) 
 && inv(this) && con(this) 
We also need to check that functions in the subclass that override functions in the 
superclass are compatible. Again, the values that satisfy the pre-condition of the method in the 
superclass should satisfy the pre-condition in the subclass, and values that satisfy the post-
condition in the subclass should satisfy the post-condition in the superclass. 
Overridden function application law: 
forall (this, params): 
 super_pre(this, params) && inv(this) && super_inv(this) 
==> 
 pre(this, params)  
 
Overridden function refinement law: 
forall (this, params, result): 
 super_pre(this, params) && inv(this) && super_inv(this) 
 && post(this, params, result) 
==> 
 super_post(this, params, result) 
The laws we presented in this section are a generalisation of the basic laws that were 
introduced in the previous section. We can derive the basic laws from them, by using the fact 
that every class which does not explicitly specify a superclass implicitly has the 
omni.lang.Object superclass, which contains no requirements and no methods or 
attributes. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Design issues for the Omnibus 
language 
There are a number of interesting problems that were encountered during the development of 
the Omnibus language. Firstly, the use of functions instead of fields in specifications 
presented some challenges. These resulted from the fact that functions can have pre-
conditions while classically fields do not. Secondly, we had to develop techniques to 
implement value semantics for our object-oriented language. This was not trivial because 
value semantics can be naturally modelled through the storing of object values but the 
dynamic binding concept from object-oriented programming requires the use of references to 
access objects. Finally, we had to provide support for the concept of equality. This is 
particularly important for a language such as ours which is based on value semantics because 
there is no primitive definition such as equality of references which we can fall back on. We 
discuss these issues in this chapter. 
3.1   Using functions instead of fields for specifications 
In section 1.3.1 we considered conventional specification approaches where specifications are 
either defined in terms of the methods in the interface without frame conditions (the Eiffel 
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base function approach), defined in terms of abstract fields with the base level defined in 
some other manner, or a hybrid approach where the lowest level specifications are defined in 
terms of the methods in the interfaces and higher levels are defined using fields. For the 
reasons set out in section 1.2.1, the Omnibus approach is built around specifications defined 
in terms of the methods in the interface, with support for frame conditions. 
Defining specifications in terms of fields and defining specifications in terms of methods 
are obviously not entirely unrelated. For example, we can formally model fields using 
methods without side-effects. We used methods as the main mechanism for expressing 
Omnibus specifications so that we could use them to express modelling types. However, 
when using methods instead of fields to represent the abstract state of a class, a number of 
new problems are encountered. 
Fields are nice for formal modelling. We do not need to consider pre-conditions: we can 
retrieve their value at anytime, regardless of whether an object is in a valid state or not (i.e. 
whether its invariants are currently satisfied). This is not so for methods. Methods may be 
specified with pre-conditions which must be taken into consideration. We cannot simply 
ignore these pre-conditions and formally model the methods as underspecified total functions 
(i.e. allow calls that do not satisfy the pre-conditions but do not specify what the return values 
will be in those cases). To check an assertion defined in terms of a method call using run-time 
assertion checking, we must execute the body of the method; an assertion violation or run-
time error may result if the pre-condition is not satisfied. 
3.1.1   Checking method pre-conditions in specifications 
It is important when supporting run-time assertion checking and static verification that the 
semantics of these two forms of checking assertions are consistent. However, as Chalin has 
discussed [22] within the JML project, the interpretation of method calls within specifications 
differs for run-time assertion checking and static verification. For run-time assertion 
checking, it is natural to define checks of the pre-conditions of methods in code at the start 
within the method implementation. Without any specialised additional support, this would 
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mean that the pre-conditions of the methods are checked whenever they are called, whether it 
is from expressions within assertions or from expressions within the normal program 
execution. Such a consistent interpretation of method calls is quite elegant: wherever a 
method call occurs, be it in an assertion annotation or normal piece of program code, its pre-
condition should be respected. 
However, the JML static verification tools have favoured an approach of formally 
modelling pure methods (i.e. those without side-effects that can be used in specifications) as 
underspecified total functions. This means that the pre-conditions of method calls appearing 
in assertion annotations do not have to be satisfied, although the post-condition of the method 
can only be used if it is. 
Within our system where run-time assertion checking and static verification are used in an 
integrated fashion, it is not acceptable to have different semantics for method calls in static 
and dynamic verification. It would be difficult to adopt the underspecification approach for 
run-time assertion checking. We could turn off pre-condition checks for method calls made 
from within assertions, but then the execution of the body of the method may result in an 
assertion failure or a run-time error. This is because the verification of the absence of 
assertion failures and run-time errors from the method body is dependent on the initial truth of 
the pre-condition. We would have to introduce additional apparatus to cope with this, perhaps 
introducing additional special return values for exceptional executions. 
It is far easier and more consistent to adopt the standpoint that the pre-conditions of all 
methods, whether in assertions or general expressions, should be shown to hold whenever a 
method is called. We can verify this through the generation of side-conditions. 
3.1.2   Model functions with pre-conditions in changes clauses 
In the previous section we discussed the challenge that method pre-conditions pose for the use 
of method calls in specifications. Method pre-conditions also cause problems for the 
interpretation of changes clauses. 
CHAPTER 3 DESIGN ISSUES FOR THE OMNIBUS LANGUAGE 
 54 
Ignoring the complexities of inheritance for a moment, frame conditions involving fields 
are relatively straightforward to handle. If only fields are used to model the abstract state of a 
class then the fields whose values are changed by a method should be listed in the frame 
condition and those that are not changed should be omitted. The final post-condition of the 
method is the conjunction of the user-provided post-condition and the calculated frame 
condition. We can simply add assertions that the values of each field that is not mentioned in 
the frame condition are the same before and after the method. 
Where methods are used to model the abstract state of a class, the frame condition should 
make reference to these methods and this can complicate matters. To illustrate the problems, 
consider the following Stack example: 
class Stack[Element] { 
 model function size():integer 
 spec model function elementAt(i:integer):Element 
  requires i >= 0 && i <= size()-1 
 ... 
} 
Here we have a portion of the specification of a Stack class. We present only the two 
methods that are used to model the abstract state of the class: size and elementAt. The 
size method returns an integer representing the number of elements currently being held by 
the Stack. The elementAt method accepts an integer parameter between 0 and one less 
than the size of the Stack, and returns the element at the corresponding position. A pre-
condition is used to formalise that the elementAt function is only defined for some index 
values. 
First consider the specification of an empty constructor: 
constructor empty() 
 ensures size() = 0 
Frame conditions are not used in conjunction with constructors since there is no previous 
state. In the ensures clause we should specify the values given to each of the constructs in 
the abstract state, here the elementAt and size model functions. We state that the size 
is set to zero but do not explicitly refer to the elementAt function. This is because the pre-
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condition of the elementAt function restricts the valid parameters of elementAt to be 
between 0 and the size()-1. No parameters satisfy this and so elementAt contains no 
values. This shows how the domain of model functions can be affected by changes to other 
model functions. 
Now let us consider the specification of a push operation without a frame condition: 
operation push(e:Element) 
 ensures size() = old size() + 1, elementAt(size()-1) = e 
The push operation increases the size by one and assigns the passed value to the last 
position in the elementAt model function. When designing the Omnibus language, we 
were faced with the question of what should the frame condition of such an operation be. 
Clearly size should be included in the frame condition, but what about elementAt? By 
increasing the size by one, an additional parameter value is accessible for elementAt. 
Does this alteration of the acceptable parameters for the method constitute a “change” and so 
should elementAt be listed in the changes clause? 
A similar problem arises for the pop operation which is shown without frame condition 
below: 
operation pop() 
 requires size() > 0 
 ensures size() = old size() – 1 
Here the size is decreased by one, reducing the valid indices of the elementAt function 
by one. Should elementAt be listed in the changes clause because its domain has 
changed? Or should it not be, because the values at the valid indices have not changed? 
The Omnibus approach that was outlined in the chapter 2 is that methods must be listed in 
the changes clause if any of the indices which are valid before and after the method are 
changed. These are really the only values for which it makes any sense to have a frame 
condition because they are the only values to have both old and new values. All other values 
are excluded from the calculated frame condition. This approach is consistent with the 
decision to omit changes clauses from constructor specifications. It does, however, appear 
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to be a source of some confusion for users. Using the Omnibus approach the specifications of 
push and pop with frame conditions would be as follows: 
operation push(e:Element) 
 changes size 
 ensures size() = old size() + 1, elementAt(size()-1) = e 
 
operation pop() 
 requires size() > 0 
 changes size 
 ensures size() = old size() – 1 
We found that some users were confused by the absence of any reference to the 
elementAt function in the changes clause. Values of that function are changed: in the 
push operation the newly accessible last value is assigned to the passed e value and in the 
pop operation the previous last value is no longer accessible. However, using the Omnibus 
approach, elementAt is not listed in the changes clause since no values of elementAt 
that satisfy the pre-condition of the function before and after the operation are changed. 
Before discussing alternatives, recall that we can include model functions in changes 
clauses with specific parameters. For example, we could specify that a replace operation 
changes only the last element in a Stack: 
operation replace(e:Element) 
 requires size() > 0 
 changes elementAt(size()-1) 
 ensures elementAt(size()-1) = e 
In the Omnibus approach we take the values that satisfy the pre-conditions both before and 
after the method as the starting point for the frame conditions. The assertions that are 
calculated from the changes clauses and added to the post-condition only refer to these 
values. Alternatively, we could take the values that satisfy the pre-conditions before or after 
as the starting point. For example, we could require that all the parameters of the model 
functions that are accessible after the operation call and are not the same as before the 
operation be listed in the changes clause. This would lead to the following specifications 
for push and pop: 
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operation push(e:Element) 
 changes size, elementAt(size()-1) 
 ensures size() = old size() + 1, elementAt(size()-1) = e 
 
operation pop() 
 requires size() > 0 
 changes size 
 ensures size() = old size() – 1 
Using this technique we have to list elementAt(size()-1) in the changes clause 
of the push operation because it is accessible after the method call and its value is not the 
same as it was before the method. If it was not listed then, using this interpretation of 
changes clauses, an assertion would be added asserting that elementAt(size()-1) = 
old elementAt(size()-1). However, size()-1 is not a valid index of old 
elementAt and so this would be a logical error; the pre-condition of the method call would 
be violated. In contrast, this approach would not require elementAt to be mentioned in the 
changes clause of pop because all values of the elementAt function that are accessible 
have the value they had before the operation call. 
The mirror of this technique is to require that all the parameters of the model functions that 
are accessible before the operation call and do not have the same value after the operation be 
listed in the changes clause. This would lead to the following specifications for push and 
pop: 
operation push(e:Element) 
 changes size 
 ensures size() = old size() + 1, elementAt(size()-1) = e 
 
operation pop() 
 requires size() > 0 
 changes size, elementAt(old size()-1) 
 ensures size() = old size() – 1 
This time, the newly accessible value of elementAt in the push operation does not 
have to be mentioned because it was not accessible before the operation. However, the value 
that was previously at the end of the Stack does have to be mentioned in pop because it no 
longer has the same value as it had before (it no longer has a value). 
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We could combine these two approaches, requiring that any parameters of the model 
functions that are accessible either before or after the operation call and do not have the same 
value at those points should be listed in the changes clause. This would lead to the 
following specifications for push and pop: 
operation push(e:Element) 
 changes size, elementAt(size()-1) 
 ensures size() = old size() + 1, elementAt(size()-1) = e 
 
operation pop() 
 requires size() > 0 
 changes size, elementAt(old size()-1) 
 ensures size() = old size() – 1 
This may be more desirable for programmers because it is more intuitive despite requiring 
them to write more code, particularly code that is essentially redundant. However, if we were 
to adopt this approach then failure to include elementAt with the appropriate parameter in 
the changes clause would become a difficult to detect error. Consider what would happen if 
we used this approach but omitted any mention of elementAt from the changes clause. 
operation push(e:Element) 
 changes size 
 ensures size() = old size() + 1, elementAt(size()-1) = e 
Since elementAt is not listed in the changes clause, all indices of the function that are 
valid either before or after the method are assumed not to change. Hence, 
elementAt(size()-1) will be assumed to have the value it had before the operation 
which would be old elementAt(size()-1). In other words, the assertion 
elementAt(size()-1) = old elementAt(size()-1) will be added to the final 
post-condition. But size()-1 is not a valid index of the old elementAt function and so 
this method call will not satisfy its pre-condition. Furthermore, the generated assertion that 
elementAt(size()-1) is ‘unchanged’ will contradict the assertion in the user provided 
ensures clause that it will equal the passed value e. 
This is highly undesirable since contradictions can cause problems for our tool, like many 
other verification tools, and lead to it reporting misleading errors. This final approach is the 
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most prone to introducing contradictions in the calculated post-condition with its generated 
frame condition because it produces the strongest frame condition assertions. Our approach 
produces the weakest frame condition assertions so that contradictions are minimised. 
3.1.3   Vicious circle of logic 
In this section we consider the complexities involved with the use of methods instead of fields 
in defining class invariants. 
The vicious circle of logic in JML and Spec# 
The classical view of class invariants is that they should hold whenever a class is externally 
accessible, i.e. in between public method calls. This can be demonstrated by showing that all 
constructors establish the invariants and then, assuming that the invariants hold before an 
instance method, showing that they hold after the method. That way, by induction, whenever 
another class has an instance of the object they can assume that the invariant holds over it. We 
can naïvely implement this by implicitly conjoining the invariants to the pre-conditions of all 
the methods of the class and then checking the invariants at the end of the methods. 
Normally Java methods cannot be used in JML assertions because they may have side-
effects. If we allowed this, then whether or not the assertions were evaluated would affect the 
behaviour of the program, and testing of a program with assertion checking enabled would 
not necessarily be valid when assertion-checking was disabled. However, there is no problem 
in using methods without side-effects in assertions. Methods without side-effects are called 
pure methods in JML and Spec# and are declared with the pure modifier. The tools then 
check that the methods do not change variables other than those local to the method. Pure 
methods are extremely useful because they allow us to write specifications that do not have to 
refer to only fields. We would like pure methods to be an extension of normal methods, with 
the properties of normal methods applying to them along with the additional properties: here 
that the method cannot have side-effects. Recall that one of these properties is that the class 
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invariants can be assumed at the start of the method and must be re-established at the end of 
the method. 
There is a problem of how to handle assertions which contain constructs such as method 
calls whose pre-conditions are not satisfied. Often such occurrences indicate limitations in the 
thinking of the programmer, coupled with logical errors. A run-time checker would normally 
check such pre-conditions whether they were invoked via an assertion or a standard 
expression in an implementation. We can adopt a similar approach within static verification: 
whenever an expression construct such as a method call is used, check its pre-condition 
separately. Such a check is referred to as a side-condition. 
We would like to be able to use pure methods in our specifications (in our requires 
clauses, our ensures clauses and, crucially, in our invariants) and we would like to generate 
side-conditions to check their use, but in doing so we hit a problem. Consider the following 
JML example: 
public class PosCounter { 
 /*@ spec_public */ int c; 
 
 //@ public invariant count() >= 0; 
 
 //@ ensures \result == c; 
 public /*@ pure */ int count() { 
  return c; 
 } 
 
 //@ requires count() > 0; 
 public void dec() { 
  c--; 
 } 
} 
This simple class contains an integer attribute c, a pure method count for returning the 
value of c and a method dec for decreasing c by one. An invariant asserts that count 
should be maintained to be non-negative. 
Using our naïve interpretation here, we include the invariants as part of the pre-condition 
of the count method. Hence we have (ignoring the need to check the invariant is maintained 
in this trivial case): 
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 //@ requires count() >= 0; 
 //@ ensures \result == c; 
 public /*@ pure */ int count() { 
  return c; 
 } 
The cyclic reference of the method itself in its pre-condition is already worrying and may 
well suggest to us that something is wrong, but let us continue regardless and now consider 
the method dec. De-sugaring the method, we again add the invariant to the pre-condition 
(although in this case it is implied by the original pre-condition and so we omit it) and also 
add an assert statement at the end of the method to check the invariant. This gives us: 
 //@ requires count() > 0; 
 public void dec() { 
  c--; 
  assert count() >= 0; 
 } 
Now, consider the execution of the assert statement. The local method call yields a 
side-condition that the pre-condition of that method is satisfied. The pre-condition of this 
method is precisely: 
 count() >= 0 
From the ensures clause of the count method we know that we can re-write 
occurrences of the count method using the value of the field c, but before we can use this 
re-write we have to show that its pre-condition is satisfied. The problem is that methods used 
to define the invariants cannot have the invariants as part of their pre-conditions (implicitly or 
explicitly). If they do then the situation degenerates when we have an object whose validity 
(i.e. whether the invariants hold over it) we do not know. In the example above the object 
whose validity we are not sure of is the this object after a local assignment to one of its 
attributes. We cannot then check the invariants over this object because these invariants may 
be described in terms of methods whose values are only defined for valid objects. 
The things which previously allowed JML to side-step this problem were its formal 
modelling of methods as underspecified total functions and its avoidance of side conditions 
for assertions. Were these to be altered then this issue would have to be addressed. 
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The developers of the Spec# system ran into this problem because they generate side-
conditions for assertions. To address the problem, all invariants are private in accessibility 
and can only refer to private members. Public methods cannot be used in the invariants 
because the invariants are part of their pre-conditions. 
The vicious circle of logic in Omnibus 
Within Omnibus the same question is raised of whether the invariants should be part of the 
pre-conditions of methods. Only methods without the invariants in their pre-conditions can be 
used to define the invariant. The problem also arises through the use of local method calls 
(excluding those with the old prefix) in ensures clauses of constructors and operations. 
Any such methods should also not have the invariants as part of their pre-conditions. So 
should all methods have the invariants as part of their pre-conditions? Should none? 
There are three ways that we see of addressing this: 
1. Functions and operations might no longer have invariants as part of their pre-
conditions. This would mean that all functions and operations could be freely used 
in invariants. This is the most extreme response and is completely unworkable 
since it would destroy the verification approaches that are at the heart of Omnibus. 
It is included here only for completeness. 
2. Functions might no longer have invariants as part of their pre-conditions but 
operations might. This means that any local function can be used in an invariant 
but local operations cannot (something which is often very useful). A key problem 
with this is that often functions will not make sense when called with parameters 
that would ordinarily be ruled out by the invariants implicitly included in their pre-
conditions. To counteract this, the programmer would have to repeat portions of 
the invariants in the pre-conditions of the functions. This is highly undesirable. 
3. Model functions might not have the invariants as part of their pre-conditions but 
derived functions and operations might. This means that the ensures clauses of 
constructors and operations and invariants must be completely defined in terms of 
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the model functions. This sounds more workable than it is. In reality, invariants 
will often be far more readily expressible via derived functions than model 
functions, and the programmer will likely get annoyed if they are not permitted to 
do so. 
4. Model functions and methods declared with a special modifier might not have the 
invariants as part of their pre-conditions but the other methods might. This means 
model functions and selected other methods can be used in invariants. This is a 
good compromise. It is a flexible approach and seems sufficient to verify all 
existing Omnibus code. 
The approach adopted by Omnibus is that model functions and methods declared with a 
special helper modifier, with the same meaning as helper in JML, do not have the 
invariants as part of their pre-conditions but the other methods do. This means model 
functions and selected other methods can be used in invariants. 
The same problem also appears in a number of other places in Omnibus, including 
ensures clauses of operations and constructors and other types of requirements. The 
general rule is as follows: only model functions and helper functions can be applied to 
this in invariants, constraints, initiallys, and ensures clauses of operations and 
constructors. You are free to use any method over old this since this is known to be valid. 
In ensures clauses for non-helper functions you are free to apply any method to this, 
since again you have grounds to assume that it is valid. 
3.2   Implementing value semantics 
In this section we discuss the techniques used to implement value semantics for an object-
oriented language. References must be used to implement the objects in order to support 
dynamic binding. To give value semantics, copying is then essential to ensure that objects that 
are referred to by multiple references are not mutated. However, it is possible to make some 
optimisations to avoid unnecessary copying. 
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3.2.1   Copy-on-update implementation of value semantics 
In value semantics, operations cannot simply be implemented as mutations of objects as is 
done in Java. If we did this and there were other references to the object then the values of 
these references would change, violating value semantics. For example, suppose we have a 
Counter object whose abstract state consists of a count value and can be increased and 
decreased by inc and dec operations to increment and decrement the value of the 
Counter, respectively. Now, if we have only a single reference to the object then we can 
freely implement the operations as mutations, but if there are other references to the object 
then we must create a new object so that the value of the other reference is unchanged. 
The situation becomes more complicated when we are changing an object contained in a 
data structure. To illustrate this, consider the following linked list example. Here, we have a 
classical linked list with each node containing a link to the node’s value and a link to the next 
node in the chain. The linked list is accessed via a reference, l, to its first node. Now suppose 
we want to update the value of the final element in the linked list, which is currently a 
Counter with the value 3, by applying the inc operation. For simplicity let us enforce that 
this operation must create a new object instead of mutating its original value in case there 
were any other references to the Counter containing the 3. As is standard we can then 
change the value pointer of the final node to point to the new Counter value. This situation 
is illustrated diagrammatically below. 
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We were careful not to implement our inc operation as a mutation in case there were 
existing references to it, so we may believe that this is an acceptable implementation, 
compatible with value semantics. However, consider the case shown below where there was 
an existing reference to the final node. 
 
In this scenario, the value of the node pointed to by x had the value of a Counter object 
with count 3 before the operation and the value of a Counter object with count 4 after the 
operation. As this operation was applied to the List and not x, x should not have changed. 
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The cause of this problem is that the node itself is also an object and so implementing 
changes to it as mutations can also lead to violations of value semantics. So, if there are other 
references to the node then we cannot update it via a mutation, and must instead create a new 
node. Similar reasoning dictates that we must create copies of the intervening nodes in case 
there are references to these. 
As an extreme, conservative solution to this problem we could implement all operations by 
creating new objects. This would give us the diagram shown below. 
 
This is clearly extremely inefficient. To change the value of a single element in the list we 
have had to create new nodes for all the elements in the list. 
However, there are some reasons why the situation is not quite as bad as this, and 
techniques that we can use to further improve the situation. 
3.2.2   Optimisations of copy-on-update 
Not everything is copied 
Firstly, we are not creating a new copy of the entire list, i.e. all the nodes and all the object 
values. All the object values which are unchanged are simply reused in the new list. This can 
be seen in the final diagram: the first two nodes point to the same object values that their 
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previous incarnations did. In this case, that is not particularly significant because our object 
values are simply Counter objects and will not be considerably larger in terms of memory 
usage than the nodes themselves. However, in more realistic examples, the object values will 
likely be considerably larger than the nodes and so creating copies of nodes will be far less 
costly than creating full copies of the object values themselves would be. To summarise, a 
new copy of only one of the object values is created, specifically the one that is being 
changed. 
Also, we do not need to create copies of portions of the List that are unchanged. In the 
example we used there were no such portions that were unchanged since we changed the 
value of the last node and the next pointers of all the nodes preceding it. However, if we had 
updated the first node in the list instead of the last then we could have reused the remainder of 
the list unchanged since neither the values nor next node pointers need to be changed. 
Balancing techniques can reduce amount of copying 
We can view the internal structures of reference-based data structures as a hierarchy. The 
access point is at the top of this hierarchy with remaining nodes arranged below it in order of 
the depth of references that must be used to reach the object. For example, for our list, the 
first node would be at the top of the hierarchy and the last node at the bottom. 
l 
7 
1 
3 
l
7
1
3
8inc
CHAPTER 3 DESIGN ISSUES FOR THE OMNIBUS LANGUAGE 
 68 
Now, in the preceding section we saw that portions of the list that are unchanged can be 
reused directly without the need for any copying. For such a portion to be directly reusable, its 
values and its next pointers should not require any changes. We can exploit this by structuring 
our data structures so that we minimise the depth of the data structure and/or ensure that 
nodes which are most likely to change are higher up in the hierarchy. There is a limited 
amount that we can do to achieve these goals in the list example. However, if we generalise 
the example to a tree data structure then we can use existing techniques such as AVL trees 
and red-black trees [99] to enforce balancing and hence minimise the depth of the hierarchy. 
We may also be able to devise a technique to ensure that the nodes that are most likely to be 
changed are at the top of the hierarchy. 
Can use mutation if there is only a single reference to the object to be 
updated 
In our discussion of the list example, we introduced complications by supposing that there 
were existing references to the nodes in our data structure. In the most extreme case, if there 
may be existing references to any of the nodes in our data structure then we must create new 
copies of any that we need to update in any way. It is in this copying process that the 
inefficiencies arise. In contrast, if we knew that there were no existing references to the nodes 
in our data structure then we could freely update any of them using mutations, and our 
originally proposed solution would be perfectly acceptable. We can freely use mutation to 
implement operations if we know that there are no existing references to the object (other than 
the one via which we are accessing it). So, a possible solution is to use mutation to update 
objects with only a single reference to them and create new objects during other operation 
calls. This approach is known as uniqueness typing [84]. 
The problem is how we can detect how many references there are to an object which needs 
to be updated. We can do this either statically or dynamically (e.g. reference counting). A 
static approach would be the more desirable because it would not involve any run-time 
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overheads. We cannot detect all possible optimisations using a static modular approach but 
we can detect some. For example, consider the following code snippet: 
var s:Stack[String] := Stack[String].empty(); 
s.push("a"); 
We can statically deduce that at the point when the push operation call is encountered, 
there can only be a single reference to the stack s. This is because we have just created the 
object and so there is no possibility that there is another reference to it. Therefore, we can 
implement this operation call as a mutation, illustrated by the following diagram. 
 
However, the process falls down somewhat when we hit an interface boundary. For 
example, suppose that instead of declaring a new Stack as a local variable, we have a 
Stack parameter passed to our method. 
function thirdTop(s:Stack[String]):String { 
   var st:Stack[String] := s; 
   st.pop(); 
   st.pop(); 
   return st.top(); 
}  
In this case we cannot make any assumptions about how many references there are to the 
Stack object that is passed into the method and so the first pop operation must create a new 
object. However, we can statically deduce that there is only one reference to the Stack 
object held in st by the time we reach the second operation call since this new Stack object 
was only created by the first pop operation. Therefore, we can implement the second 
operation call as a mutation as shown below.  
s size: 0, elements: <none>
s size: 0, elements: <none>
1 { “a” }
push operation
Note that the 
original object is 
mutated rather than 
a new object being 
created 
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The static deduction approach is necessarily incomplete. Perhaps, in a particular case, the 
Stack passed to the thirdTop operation will only have a single reference to it and so we 
could implement the first operation call via a mutation. We cannot detect this case statically in 
a modular fashion but we could detect it dynamically. This would require a form of reference 
counting mechanism similar to that used in primitive garbage collection algorithms. Ideally 
this would be implemented within the VM but could be simulated within the generated code. 
However, it is not clear that the gains from using mutation in these cases would compensate 
for the additional run-time overhead required to track the number of references to each object. 
It is also not clear whether the number of cases that could be dynamically deduced to be 
appropriate for mutation would be significantly higher than those that could be statically 
deduced to be as such. This section described possible extensions to the Omnibus verification 
tool. None of the approaches described are implemented in the current version of the 
Omnibus verification tool. 
s Stack[String] 
st 
s Stack[String] 
We cannot mutate 
this object because 
there may be other 
references to it 
st 
s Stack[String] 
(              ).pop() 
We know that there 
can only be one 
reference to these 
objects because we 
have just created 
them so we can 
implement the 
second operation 
call as a mutation 
st 
s Stack[String] 
(              ).pop().pop()
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3.3   Equality in Omnibus 
Equality is a key concept within Omnibus. It is even more important in a system built upon 
value semantics than it is in one built on reference semantics. 
In Java, which is built on reference semantics, there are two concepts of object equality: 
equality of references and equality of objects. The == and != operators allow the programmer 
to compare the addresses held in two references for equality. If two object references hold the 
same address then these references point to the same object on the heap. Equality of the 
objects themselves can be defined using the special equals method. This is a normal 
method which returns the boolean value true iff the passed object is equal to this. The 
writer of the class is free to give any implementation for this function although there are some 
informal requirements that they should follow (it should be commutative, etc.). 
In Omnibus, there is only one concept for equality of objects which can be accessed via 
the = and != operators. This operator represents value equality and should evaluate to true 
whenever the two objects to which it is applied are interchangeable without observable 
differences. This is actually quite a complicated concept and this section will explore the 
range of support which Omnibus provides for it. 
3.3.1   Built-in concept of equality 
In Java, if you do not define an equals method for your class, a default implementation is 
inherited from the java.lang.Object class. This provides you with some concept of 
equality of objects without the programmer having to do any work. Omnibus provides similar 
facilities to automatically define an equality operator even if none is explicitly given. 
While at this high level the two approaches to this problem appear similar, they are 
implemented in diverse fashions. In Java, the default equality operator simply compares the 
references of the two objects; this is enough because the programmer also has the concept of 
reference equality to work with. However, in Omnibus, the equality operator has only one 
definition and this must be powerful enough to reason effectively about the equality of many 
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object expressions. As a result, the automatic definition of equality in Omnibus is far more 
complex. 
If no equality operator is defined for a class, the Omnibus system automatically defines 
one. Leibnitz’s rule is used to reason about equality of object instances of the class for static 
verification. An implementation of structural equality checking is provided for 
implementations and run-time assertion checking. This gives an overly conservative but 
useful and safe automatic definition of equality. These concepts are introduced in the 
remainder of this section. 
Leibnitz’s rule is simply this: if the same method is applied to two objects that are equal 
with parameters that are equal then the result will be equal. So, for example, if we have an 
object obj which has a method func() then Leibnitz’s rule allows us to deduce that 
obj.func() = obj.func(). More interestingly, suppose we have objects obj1 and 
obj2 that we know are equal and p1 and p2 that we know are equal. Now if there is a 
method calc in the class of obj1 and obj2 that takes two parameters then we can deduce 
that obj1.calc(p1,x) = obj2.calc(p2,x). This is true because the objects are equal 
and the corresponding parameters are equal. 
Leibnitz’s rule is of most use when coupled with substitutions. Suppose we know that an 
ensures clause tells us that modFunc() = old modFunc().op(param), and an 
invariant requires us to check that modFunc().isGood(). We can then substitute old 
modFunc().op(param) for modFunc(), allowing us to demonstrate the invariant by 
showing old modFunc().op(param).isGood(). This facility is used extensively 
throughout all Omnibus examples which have been produced so far. 
Leibnitz’s rule gives some very basic rules about equality. These rules are always 
respected by Omnibus classes (it is not possible to write a method which returns different 
values for the same parameters – there are no static variables) but obviously do not give the 
rich definition of equality that will often be required. Programmers will often want objects 
that are constructed using different sequences of method calls to be considered equal. For 
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example, consider a Stack where an element is pushed and then popped. The programmer 
would probably want these two Stack objects to be considered equal, but Leibnitz’s rule 
alone does not permit you to deduce this. 
Structural equality is a mechanism for comparing any two objects. Using structural 
equality, two objects are equal if their dynamic classes are equal (i.e. they are instances of the 
same class) and all of their corresponding attributes are equal. This is a recursive definition 
which checks the equality of two objects by checking the equality of all of their 
subcomponents (i.e. the attributes that define the implementation of the class).  
Like Leibnitz’s rule, structural equality gives a basic definition for equality. Structural 
equality is consistent with Leibnitz’s rule, since if all the attributes of two objects of the same 
class are equal then the result of the same method with the same parameters will be the same. 
We will see later that, like Leibnitz’s rule, there are limitations to structural equality. Again, 
though, in these cases the programmer can provide an implementation for equality. 
To illustrate the default definition of equality provided by Omnibus, consider the 
following Array class. 
class Array[Element] { 
 model function length():integer 
 model function access(i:integer):Optional[Element] 
  requires i >= 0 && i < length() 
  
 invariant length() >= 0 
  
 constructor ofSize(n:integer) 
  requires n >= 0 
  ensures length() = n, 
   forall (j:integer := 0 to n-1): 
    access(j).isNil() 
  
 operation assign(k:integer, e:Element) 
  requires k >= 0 && k < length() 
  changes access(k) 
  ensures access(k) = Optional[Element].of(e) 
  
 operation assignOptional(k:integer, e:Optional[Element]) 
  requires k >= 0 && k < length() 
  changes access(k) 
  ensures access(k) = e 
} 
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Note that no definition for equality is given explicitly, so the default definition will be 
automatically introduced by the system. Let us now consider some expressions involving this 
class in order to explore what the default definition gives us. The expressions we will consider 
will refer to the following variables: 
p1:Person 
arr:Array[Person] := Array[Person].ofSize(3).assign(1, p1) 
We now know the following facts about model functions of the arr object: 
arr.length() = 3 
arr.access(0).isNil() 
!arr.access(1).isNil() 
arr.access(1) = p1 
arr.access(2).isNil() 
From Leibnitz’s rule we can then deduce the following: 
 arr.assign(1, p1) = arr.assign(1, p1) 
This is a straightforward application of Leibnitz’s rule. 
However, we cannot deduce the following: 
 arr = arr.assign(1, p1) 
Intuitively, this should be true since, on assigning to the element at index value 1, the 
value that it currently has should not change the array object. However, Leibnitz’s rule is not 
enough to deduce this. To enforce this we need to provide a manual definition for equality of 
Arrays. 
While we cannot deduce the equality of arr and arr.assign(1,p1), we can deduce 
the equality of their model functions: 
 arr.length() = arr.assign(1, p1).length() 
 && (forall (i:integer := 0 to 2): 
  arr.access(i) = arr.assign(1, p1).access(i)) 
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3.3.2   Manually defining the equality operator 
Let us now look at how programmers can provide their own definition for equality. Before 
looking at a range of techniques for defining equality, let us quickly look at how an equality 
operator for the Array class could be defined. 
class Array[Element] { 
 model function length():integer 
 model function access(i:integer):Optional[Element] 
  requires i >= 0 && i < length() 
 ... 
 function equals(a:Array[Element]):boolean 
  returns length() = a.length() 
   && forall (i:integer := 0 to length()-1): 
    access(i) = a.access(i) 
} 
Note how equality is defined via an equals method which accepts an instance of the 
current class. In the following sections we will look at how to define these methods. 
Equality over model functions of no parameters 
It is relatively straightforward to define an equality operator for a class whose abstract state 
consists only of model functions of no parameters. Two objects are simply equal if all their 
model functions evaluate to the same values. Consider the following Library class whose 
abstract state consists of a Collection of Books, a Collection of Members and a 
Collection of Loans of Books to Members. The equals method simply compares the 
values of these model functions. 
class Library { 
 model function books():Collection[Book] 
 model function members():Collection[Member] 
 model function loans():Collection[Loan] 
 
 ... 
 
 function equals(l:Library):boolean 
  returns books() = l.books() 
   && members() = l.members() 
   && loans() = l.loans() 
} 
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Equality over model functions with parameters of restricted range 
The first example considered the simplified case where the model functions of the class had 
no parameters. We will now consider a slight generalisation of this where the model functions 
have parameters but they have a restricted range. In such cases, we can simply specify the 
equality operator by quantifying over a variable in this range. Consider the following example 
of a List class which contains a size model function with no parameters and an 
elementAt model function with a single index parameter i. This parameter is restricted to 
range from zero to one less than the size. We can then define equality of Lists by 
asserting that their sizes should be equal and that the values of the elementAt model 
function from 0 up to the size()-1 are equal. In other words, the model functions are equal 
for all values that satisfy their pre-conditions. This fits our intuition of equality of Lists: two 
Lists should be considered equal if they contain the same elements. 
class List[Element] { 
 function size():integer 
 function elementAt(i:integer):Element 
  requires i >= 0 && i < size() 
 
 ... 
  
 function equals(l:List[Element]):boolean 
  returns size() = l.size() 
   && forall (i:integer := 0 to size()-1): 
    elementAt(i) = l.elementAt(i) 
} 
Equality over model functions with parameters of restricted range with 
additional restrictions 
In the previous section we considered the case where the only restriction on the parameters of 
a model function was to limit its range. However, there may be other restrictions within the 
pre-condition of the model function. In such cases we can simply add these additional 
restrictions to the quantification over the parameters of the model function in the equals 
method using a where clause. Consider the following example of a YahtzeeGame class. 
First, there is a model function containing the number of rolls that have been taken in the 
CHAPTER 3 DESIGN ISSUES FOR THE OMNIBUS LANGUAGE 
 77 
current turn. This can range from 0 up to 3. Next there is a diceAt model function used to 
hold the values of the Dice that are currently showing. The method can be called with 
parameters from 1 up to 5 apart from when there have been no rolls yet (in which case the 
dice do not have any values yet). These values then change as follows. Initially the number of 
rolls will be 0, signifying that the dice have not been rolled yet in the current turn. The dice 
can then be rolled, at which point the number of rolls is increased to one and values are given 
to the dice positions 1 up to 5. The dice can then be rolled up to a limit of 2 further times 
before a position on the board is selected and the number of rolls is reset to 0. There is also a 
range of other model functions that are not of interest to us here. The key part of interest to us 
is the definition of the equality in relation to these two model functions. The handling of the 
rolls model function is straightforward, and we can handle the diceAt model function 
like the elementAt function in the List class, adding the additional restriction that the 
number of rolls should be greater than zero in a where clause of the quantification over the 
pos parameter. 
class YahtzeeGame { 
 model function rolls():integer 
 model function diceAt(pos:integer):Dice 
  requires pos >= 1 && pos <= 5, 
   rolls() > 0 
 
 ... 
 
 function equals(g:YahtzeeGame):boolean 
  returns rolls() = g.rolls() 
   && (forall (pos:integer := 1 to 5 where rolls() > 0): 
    diceAt(pos) = g.diceAt(pos)) 
   && ... 
} 
Equality over model functions with parameters of unrestricted range 
So far we have only considered model functions with parameters of restricted ranges. In these 
cases we can use a quantifier with the quantified variables restricted to that range. The 
advantage of this kind of quantifier is that it can be evaluated at run-time. If a model function 
has a parameter without such a restricted range, the situation is much harder to deal with 
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because we cannot simply write an executable specification. In such cases we have little 
alternative but to write separate specifications and implementations for the method. Consider 
the following example of a Collection class which is described in terms of a contains 
model function. The method takes an Element parameter whose values cannot be 
enumerated over like the integer ranges we encountered earlier. So, we describe the equals 
method using an ensures clause containing a universal quantification over Elements. 
Two Collection objects are equal if their contains functions have the same value for 
every possible Element. Note that we cannot use a returns clause here because the 
unconstrained universal quantifier is not executable. The specification of this class is shown 
below: 
class Collection[Element] { 
 model function contains(e:Element):boolean 
 
 ... 
 
 function equals(c:Collection[Element]):boolean 
  ensures result 
   <==> forall (e:Element): contains(e) = c.contains(e) 
} 
Now let us consider how to define the implementation of the class and, specifically, the 
equals method. First, we introduce a List attribute and define the contains model 
function in terms of it. So we are using a List, which may contain duplicates, to implement 
our Collection, which should not, and ruling duplicates out via an invariant. We can then 
implement our equals function by iterating over the elements in each of the Lists in turn 
and checking that the other contains all of their elements. If each Collection contains all 
of the Elements in the other, then the contains functions must yield the same value for 
all Element values and hence the Collections are equal. 
public class Collection[Element] { 
 private attribute elements:List[Element] 
 public model function contains(e:Element):boolean 
  private returns elements.contains(e) 
 
 private invariant 
        forall (e:Element): elements.countOf(e) <= 1 
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 ... 
 
 public function equals(c:Collection[Element]):boolean 
  ensures result = true 
   <==> forall (e:Element): contains(e) = c.contains(e) 
 { 
  foreach (e:Element in elements) { 
   if (!c.contains(e)) { 
    return false; 
   } 
  } 
  foreach (e:Element in c.elements) { 
   if (!contains(e)) { 
    return false; 
   } 
  } 
  return true; 
 } 
} 
Coping with irrelevant information in the abstract state 
The techniques that we have looked at so far for defining equality break down when the 
abstract state contains information that is irrelevant. For example, consider the following 
specification of a Stack class: 
class Stack[Element] { 
 model function elements():Array[Element] 
 model function size():integer 
 
 invariant size() >= 0 
 invariant size() <= elements().length() 
 
 invariant forall (i:integer := 0 to size()-1): 
   !elements().access(i).isNil() 
 
 constructor empty(capacity:integer) 
  requires capacity >= 0 
  ensures size() = 0, 
   elements() = Array[Element].ofSize(capacity) 
 
 operation push(e:Element) 
  requires size() < elements.length() 
  changes size, elements 
  ensures size() = old size() + 1, 
   elements() = old elements().assign(size()-1,e) 
 
 operation pop() 
  requires size() > 0 
  changes size 
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  ensures size() = old size() - 1 
 
 function top():Element 
  requires size() > 0 
  returns elements().access(size()-1) 
 
 function equals(s:Stack[Element]):boolean 
  returns size() = s.size() 
   && elements() = s.elements() 
} 
Here the abstract state contains an Array, which is used to store the elements in the 
Stack, and an integer to record the number of elements in the Stack. An element is 
deemed to be contained in the Stack if it is in one of the first size() positions of the 
Array. The elements in the Array after the first size() are not deemed to be in the 
Stack and their values are irrelevant. The standard definition for equality is given which 
compares the values of the model functions of the current class and the one passed to the 
equals method. 
However, in this example, we cannot simply compare the values of the model functions. If 
we do this then objects whose values differ only in irrelevant details will not be considered 
equal. For example, consider we have a Stack s1 containing the elements “abc”, “def” 
and “ghi”, i.e.: 
var s1:Stack[String] := 
  Stack[String].empty(5).push(“abc”).push(“def”).push(“ghi”); 
From the specification it will have the following values: 
 s1:Stack[String] 
where s1.size() = 3 
 && s1.elements().length() = 5 
 && s1.elements().access(0) = “abc” 
 && s1.elements().access(1) = “def” 
 && s1.elements().access(2) = “ghi” 
 && s1.elements().access(3).isNil() 
 && s1.elements().access(4).isNil() 
Now let us define a new Stack s2 formed by taking the Stack s1, pushing “jkl” 
onto it and then popping it off i.e. 
var s2:Stack[String] := s1.push(“jkl”).pop(); 
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Intuitively, these two Stacks should be considered equal since they contain the same 
elements in the same order but they would not be equal using our standard definition of 
equality. This is because the values of the model functions are as follows: 
 s1:Stack[String], s2:Stack[String] 
where s1.size() = 3 && s2.size() = 3  
 && s1.elements().access(0) = “abc” 
 && s2.elements().access(0) = “abc” 
 && s1.elements().access(1) = “def” 
 && s2.elements().access(1) = “def” 
 && s1.elements().access(2) = “ghi” 
 && s2.elements().access(2) = “ghi” 
 && s1.elements().access(3).isNil() 
 && s2.elements().access(3) = “jkl” 
 && s1.elements().access(4).isNil() 
 && s2.elements().access(4).isNil() 
The problem here is that the abstract state contains information that is irrelevant, namely 
the values in the elements() Array at indices between size() and capacity()-1. 
There are a number of techniques we can use to cope with this problem. Firstly, we could 
assert that irrelevant information always has the same value. For example, in this case we 
could assert that the information in the elements array at indices between size() and 
capacity()-1 should always be null. This can be formalised in the following invariant: 
private invariant forall(i:integer := size() to capacity()-1): 
   elements.access(i).isNil() 
We would then need to adjust the pop operation to set the newly irrelevant value from the 
elements array to be null. 
public operation pop() 
 requires size() > 0 
 changes size, elements 
 ensures size() = old size() – 1, 
  elements() = old elements().assignOptional(size()-1, 
                   Optional[Element].nil()) 
This would enable us to use the existing definition of equality to fulfil our intuition. 
Alternatively we could adopt a different approach for the specification of the equality 
operator. We could write a new function to return only the relevant elements of the abstract 
state and then compare the results of these functions for the two objects. For example, we 
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could define a relevantElements function to return the range of values from the 
elements array that are relevant and then specify our equality operator in terms of it. 
private function relevantElements():Array[Element] 
 returns elements().range(0, size()) 
 
function equals(s:Stack[Element]):boolean 
 returns size() = s.size() 
  && elements().size() = s.elements().size() 
  && relevantElements() = s.relevantElements() 
This section described possible extensions to the Omnibus verification tool. None of the 
approaches described are implemented in the current version of the Omnibus verification tool. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Challenges of reference semantics 
The modular static verification of object-oriented languages which use reference semantics is 
extremely complicated. Indeed, until recently, the state-of-the-art approaches had soundness 
holes for data structures incorporating complex internal structures that utilised references 
[77]. This issue had been side-stepped by the majority of the verification field working with 
languages like JML. Recent work [37] has helped provide a sound basis for the modular 
verification of JML and other OO languages with reference semantics. This chapter 
demonstrates the problems with the modular static verification of OO languages built upon 
reference semantics and then discusses existing solutions. 
Chapters 2 and 3 discussed the Omnibus language with its support for value semantics. 
This chapter is concerned with reference semantics and uses examples presented in JML, not 
Omnibus. The chapter describes existing approaches rather than presenting new ones. The 
support for value semantics that we have previously described could be combined with the 
techniques for reference semantics presented here. Either Omnibus could be extended with 
the techniques presented in this chapter, or the concepts of Omnibus could be incorporated 
into the systems we describe. 
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4.1   Problems of modular reasoning about reference 
semantics 
References are used extensively in Java programs. All objects are accessed via references. In 
this section we will illustrate the problems this causes for modular static verification. 
4.1.1   Review of the basics of reference semantics 
Consider the following piece of code where we define a Java class BankAccount: 
public class BankAccount { 
 private int balance; 
 
 public BankAccount() { 
  balance = 0; 
 } 
 
 public int getBalance() { 
  return balance; 
 } 
 
 public void deposit(int amount) { 
  balance += amount; 
 } 
 
 public void withdraw(int amount) { 
  balance -= amount; 
 } 
} 
Now consider the following statements that use this class: 
BankAccount a = new BankAccount(); 
BankAccount b = a; 
In the first line we create a new BankAccount object and assign it to the local variable 
a. The effect of this is that variable a is given the value of a reference to the newly created 
object. In the second line we assign the value of a to a new variable b. The effect of this is 
that the new variable b is given the value of the variable a which is a reference to the 
previously created BankAccount object. Thus, both variables contain references to the 
same object. This situation, where multiple references point to the same object, is called 
sharing and is common in OO programs. 
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Operations to alter the state of objects are implemented in Java using methods which 
change the values of the attributes of the object. These are called destructive updates and they 
act to mutate the object. If we use a method to change the value of the object via one of the 
references then the value of the other reference will also have changed. Suppose we now 
execute the following line of code: 
a.deposit(100); 
Naturally, a.balance will now hold 100 since we have explicitly applied the 
deposit method to the a reference. However, b.balance will now also hold the value 
100 since b points to the same object as a. 
The dependencies appear relatively straightforward here; we have two objects that clearly 
point to the same object. However, in modular verification we must consider the different 
parts of an application separately. When we are passed a reference to an object via a 
parameter, we do not know what other references there are to it. The passed reference may 
only be used as a local variable which will not be used further and whose lifetime will end 
imminently after the method we are considering returns. On the other hand, the passed 
reference may be used as an attribute of another object or may be used as a local variable but 
will be manipulated further after our method returns. These later situations can cause 
problems as we will see in the following sections. 
4.1.2   A class with a mutable, reference-based internal state 
Consider the following code: 
public class Person { 
 private BankAccount acc; 
 
 public Person() { 
  acc = new BankAccount(); 
 } 
 
 public void setAccount(BankAccount a) { 
  acc = a; 
 } 
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 public BankAccount getAccount() { 
  return acc; 
 } 
}  
This code defines a class Person which contains a BankAccount attribute along with 
setter and getter methods [105]. The constructor creates a new BankAccount object and 
stores a reference to it in the private acc attribute. We can use the getAccount and 
setAccount methods to query and change this value, respectively. In the setAccount 
method we do not know whether there are other references to the passed BankAccount 
object. Likewise, callers of the getAccount method do not know what references there are 
to the object we return. As it happens, it is part of the internal state of this object but they 
would not know this from the type signature alone. If we are performing modular verification 
then the interface is all we can use to reason about other classes. 
To clearly illustrate the problems that can arise from this situation, let us introduce an 
invariant to the Person class and attempt to verify it in a modular fashion. Let us alter the 
Person class as follows: 
public class Person { 
 private BankAccount acc; 
 
 //@ private invariant acc != null && acc.getBalance() >= 0; 
 
 public Person() { 
  acc = new BankAccount(); 
 } 
 
 //@ requires a != null && a.getBalance() >= 0; 
 public void setAccount(BankAccount a) { 
  acc = a; 
 } 
 
 //@ ensures \result != null; 
 public BankAccount getAccount() { 
  return acc; 
 } 
}  
We have introduced a series of JML annotations in special comments which start with 
//@. The requires annotations provide pre-conditions, the ensures annotations provide 
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post-conditions and the invariant annotations provide class invariants. A class invariant 
should (crudely) hold throughout the lifetime of all object instances of the class. More 
specifically, it should hold after the execution of any of the class’s constructor methods and 
after any subsequent calls of its methods. It may be temporarily invalidated within the body of 
a method as long as it is re-established by the end of the method. Note that our invariant here 
has to be declared as private since it refers to a private field. This follows from Meyer’s 
guideline that specifications at a specific accessibility level can only refer to methods and 
fields declared at that accessibility level or above [68]. 
The invariant that we have added states that the acc attribute should not be null and its 
balance should be non-negative. The requires clause of the setAccount method 
ensures that any BankAccount values that we assign to the local variable satisfy this 
requirement. Therefore, the invariant is respected. This class is correct JML and follows the 
principles of JML modular static verification. 
4.1.3   The representation exposure problem 
Now let us consider some code which uses this class. 
Person p = new Person(); 
BankAccount acc = p.getAccount(); 
acc.withdraw(100); 
Here we start by constructing a new Person object and assigning it to the local variable 
p. We then use the getAccount method from the Person class to retrieve a reference to 
the BankAccount object of the Person. Finally, we use the withdraw method to 
withdraw the value 100 from the account. This code follows the principles of JML static 
verification since the code respects the specifications of the Person and BankAccount 
classes. The Person constructor, getAccount method in the Person class and the 
withdraw method in the BankAccount class all have no pre-conditions and so our calls 
are valid. 
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However, the invariant of the Person object accessed by p is violated when we perform 
the withdraw operation on the acc variable. This is because the BankAccount that 
getAccount returns is used in the internal representation of our Person object. The 
problem is that the getAccount method gives mutable access to the internals of our 
Person class. Code outside the class can then use this reference to indirectly alter the value 
of the Person class. Because of the information hiding required to support modular 
verification they cannot be aware of this dependency because it is not described in the 
interface of the class.  
This problem is called representation exposure and arises when a reference to an object 
used in the internal representation of an object is made accessible to clients of the class. 
Clients can then manipulate the object directly, bypassing the interface of the class which has 
been verified to maintain the correctness of any invariants over it. 
4.1.4   The argument object dependency problem 
We can arrive at the same problem through a slightly different means. Suppose we, again, use 
the Person class with the invariant. This time consider the following code instead: 
Person p = new Person(); 
BankAccount a = new BankAccount(); 
a.deposit(100); 
p.setAccount(acc); 
a.withdraw(200); 
Here we start by creating a new Person and assigning it to p. A default BankAccount 
object will be created by the Person constructor and stored in its acc attribute. We then 
create a new BankAccount and assign it to a local a variable. We then call the deposit 
method to deposit 100 into the BankAccount. Next we call the setAccount method of 
the Person p, passing the BankAccount we created. The pre-condition of this method 
requires that the passed object is not null and has a non-negative balance so that the 
invariant of the Person class is respected. Our passed BankAccount reference passes both 
of these criteria. Finally we withdraw 200 from our BankAccount. There is apparently 
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nothing wrong with this since there is no pre-condition of the withdraw method. Therefore, 
this code also passes JML modular static verification. 
However, again, the invariant of the Person object accessed via p is violated by the final 
statement. The setAccount method call takes a reference to our BankAccount object a 
and stores it in the attribute of the Person class. At the end of this method, the invariant is 
satisfied, just as our verification of the Person class ensured. However, when we use the 
withdraw method to remove 200 from the BankAccount the balance of the 
BankAccount goes to -100. This not only affects a but also our Person object p and 
leads to a violation of the invariant. Again, this dependency is not described in the interface of 
the Person class and so we do not know about it when verifying this code. 
This problem is called argument object dependency and arises when a reference is passed 
into a constructor or method and incorporated into the internal representation of the object. 
Clients can then use the passed reference to manipulate the object’s internal representation 
directly, bypassing its interface which is supposed to protect the integrity of the data. 
4.1.5   Different views of the same problem 
These are essentially different mechanisms by which you can reach the same problem. Via 
both approaches you end up with an object accessible through two reference variables where 
there is an invariant relating to one of the references that is not known by the other. If the 
second of these references is then used to mutate the object, the invariant relating to the first 
reference may be violated in a way that cannot be detected by the modular static verification. 
The standard type signature interfaces are not enough to prevent this problem. Neither are 
standard pre- and post-conditions. Interfaces built out of these specification components alone 
say nothing about the number of references to the objects that are passed about. 
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4.2   Sound modular static verification techniques 
Until relatively recently, there was no widely-accepted approach to solve this problem [77]. 
Users and tool developers working with JML had to work around this problem. The problem 
can be avoided if the programmer is careful about the references they use (e.g. they could 
clone the BankAccount before getting or setting it). However, there was no tool support to 
check for this which acted to limit the soundness of the verification approach as a whole. 
These limitations led people such as myself and David Crocker of the PerfectDeveloper 
project [33] to investigate the use of value semantics (which, in any event, is of fundamental 
importance even within languages primarily built upon reference semantics). 
There are now two leading approaches to this problem. The first approach is to restrict the 
use of sharing through alias control. This technique allows us to describe the allowed aliasing 
of an object within the interface of a class. This approach is currently being incorporated into 
JML [37]. The second approach requires that all the invariants relating to object instances of a 
specific class are visible wherever those objects can be manipulated and that checks are made 
at the point of manipulation that no invariants in the system are violated. This work is already 
supported within JML tools. 
4.2.1   Alias control through Universes 
Alias control is perhaps the most natural solution to this problem. The fundamental problem is 
the unrestricted freedom in languages like Java for references to point to any object of the 
appropriate type. With this fundamentally unstructured and non-modular starting point we 
cannot easily perform static verification modularly. We cannot restrict the use of aliasing via 
existing specification languages, such as JML, because there are no constructs to allow us to 
express such restrictions. We need a new vocabulary which allows us to talk about aliasing so 
that we can describe suitable restrictions. 
A number of alias control mechanisms were developed in the 90s [4, 29, 47] but most 
require a range of complicated annotations. Muller has pulled together the best aspects of a 
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range of approaches to form his Universe type system [37, 46, 74-76, 78]. This provides a 
flexible alias control mechanism with relatively lightweight annotation burdens. 
In this section we will look at how the Universe type system addresses the problems we 
saw earlier, and show how it can be used to implement a sophisticated example consisting of 
a doubly-linked list with iterators supporting deletion (an example taken from [37]). 
Basic principles of the Universe type system 
The Universe type system arranges the objects in an application into so-called Universes. 
Every object may have some other object declared as its owner. All objects which have the 
same owner are said to be in the same universe. Only the owner of an object can mutate that 
object. All modifications of the objects in a universe must go through the owner. This allows 
the system to ensure that the interface of a data structure is not bypassed. A class can then 
only define invariants over objects that it owns. Since only the considered object can update 
these objects, it is sufficient to verify that the invariant is maintained by the methods in the 
considered class. 
A key innovation by the Universe type system is that, instead of explicitly stating the 
owner object of variables, it is generally sufficient to simply describe its relationship to this. 
Typically we require the owner of a field to be either this or the owner of this. When we 
declare an object variable or create a new object we must indicate what the owner of the 
object should be. To indicate that this should be the owner, we use the rep modifier. 
Objects with the rep modifier are created in the universe owned by this and can be viewed 
as part of its representation (hence the modifier used). To indicate that the owner of this 
should be the owner, we use the peer modifier. Objects with the peer modifier will be 
created in the same universe as this and, hence, can be viewed as peers of this. 
References whose owners are anything else must be declared with the any modifier and 
cannot be mutated. 
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Class with a mutable, reference-based internal state re-visited 
Let us revisit our Person class. Our acc attribute is part of the internal representation of our 
Person and so we should declare it with the rep modifier. 
public class Person { 
 private /*@ rep */ BankAccount acc; 
 
 //@ private invariant acc != null && acc.getBalance() >= 0; 
 
 public Person() { 
  acc = new /*@ rep */ BankAccount(); 
 } 
 
 //@ requires a != null && a.getBalance() >= 0; 
 public void setAccount(/*@ rep */ BankAccount a) { 
  acc = a; 
 } 
 
 //@ ensures \result != null; 
 public /*@ rep */ BankAccount getAccount() { 
  return acc; 
 } 
}  
By adding the rep modifier to the declaration of the acc attribute we have implicitly 
stated that the owner of acc is this. The result is that only this object is allowed to 
manipulate the value of that object. We can also define an invariant over it because it is 
owned by this. 
Prevention of representation exposure 
So let us now re-consider the first troublesome block of code. It was as follows: 
Person p = new Person(); 
BankAccount acc = p.getAccount(); 
acc.withdraw(100); 
The first thing we must do is declare the universes of the variables. We can no longer 
simply declare a variable p of type Person, we must also define what universe it is in. Let 
us assume that this code is in the body of a method of a different class. We can declare each 
type using either rep, peer or any. We want to mutate the variable p so we must declare it 
using rep. 
CHAPTER 4 CHALLENGES OF REFERENCE SEMANTICS 
 93 
/*@ rep */ Person p = new /*@ rep */ Person(); 
We would like to declare the acc local variable using rep as well so that we can mutate 
it. In other words, we would like to declare ourselves as its owner. However, the return type 
of the getAccount method is declared with the rep modifier which means that the owner 
of that object is the Person object itself. Thus, we cannot assign it to a variable which we 
are claiming ownership of ourselves. Instead, we can only declare it to be a any reference. 
/*@ any */ BankAccount acc = p.getAccount(); 
Now, since we have a any reference, we cannot use the withdraw method to update 
acc. Only the owner of acc can update it. If the getBalance method were declared to be 
pure (i.e. it just calculates a value and does not mutate the object) then we could call it, but 
we cannot call non-pure methods or assign to its fields. 
Prevention of argument object dependency 
Let us now re-consider the second block of code: 
Person p = new Person(); 
BankAccount a = new BankAccount(); 
a.deposit(100); 
p.setAccount(acc); 
a.withdraw(200); 
Again, we should declare p using the rep modifier so that we can manipulate it. 
/*@ rep */ Person p = new /*@ rep */ Person(); 
This time, we can also declare a using the rep modifier since we are not constrained by a 
value from elsewhere. Since we are the owners of a we can freely execute the next statement 
which makes a deposit to the account. 
/*@ rep */ BankAccount a = new /*@ rep */ BankAccount(); 
a.deposit(100); 
However, we can no longer pass this BankAccount to the setAccount method of p 
since the method requires as its parameter a BankAccount owned by p. Our 
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BankAccount a is owned by the object whose class contains the code being executed, 
which we have assumed in our premise was not Person. 
 
So the universe type system prevents both of these troublesome situations from arising by 
associating with each object an owner and requiring that only the owner can update the object. 
 
Exploring the restrictions of the Universe type system 
Let us now explore a bit more of what can and cannot be done with the Universe type system. 
Consider the following code: 
/*@ rep */ Person p = new /*@ rep */ Person(); 
/*@ any */ BankAccount a = p.getAccount(); 
p.setAccount(a); 
We saw earlier that we could not retrieve the BankAccount from a Person and then 
mutate it ourselves. This time, we retrieve the BankAccount as a any reference and then 
pass it back to the Person p using the setAccount method. This is fine since we can tell 
that the owner of a is p from the return type of the getAccount method and this fulfils the 
requirement of the setAccount parameter. 
Consider this piece of code: 
/*@ rep */ Person p1 = new /*@ rep */ Person(); 
/*@ rep */ Person p2 = new /*@ rep */ Person(); 
/*@ any */ BankAccount a1 = p1.getAccount(); 
p2.setAccount(a1); 
Here we start by declaring two Person objects: p1 and p2. We retrieve the 
BankAccount of a1 and then attempt to assign it to p2 using the setAccount method. 
This is not allowable since although p1 and p2 are instances of the same class, they are 
different objects. Universes are structured around objects, not classes. From the return type of 
getAccount we know that the owner of p1.getAccount() is p1. The parameter of 
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setAccount is also declared with rep and so the owner of the parameter to 
p2.setAccount must be p2, which p1 is not. 
A larger case study: doubly linked lists with iterators supporting deletion 
Finally, consider the doubly-linked list with iterators which Müller uses to illustrate the 
approach [37]. This example is relatively complicated and cannot be handled by many of the 
other aliasing control mechanisms. 
Consider first the Node class which has references to the previous and next nodes (that are 
in the same universe as this) and a any reference to the value contained at this node named 
elem. 
class Node { 
 public /*@ peer */ Node prev, next; 
 public /*@ any */ Object elem; 
} 
Next let us consider the LinkedList class. Firstly, it contains references to the first and 
last nodes. These are declared using rep and so are owned by this and stored within the 
universe owned by this. This allows only this and the peers of this to manipulate them. 
The iterator method constructs an Iterator as a peer. This, together with the 
remove method, is discussed in the next section. We can also define an equals method 
which tests for deep equality. We can accept a any reference to the other LinkedList (i.e. 
a LinkedList from any other universe) because we only need to inspect it and do not need 
to manipulate it. 
public class LinkedList { 
 protected /*@ rep */ Node first, last; 
 
 public /*@ peer */ Iterator iterator() { 
  return new /*@ peer */ Iterator(this); 
 } 
 void remove(/*@ rep */ Node np) { 
  ... 
 } 
 public boolean equals(/*@ any */ LinkedList l) { 
  /*@ any */ Node f1 = first; 
  /*@ any */ Node f2 = l.first; 
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  while (f1 != last && f2 != l.last && f1.elem == f2.elem) { 
   f1 = f1.next; 
   f2 = f2.next; 
  } 
  return f1 == last && f2 == l.last && f1.elem == f2.elem; 
 } 
 ... 
} 
Now let us consider the Iterator class. The iterator method of the LinkedList 
constructs one of these and returns it to the clients. The iterator has two attributes: the 
LinkedList to iterate over which is from the same universe (and hence declared with 
peer) and a reference to the current Node. We must declare this Node using any since it is 
neither owned by this (rep) or by the owner of this (peer). In fact, we know that the 
owner should be the LinkedList that we are iterating over and we can formalise this in an 
invariant referring to the special owner field. The remove method is of particular interest. 
We cannot implement the deletion ourselves because we are not the owners of the Node and 
so cannot manipulate it. Only the LinkedList containing the nodes can manipulate them. 
We can, however, define a delete method in LinkedList and pass our Node to it. 
public class Iterator { 
 protected /*@ peer */ LinkedList list; 
 protected /*@ any */ Node pos; 
 
 //@ invariant pos.owner == list; 
 
 Iterator(/*@ peer */ LinkedList l) { 
  list = l; 
  pos = l.first; 
 } 
 public /*@ any */ Object next() { 
  /*@ any */ Object result = pos.elem; 
  pos = pos.next; 
  return result; 
 } 
 public void remove() { 
  list.remove(pos); 
 } 
 ... 
} 
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Evaluation of the Universe type system 
We have seen that the Universe type system is fairly powerful. It was able to rule out the 
problems that we met earlier but is still able to model interesting examples like doubly-linked 
lists with iterators that incorporate deletion. Recent work has also shown that it can be applied 
to industrial examples [46]. Certain adjustments are typically needed in the structuring of the 
applications, but these changes encourage a more modular and more maintainable architecture 
and so could be viewed quite favourably. 
There are, however, still some common implementation patterns that it does not support 
[78], e.g. the composite pattern where there is no separate owner through which all 
manipulations take place [60]. New techniques are needed to extend the work to handle these 
problems. 
Currently there is no support for the transfer of ownership or multiple ownership. Transfer 
of ownership could perhaps be achieved through the use of cloning like that which is 
currently used within Omnibus to support value semantics. Handling of multiple ownership 
may require a hybrid approach incorporating aspects of the techniques described in the next 
section. 
4.2.2   Visibility-based invariants 
The second approach is called visibility-based invariants and requires that all the invariants 
that can be affected by a field assignment are visible in the methods that contain the updates. 
Whenever we assign to a field of an object we not only check the invariant of the class the 
code is in but all the other invariants that are visible and could be affected by the changes. 
This approach does not work for the Person-BankAccount example as it is since the 
invariant in class Person is private and so is not visible from the client code outside the 
class. To support this verification mechanism we would have to make the invariant public 
which would require us to make the acc attribute public so that we can refer to it in the 
invariant. We would also have to describe in the specification how this attribute is 
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manipulated so that clients can tell at all times what BankAccount is owned by the object. 
Then any time we mutate a BankAccount object we have to prove that either it is not 
referenced by a Person object and hence cannot violate the invariant or that it is referenced 
by a Person object but maintains the invariant. For our example code snippets, this process 
would raise an error at the final lines where we attempt to mutate the BankAccount objects 
which are referenced by a Person object. 
Visibility-based invariants are very powerful and can be applied in situations where 
ownership-based verification is not possible. However, there are some serious problems with 
the approach [60]. Firstly, it is an intrinsically non-modular approach and involves the sort of 
complicated reasoning that is characteristic of non-modular static verification. Considerably 
more proof obligations are generated since invariants have to be checked whenever field 
assignments take place and not just at the end of the methods in the class that contains the 
declarations of the fields. The proof obligations may also be very complicated since they must 
refer to all the objects in the heap. Secondly, the visibility requirement is very strict. For 
example, if an invariant involving an array is defined then any method that uses an array must 
be checked to make sure it does not violate the invariant. Thirdly, subtyping causes real 
problems for the visibility requirement since a subclass may be defined in a separate package 
where it cannot see a relevant invariant. 
The complexity of the visibility-based invariant approach compromises the ability to 
which it can be automated and, by being non-modular, will not scale well. 
Future work on the combination of support for reference semantics with the value 
semantics techniques of the Omnibus language are discussed in section 9.3.1. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Combining verification approaches 
In this thesis we focus on three assertion-based techniques for the integrated specification, 
implementation and verification of object-oriented software: Run-time Assertion Checking 
(RAC) [68], Extended Static Checking (ESC) [41] and Full Formal Verification (FFV) [34]. 
RAC and ESC are lightweight approaches which accept programs annotated with lightweight 
specifications that describe some key properties, but do not attempt to be complete in any 
sense. In RAC, the lightweight assertion annotations are converted into run-time checks and 
the application is then tested to uncover assertion failures. The key contribution of RAC to the 
testing process is the ability to detect errors close to source, easing analysis and correction. In 
ESC, the consistency between code and its assertion annotations is checked statically 
allowing errors to be detected without testing. The process depends on the presence of a 
powerful fully-automated theorem prover such as Simplify [36]. ESC is neither sound nor 
complete, aiming simply to detect assertion violations and a range of common run-time 
errors. FFV, or full formal verification, provides support for traditional, heavyweight 
assertion-based verification. The approach requires the production of heavyweight 
specifications (also known as Behavioural Interface Specifications [59]) for all components 
being verified and a range of code-annotations such as loop invariants. Again, the code is 
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statically analysed and verification is performed with the use of either a fully-automated or 
interactive theorem prover. 
The different assertion-based verification approaches provide different balances between 
rigour and ease of use, matching the different balances between reliability requirements and 
development resources in different parts of a software development project. The approaches 
also have neatly complementing strengths and weaknesses. The lightweight RAC and ESC 
approaches allow reliability to be improved without requiring prohibitive investments in time 
and effort, but ESC breaks down somewhat in the presence of external components and RAC 
requires the use of testing to uncover failures. In contrast, FFV is capable of sufficiently 
describing and statically verifying external components, but its costs cannot typically be 
justified unless the component is going to be reused in different projects or reliability is 
critical. We are interested in allowing the different approaches to be used together in an 
integrated fashion within different parts of the same project. 
Traditionally, support for these approaches has been developed by separate teams, yielding 
separate tools often targeting separate languages. JML has provided a common language for a 
range of lightweight and heavyweight assertion-based verification tools but those tools are 
still developed and used separately. Even comparative case studies from the JML group have, 
until recently, used the tools independently rather than in an integrated fashion [51] although 
there were suggestions of using the approaches together. In [51], Jacobs et al. proposed using 
ESC to guide the selective application of FFV. The idea is first to apply ESC to the entire 
project, verifying much of it, and then to use interactive FFV to attempt to verify the 
remainder. In [30], Cok and Kiniry discussed how beneficial they thought it would be to have 
an integration of tools that support JML, but at the time there was no tool support for this. 
Other tools have combined static and dynamic checking to some extent. Spec# [10] uses a 
combination of static and dynamic techniques to verify its assertion annotations. They exploit 
the fact that constructs that are difficult to statically check are often relatively easy to 
dynamically check and vice versa. Their approach, however, uses a combination of static and 
dynamic checking to support their single form of verification, whereas we offer a range of 
CHAPTER 5 COMBINING VERIFICATION APPROACHES 
 101 
verification approaches of varying rigour. Other tools like PerfectDeveloper [33] include 
provisions to generate RAC pre-condition checks to ensure that the assumptions on which the 
proofs of correctness are made are not violated by calls made from unverified code. 
Our integrated support for ESC and FFV hinges on our generic logic which allows us to 
support interactive and automated provers. While ESC and FFV tools have been implemented 
separately, many FFV tools support the use of both automated and interactive provers (e.g. [2, 
3, 9, 19]) and some support different interactive theorem provers (e.g. [72]). 
Independently of our own work on the integrated use of approaches together [97, 101-
103], people in the JML community have been working towards the integration of ESC and 
interactive verification (which  comes within our definition of FFV) [57]. More recently, an 
architecture of JML4 has been proposed which will allow the integration of RAC, ESC and 
FFV [23]. The proposal does not include anything similar to our concept of verification 
policies. 
Portions of this chapter have previously been presented elsewhere [102, 103]. 
5.1   Addressing limitations of ESC with the other 
approaches 
We start by selecting one approach, ESC, and discuss some of the reasons why it has been 
relatively well received. We then illustrate a key flaw in the approach and show how the other 
approaches help address it. 
5.1.1   Strengths of ESC 
The ESC approach provides a push-button technique to statically detect a range of possible 
run-time errors and violations of lightweight specifications. It provides better error coverage 
than conventional type checking, and allows problems to be uncovered earlier in the software 
development cycle than RAC, when they are cheaper to correct, without the need to use 
testing. Furthermore, it requires considerably less effort to use than FFV. 
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ESC tools feel like type checkers to use, producing type checker-like error messages that 
developers are generally more receptive to than traditional formal methods. The approach 
uses lightweight interface specifications that allow design decisions to be documented, and 
warns of inconsistencies between these annotations and the code. While appearing like type 
checkers to the user, the implementations of ESC tools have more in common with traditional 
formal verification tools, utilizing fully automated theorem provers behind-the-scenes. The 
approach is neither sound (so it can miss errors) nor complete (so it can report spurious 
warnings) but is relatively easy to use, fast and powerful. ESC has been fairly well received 
[62] and appears to hold great promise. 
5.1.2   A Problem with ESC 
There is, however, a critical problem with ESC: the lightweight specifications developed 
while using ESC to check a particular class may not be sufficient as a basis for later static 
modular checking of classes that use this class. In this section we will illustrate this problem 
by presenting an example, showing how the ESC approach is used to the point where it breaks 
down, show the facilities ESC provides for coping with this situation, and then investigate 
how RAC and FFV handle the problem. 
When applying ESC to a particular class, the process typically starts by taking an 
unannotated or partially annotated piece of code and using an ESC tool to check for errors. 
This will usually yield a number of warnings indicating a combination of bugs in the code and 
incompleteness in the specifications of the current class or a class it uses. The user will then 
enter into a cycle of correcting code and adding annotations to address the issues raised until 
the tool processes the class without warnings. 
Consider the following Omnibus example adapted from the classic example presented in 
the founding paper on ESC/Java [41]. It represents a Bag class which is constructed from a 
List of elements of which the minimums can subsequently be removed, in turn, using the 
extractMin operation. Comparisons are carried out using a passed Comparator object. 
CHAPTER 5 COMBINING VERIFICATION APPROACHES 
 103 
An Array is used to store the elements, with the first size positions in the array arr 
containing the elements currently in the Bag. The constructor copies all the elements from the 
passed List into the Array and sets size to the size of the passed List. The 
extractMin operation calculates the index and value of the minimum element and then 
copies the last element in the Array to that index, reduces the size by one and returns the 
minimum element. The Optional class is used to model possibly null values. This class has 
two constructors: nil for where no value is provided and of for where there is a value. We 
will add annotations later as needed to respond to errors reported by our ESC tool. 
 1: public class Bag[Element] { 
 2:  private attribute arr:Array[Element] 
 3:  private attribute size:integer 
 4:  private attribute comparer:Comparator[Element] 
 5:  
 6:  public constructor containing 
 7:    (input:List[Element], 
 8:     comp:Comparator[Element]) 
 9:  { 
10:   comparer := comp; 
11:   size := input.size(); 
12:   arr := Array[Element].ofSize(size); 
13:   for (i := 0 to size - 1) { 
14:    arr.assign(i, 
15:         Optional[Element].of(input.elementAt(i))); 
16:   } 
17:  } 
18:  
19:  public operation extractMin(out min:Element) 
20:  { 
21:   var minIndex:integer := 0; 
22:   min := arr.access(0).value(); 
23:   for (i := 1 to size-1) { 
24:    if (comparer.compare(arr.access(i).value(), 
25:                min) = Ordering.before()) { 
26:     minIndex := i; 
27:     min := arr.access(i).value(); 
28:    } 
29:   } 
30:   size := size - 1; 
31:   arr.assign(minIndex, arr.access(size)); 
32:  } 
33: } 
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Applying ESC to this example using our Omnibus IDE verification tool yields the 
following warnings: 
Bag.obs:22: Unable to verify public requires clause of the 
access function declared in omni.lang.Array at line 6 
Bag.obs:22: Unable to verify public requires clause of the 
value function declared in omni.lang.Optional at line 6 
Bag.obs:24: Unable to verify public requires clause of the 
access function declared in omni.lang.Array at line 6 
Bag.obs:24: Unable to verify public requires clause of the 
value function declared in omni.lang.Optional at line 6 
Bag.obs:31: Unable to verify public requires clause of the 
access function declared in omni.lang.Array at line 6 
These warnings expose undocumented design decisions. For example, the first of the 
errors at line 24 warns that i may not be a valid index of the arr array. We know from the 
loop condition that to reach these lines i must be less than or equal to size-1 but there is no 
known connection between size and arr.length() and so we cannot tell whether i < 
arr.length(). The reader may argue that the implementation of the constructor together 
with the implementation of the extractMin operation should be sufficient to deduce this 
but our ESC tool uses modular checking of methods. When reasoning about the 
extractMin operation, it can reason about the other methods in the class using only their 
specifications. The developers of the ESC/Java tool adopt the same position since modular 
checking is essential if the approach is to scale [41]. 
In order to get the Omnibus ESC tool to accept the Bag class we need to add the following 
invariants to formalize the intended relationship between size and arr, and a pre-condition 
that the Bag must be non-empty before extractMin can be used. The invariants must be 
established by the end of the body of the containing constructor, can be assumed at the 
start of the extractMin operation, and must be re-established by the end of the body of 
extractMin. To describe the pre-condition of extractMin we need to make the size 
of the Bag publicly accessible by introducing a new public function to return it. 
private invariant size >= 0 && size <= arr.length() 
private invariant forall (i:integer := 0 to size-1): 
     !arr.access(i).isNil() 
public model function size():integer 
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 private returns size 
public operation extractMin(out min:Element) 
 requires size() > 0 
These alterations permit the code to pass the checks performed by our ESC tool and so the 
user can move on to another class. Consider the IntegerSorter class shown below which 
uses an instance of the Bag class to sort a List of integers. It starts by constructing a Bag 
from the passed List and an initially empty List named sortedInts into which the 
sorted values will be put. It then repeatedly extracts the minimum from the Bag, adds it to the 
List until the Bag is empty at which point it returns the sortedInts. The function 
contains an ensures clause asserting that the sortedInts list is of the same size as the 
input list. 
1: public class IntegerSorter { 
2: public static function sort 
3:          (ints:List[Integer]) 
4:      :List[Integer] 
5:   ensures result.size() = ints.size() { 
6:  var b:Bag := Bag.containing(ints,  
7:    DefaultIntegerComparator.init()); 
8:  var sortedInts:List[Integer]  
9:    := List[Integer].empty(); 
10:   while (b.size() > 0) { 
11:    var m:integer; 
12:    b.extractMin(out m); 
13:    sortedInts.add(m); 
14:   } 
15:   return sortedInts; 
16:  } 
15: } 
Applying ESC to this example yields the following warning: 
IntegerSorter.obs:16: Unable to verify public ensures clause 
of sort function declared at line 5 holds at return 
statement 
The tool is unable to deduce that the size of the returned List is equal to the size of the 
passed List. This is because the specification of the Bag class does not explain how the 
containing constructor and extractMin operation alter the size of the Bag. Once 
again, this is a product of the fact that, in the modular checking process, methods can only 
reason about other methods using their specifications. 
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We have now hit the problem: the lightweight specification we developed through 
verification of the Bag class is insufficient as a basis for the modular checking of our new 
class IntegerSorter. 
In ESC there are two techniques we can use to cope with this eventuality: 
1. iteratively increase the detail of the original specification or  
2. use assumption constructs. 
Iteratively increasing the detail of the original specification 
The first and most obvious approach is to return to our Bag specification and add to the 
specification the details the tool needs to verify the new class. In this case, we simply need to 
describe how the containing constructor and extractMin operation change the size of 
the Bag. This is made easier by the fact that we have already defined a public size function. 
Hence we can alter the headers of the containing and extractMin methods in our Bag 
class to be: 
public constructor containing(input:List[Element], 
        comp:Comparator[Element]) 
 ensures size() = input.size() 
 
public operation extractMin(out min:Element) 
 requires size() > 0 
 ensures size() = old size() - 1 
With these additional annotations, the ESC tool is able to successfully deduce that the size 
of the input and returned lists in the IntegerSorter.sort method are equal. 
While this has solved the original problem, there is still a host of related problems lying in 
wait. The problem was triggered by the ensures clause of the IntegerSorter.sort 
method which stated that the sizes of the source List and the sorted List should be equal. 
Of course, we might want to more completely characterize this method. For example, the 
entries in the result should be ordered and result should be a permutation of the input. If we 
wanted to include such things in the ensures clause of IntegerSorter.sort then we 
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would need to further augment the Bag specification to describe how the contents are 
manipulated and how the values returned relate to them. 
This approach assumes that the users of the tool are developing the classes being analysed 
themselves or at least have access to the original source code in order to deduce and add 
assertion annotations. However, this may not always be the case. Realistic applications are 
made up of code written specifically for the application being developed, components reused 
from built-in libraries, and possibly components produced by third-party component vendors. 
If the specifications of the external components (i.e. the components developed by others) are 
insufficient as a basis for the modular checking then iteratively increasing the detail of the 
specification in this way is not an option. 
A variation of this technique could be used for external components where specifications 
are provided “out-of-band”, i.e. separately from the component [10]. So whereas the client 
may not have access to the inner details of the external component, they do have read/write 
access to the specification of the component. However, without access to the original code, 
they have no way of determining the subtleties of exactly how the implementation handles 
different circumstances and no way of checking their best guesses. 
Use of assumption constructs 
The other major technique which we can use to get around this problem in ESC is to make use 
of assumption constructs. One such assumption construct is the assume statement which 
permits the user to give an assertion to be added to the system’s current knowledge without 
further justification. So, for example, when we found that the specification of the Bag class 
was insufficient to verify that the sizes of the input List and sorted List are equal, we 
could simply have added an assume statement to say that they should be. Such a statement 
could be placed just before the return statement and would appear as follows: 
15a: assume sortedInts.size() = ints.size(); 
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This would then enable the system to deduce the truth of the ensures clause at the end 
of the method. 
The problem with assumption constructs is obvious: they are, as their name implies, 
assumptions without formal justification within the system. They are unsound and allow the 
user to circumvent the entire checking process. However, they do allow the user to suppress 
spurious warnings and can be used in conjunction with external components as well as pieces 
of code written by the developers themselves. Furthermore, while there is no basis for the 
assumptions within the system, the user can base them upon informal information such as the 
names of the class and methods, associated interface documentation and domain information. 
They can then include descriptions of informal justification as comments within the code. We 
will also see how they can be used in conjunction with RAC. 
5.1.3   Plugging the gaps in ESC with RAC and FFV 
Let us now consider how the other approaches can help address this problem. 
Incorporating RAC 
RAC is another approach that we can use to verify the correctness of an application relative to 
lightweight specifications. We can take our Bag and IntegerSorter classes with their 
specifications, generate an implementation incorporating run-time assertion checks, and then 
test it to detect failures. The key advantage of RAC in tackling this problem is that while in 
ESC the specification of a class forms the sole basis for verification of its use in classes that 
use it, in RAC the implementation can be used to check properties that were not described by 
the specification. Taking our example, the incompleteness of the lightweight specification of 
the Bag class would not cause a problem for the verification of the IntegerSorter class 
using RAC. This is because, although the specification does not explicitly describe how the 
size changes, the implementation does and that is what is used to check assertions in RAC. 
Another way of looking at this is that RAC never gives a warning unless there is a run-time 
error or a violation of an assertion, whereas ESC also reports warnings if the specifications 
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are insufficient to perform static modular checking. So RAC does not suffer from this crucial 
limitation although it has its own limitations (like the need to be associated with a testing 
strategy in order to detect assertion failures) that prevent it being an ideal replacement. 
We have seen how assumption constructs are a useful way to provide additional 
information about components although they have no formal basis within the ESC system and 
so can be used to circumvent the verification process. However, while the assumption 
constructs cannot be verified statically, they can be converted into RAC checks. Thus ESC 
can be used to check everything except the assumption constructs, and RAC can be used to 
check the assumption constructs. This can be applied to our IntegerSorter example, the 
class being verified by the ESC tool, assuming that the assume statement holds, something 
that can then be verified by testing the application with its generated RAC run-time checks. 
This technique is used by the Spec# tool [10]. 
Incorporating FFV 
Up until this point, we have considered only lightweight specifications and approaches. 
However, an obvious solution to the problem of lightweight specifications not providing 
sufficient information is to write more descriptive heavyweight specifications. By using these 
together with FFV we can get around the problem, since a heavyweight specification can be 
sufficiently informative to provide a basis for static modular checking. However, FFV is too 
costly to form an ideal complete replacement for ESC. 
Let us for the moment restrict our attention to reusable components, i.e. components that 
have been written by another developer, whose source code we have no access to, and whose 
specification we have read-only access to. There has been a wide range of work on reusable 
software components. To safely reuse components from external sources we need two things: 
1. specifications that sufficiently describe the interface of the component [71], and  
2. sufficient basis to trust that the implementation satisfies the specification [70].  
The problem is that ESC does not completely address either of these issues. However, 
FFV can. The heavyweight specifications produced for FFV provide a way of sufficiently 
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describing the interface of a component and its associated verification approach provides a 
basis for trusting a hidden implementation. Also, while the costs of FFV cannot typically be 
justified for entire applications, the economies of scale make it a more attractive proposition 
for reusable components. So suppose the Bag class was developed by a third-party 
component vendor. They could use FFV to fully specify and verify their component, giving a 
specification with all the information needed to check the IntegerSorter class. An 
outline of a heavyweight specification of the Bag class is given below: 
public class Bag[Element] { 
 private attribute arr:Array[Element] 
 private attribute size:integer 
 private attribute comparer:Comparator[Element] 
 ... 
 public model function contents():List[Element] 
  private returns arr.range(0,size).toList() 
 
 public model function comparer():Comparator[Element] 
  private returns comparer 
 
 public function size():integer 
  returns contents().size() 
 
 public constructor containing 
         (input:List[Element], 
       comp:Comparator[Element]) 
  ensures contents() = input, 
    comparer() = comp 
 { ... } 
 
 public operation extractMin(out min:Element) 
  requires size() > 0 
  changes contents 
  ensures old contents().contains(min), 
   forall (e:Element in old contents()): 
    comparer() 
      .compare(min, e).isBeforeOrSame(), 
   forall (e:Element in old contents()): 
    if e = min then 
     contents().countOf(e)  
     = old contents().countOf(e)– 1 
    else 
     contents().countOf(e) 
     = old contents().countOf(e) 
 { ... } 
} 
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If we are verifying the IntegerSorter class using FFV then the tool can use this 
heavyweight specification to reason about the Bag class. However, the ESC tool is not able to 
effectively reason about it because of its use of the recursive countOf method. We will look 
at how we can ESC-check the IntegerSorter class using this specification in a later 
section. 
5.2   Guidance on how to use the approaches together 
There are a number of problems that can arise when using the approaches together. These 
occur when, in using a particular approach to verify a class, we have to reason about the use 
of a class that was verified using a different approach. In this section we present some 
guidelines for avoiding conflicts between the approaches. We have included “unverified” as a 
class of verification since the application may contain classes that are not verified with any of 
the approaches; interactions with such classes may be particularly troublesome. 
Note that we consider the problems from the point of view of a class using another class, 
where the usage is strictly directed. For example, the IntegerSorter class uses the Bag 
class, but the Bag class does not use the IntegerSorter class, so we only consider the 
problems caused by the incompatibilities of the two specifications from the point of view of 
the IntegerSorter class. Of course, it may be possible to have bi-directional usage links; 
where these occur we treat them as two separate usage links.  
5.2.1   RAC- and ESC-compatibility 
A key problem with combining the different assertion-based verification approaches is that 
not all specifications can be converted to efficient run-time checks and handled by the 
automated provers used by ESC. We refer to these properties as RAC- and ESC-
compatibility, respectively. 
RAC-compatibility is the more straightforward to define. Certain specification constructs 
like quantifiers and recursion can cause problems for run-time assertion checkers. We can 
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check quantifiers at run-time if their variables are restricted to enumerable ranges, but even if 
we do this it may not be practical for efficiency reasons. Care must also be taken with 
recursion so as to avoid non-termination (a potential source of unsoundness in our approach) 
and situations where evaluation of the assertion describing the intended behaviour of the 
method is as costly as the execution of the method itself. To ensure RAC-compatibility the 
developer must ensure that all specifications that need to be checked at run-time can be 
converted into efficient checks. In the next section we will see that we must consider RAC-
compatibility even when we are using one of the other approaches to verify a component. 
The Omnibus tool is able to check whether assertions are executable by ensuring they do 
not use certain constructs like quantifiers without enumerable ranges. The efficiency aspect is 
trickier. Test harnesses can be used to help assess the efficiency but what is acceptable will be 
dependent on the context. Run-time overheads may prevent the use of assertion checks in 
certain final products, but they may still be useful in pre-release testing. 
ESC-compatibility is more complex to define. Firstly, certain constructs like recursion 
cannot typically be handled by automated provers and so are not ESC-compatible. However, 
automated provers can run into problems even when using specifications that do not use such 
features. Although quantifiers can usually be handled, complicated combinations will often 
defeat them. Every prover will have things that it can handle well and, as a consequence of 
undecidability of the problem, will also have things that it handles poorly. A possible 
approach is to define ESC-compatibility relative to the specific theorem proving capabilities 
of the ESC tool being used. To determine whether a specification is ESC-compatible for a 
particular tool, we must experiment with that tool. The Omnibus IDE supports the definition 
of test harnesses which can be used to carry out this experimentation. A problem with this 
definition of ESC-compatibility is that it is implementation dependent, which will become 
more of an issue as the community moves towards interchangeable provers. 
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5.2.2   Guidelines for avoiding conflicts between approaches 
We have developed a set of guidelines to help developers to avoid conflicts between the 
approaches. 
1. All pre-conditions of methods should be RAC- and ESC-compatible if they are 
called from RAC- or ESC-verified classes. 
2. All post-conditions of methods should be ESC-compatible if they are called from 
ESC-verified classes. 
3. All assertions should be checked using at least one of the approaches. 
4. A class should not directly use a less rigorously verified one where RAC, ESC and 
FFV offer verification at increasing levels of rigour. 
Guidelines 1 and 2 are to do with the compatibility of specifications between approaches. 
Guideline 3 ensures that when the approaches are used together, no assertion checks are 
missed. Guideline 4 describes forms of integration that will be troublesome and should be 
avoided. 
Guideline 1: Pre-condition compatibility 
Guideline 1 says that the pre-conditions for all methods should be RAC- and ESC-compatible 
if an RAC- or ESC-verified class calls the method. As was discussed earlier, to ensure RAC- 
and ESC-compatibility, the developer should attempt to write the pre-conditions in a suitable 
form, e.g. avoiding the use of recursion and providing enumerable ranges for quantified 
variables wherever possible, allowing them to be converted into run-time checks. However, to 
sufficiently describe the pre-condition of a method, it may be necessary to use assertions that 
cannot be handled by RAC and ESC. 
As a somewhat artificial example, consider the following extract of a Set class verified 
using FFV. The public specifications are described in terms of the contains and size 
public model functions, which are implemented using a private List attribute named 
contents. We ensure that contents contains no duplicates by using an invariant so 
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that we can calculate the size of the Set by taking the size of the contents List and do 
not need to remove any duplicates first. We define a unionOfDisjoints operation to 
calculate the union of the set with another set. The pre-condition of the 
unionOfDisjoints operation is expressed in terms of the contains model function 
using a quantifier without an enumerable range. Thus, the system cannot automatically 
generate an appropriate run-time check to guard this method. We may wish to write a 
quantifier to iterate over the contents attribute that is used to implement the contains 
model function, but we cannot refer to this private attribute in the public specification of 
unionOfDisjoints. 
public class Set[Element] { 
 private attribute contents:List[Element] 
 
 private invariant "No duplicates in contents": 
  !(exists (i:integer := 0 to contents.size()-1, 
    j:integer := 0 to contents.size()-1): 
   i != j 
   && contents.elementAt(i) 
     = contents.elementAt(j))  
 
 public model function contains(e:Element):boolean 
  private returns contents.contains(e) 
 
 public model function size():integer 
  private returns contents.size() 
 
 ... 
 
 public operation unionOfDisjoints(s2:Set[Element]) 
  requires "Sets must be disjoint": 
      forall (e:Element): 
       !(this.contains(e) && s2.contains(e)) 
  changes contains 
  ensures 
       contains(e) = old contains(e) || s2.contains(e), 
       size() = old size() + s2.size() 
} 
We can combat this problem by rewriting pre-conditions involving unconstrained 
quantifiers using separate new functions that are described using a method with the 
troublesome assertion in its post-condition and an implementation defining how to implement 
the check. This solves the problem of RAC-compatibility since the dynamic checks will use 
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the implementation of the new function to check the pre-condition, whereas the static 
approach can use the post-condition of the new function described using the unexecutable 
assertion. What we have exploited here is that RAC only requires that the pre-conditions and 
the implementations of called classes can be executed. 
For example, in the Set class we could introduce an isDisjointTo function and 
define the pre-condition of the unionOfDisjoints operation in terms of it. The system 
will then be able to convert the pre-condition of the unionOfDisjoints operation into a 
run-time check, using the implementation of the isDisjointTo function. Run-time checks 
do not need to be generated for the post-conditions in the Set class since the verification of 
the Set class using FFV will prove these, provided that the pre-conditions hold at the start of 
the method (which the run-time checks ensure). The FFV verification of the Set class can 
still reason about the pre-condition of the unionOfDisjoints operation in terms of the 
unconstrained quantifier which now appears in the post-condition of the isDisjointTo 
function. Furthermore, the FFV verification of the Set class will require the developer to 
prove that the isDisjointTo function satisfies its post-condition, ensuring that the 
developer has implemented the check properly. 
 public operation unionOfDisjoints(s2:Set[Element]) 
  requires "Sets must be disjoint": 
      this.isDisjointTo(s2) 
  changes contains 
  ensures 
      contains(e) = old contains(e) || s2.contains(e), 
       size() = old size() + s2.size() 
 { ... } 
 
 public function isDisjointTo(s2:Set[Element]):boolean 
  ensures result <==>  
         (forall (e:Element):  
      !(this.contains(e) 
      && s2.contains(e))) 
 { 
  // Check all elements in 'this' are not in 's2' 
  foreach (e:Element in contents) { 
   if (s2.contains(e)) { 
    return false; 
   } 
  } 
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  // Check all elements in 's2' are not in 'this' 
  foreach (e:Element in s2.contents) { 
   if (contains(e)) { 
    return false; 
   } 
  } 
  return true; 
 } 
This approach can also be used to ensure ESC-compatibility when used in conjunction 
with guideline 2. A new function can be introduced to move a non ESC-compatible assertion 
from the pre-condition of the original method to the post-condition of a new method where 
redundant specifications can be used to provide a partial, ESC-compatible description of the 
method. Additional assumptions about the value of the method can then be easily formulated 
in the client code as appropriate. 
Guideline 2: Post-condition compatibility 
Guideline 2 says that the post-conditions for all methods should be ESC-compatible if an 
ESC-verified class calls the method. Post-conditions are even more prone to ESC-
compatibility problems since, in FFV, heavyweight specifications may have been required to 
sufficiently describe the method. 
This problem can be addressed by using which ensures clauses to provide lightweight 
ESC-compatible redundant specifications for non ESC-compatible ensures clauses. 
Redundant specifications are generally used to express properties that should follow from the 
standard specification. Our idea is that if the post-condition of a method in a FFV-verified 
class cannot be handled by ESC, then a redundant specification is provided giving a 
lightweight specification that should follow from the original specification but does not have 
to be complete in any sense. For example, while the heavyweight Bag specification in section 
5.1.3 provides all the information necessary to verify our IntegerSorter class, its use of 
the recursive countOf method means the ESC tool cannot effectively deduce that the size of 
the Bag is decreased by one in the extractMin method. We can provide this information 
CHAPTER 5 COMBINING VERIFICATION APPROACHES 
 117 
in a form accessible to the ESC tool via a lightweight redundant specification like the one 
shown below. 
public operation extractMin(out min:Element) 
 requires size() > 0 
 changes contents 
 ensures ... 
 which ensures size() = old size() - 1 
In this case we discovered that the heavyweight Bag specification from section 5.1.3 was 
not ESC-compatible when we attempted to verify the IntegerSorter class using ESC. 
Alternatively we could have defined a test case within the Bag class to check its ESC-
compatibility. Omnibus tests can have a policy specified in a policy clause; if present, this 
indicates that the specified approach should be used to verify the test. So an FFV-verified 
Bag class we can define a test to be verified using ESC. We refer to tests to be verified with 
RAC, ESC or FFV as RAC-targeted, ESC-targeted or FFV-targeted tests, respectively. 
Now, if we are using FFV to verify the use of a class that was verified using FFV then we 
would use its original heavyweight specification and, if we are using ESC to verify the use of 
a class that was verified using FFV, we would use its lightweight redundant specification. Of 
course, the lightweight redundant specifications suffer from the same incompleteness 
problems as any other lightweight specifications. Normally, when using ESC, the lightweight 
specification and the code is all we have. If we do not have access to the code then we have to 
use assumption constructs based on informal domain knowledge or interface documentation. 
However, in this situation the developer can refer to the heavyweight specification in order to 
determine if assumption constructs are valid. These justifications could be informally 
documented in comments within the code or formally verified with FFV. 
In our experience, the majority of methods can be written to be ESC-compatible and, for 
those that cannot, redundant specifications are generally easy to write and are useful to verify 
some desired properties of the specification. 
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Guideline 3: Assertion coverage 
Guideline 3 states that all assertions should be checked using at least one of the approaches. 
For example, every time a method is called, its pre-condition should be checked and every 
time an ESC assume statement is used it should be checked by another approach to ensure 
that it is true. The use of different approaches for different classes can make it possible for 
assertions to be missed because RAC checks assertions in a different way from ESC and FFV. 
In ESC and FFV, the caller of a method is responsible for checking the pre-condition of the 
method whereas, in our RAC approach, the called method is responsible for checking its own 
pre-condition. 
The Omnibus IDE provides two tools for tracking the verification performed: the check 
viewer and the obligation viewer. The check viewer displays the details of the verification that 
was performed on a file. This is useful because the errors only describe the things that were 
checked and failed, but the programmer may be interested in reviewing the things that were 
checked and passed. 
Consider the situation where we use ESC to verify the Bag class and RAC to verify the 
IntegerSorter class. Since we use RAC to verify the IntegerSorter class, a run-
time check will be generated for the ensures clause of the sort function. This is the only 
check that is generated for the file and, given an appropriate test case, it is checked so the 
check viewer (shown below) reports that the verification was successful. 
 
No run-time check was generated for the pre-condition of the extractMin operation of 
the Bag class called from the sort function in the IntegerSorter class because in our 
RAC approach it is the responsibility of the method being called to run-time check its pre-
condition. However, the Bag class has no checks because it was verified using ESC, not 
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RAC. So there is a gap in the assertion coverage of the approaches. The assertion to check the 
requires clause of the extractMin operation call is not being checked by any of the 
approaches. The first problem is how we can detect this situation, the second being how we 
can correct it. 
In order to detect the situation, Omnibus supports the generation of correctness obligations 
which give details of all the assertions that need to be checked for each class. In order to 
ensure assertion coverage, justification should be provided for each correctness obligation. 
Justification can take the form of the execution of a run-time assertion check or the proof of 
an appropriate VC. The obligation viewer tool displays the correctness obligations for a class 
together with any corresponding justification. A screenshot of the tool is shown below. The 
correctness obligations are shown as special comments within a tree display of the source of 
the class. Ticks indicate that there are no unjustified correctness obligations in a branch. 
Exclamation marks indicate that there are some unjustified correctness obligations in a 
branch. Crosses are used to indicate errors (i.e. obligations which have a failed run-time check 
or failed VC as justification). The screenshot indicates that, when RAC is used for the 
IntegerSorter class and ESC is used for the Bag class, there is an unjustified 
correctness obligation that the requires clause of the extractMin operation is satisfied. 
ESC assume statements would also appear as unjustified correctness obligations unless they 
were checked using one of the other approaches. 
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Correctness obligations are also used to identify special cases which should be verified 
using different policies, as discussed in section 5.3.2, and as the basis for the certification 
system discussed in chapter 6. 
In order to ensure no pre-condition checks are missed, all classes should, in general, 
include run-time checks of their pre-conditions because, while calls made from statically 
verified code should satisfy the pre-conditions, calls from RAC-verified or unverified code 
may not. Hence, ESC- and FFV-verified classes that were verified under the assumption that 
their pre-conditions are always respected, may have that assumption broken. This may lead to 
a run-time error or assertion failure being generated within the execution of the statically 
verified class, even though the cause of the error was the silent violation of the pre-condition 
by the calling class, and not a fault in the implementation of the statically verified class. To 
guard against this we must ensure that any methods called by unverified or RAC-verified 
classes must have their pre-conditions checked at run-time so that invalid calls of these 
methods can be identified and reported correctly to the user. If, however, the class being 
considered is for use only within this system and all the classes that use the class have been 
statically checked then, for efficiency reasons, the checks can be omitted. 
Guideline 4: Non-decreasing rigour 
Guideline 4 advises that a class should not directly use (i.e. instantiate and call methods of) 
another class which was verified using a less rigorous verification approach. RAC, ESC and 
FFV provide verification at increasing levels of rigour. An ESC-verified class should not 
directly use an unverified class because the unverified class will have no specification that can 
be used to reason about its method calls. If an ESC-verified class uses an RAC-verified class, 
the specifications in the RAC-verified class may need to be enhanced so that they include 
constructs, such as private ensures clauses for model functions and changes clauses, 
which are not required for RAC but are essential for the use of ESC. Similarly, FFV-verified 
classes should not directly use unverified, RAC-verified or ESC-verified classes because the 
specifications of those classes will not be sufficient. 
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Guideline 4 states that these combinations of approaches should be avoided. If the entire 
application has been developed by a single person then it is always possible to structure the 
application so that these combinations are avoided. We can achieve this by either increasing 
the level of verification used for the client class or by decreasing the level of verification for 
the supplier class. For example, it is not allowable to use FFV to verify the IntegerSorter 
along with ESC for the Bag class, but we can either increase the verification of the Bag class 
to FFV or decrease the verification of the IntegerSorter class to ESC. The situation may 
be complicated by the relationships with other classes in the system. For example, there may 
be another class in the system that uses Bag and is also verified using FFV, in which case we 
should probably increase the verification of Bag to FFV rather than decrease the verification 
of IntegerSorter to ESC. In the extreme we will be forced to increase the verification 
level of the entire application to FFV or decrease it to RAC/ESC but, in general, it will be 
possible to have intermediate levels of verification. We will discuss this further in section 
5.2.3. 
While we can always follow guideline 4 if we have developed all the classes in the 
application ourselves, applications will usually make some use of external components either 
from built-in libraries or component vendors. These pose a problem since we cannot change 
their level of verification to fit the verification levels of the other classes in our application. 
Let us suppose that the Bag class is an external component. If it was verified using ESC/RAC 
then we are constrained to use ESC/RAC to verify the IntegerSorter class. However, if 
it was verified using FFV then, assuming guidelines 1, 2 and 3 are followed, we are free to 
use any one of RAC, ESC or FFV to verify our IntegerSorter class. We view this as a 
sufficient justification to favour the use of FFV for reusable components wherever possible 
[97]. 
The following table enumerates the allowable calling relationships between classes 
verified using the different approaches along with the corresponding constraints. This table is 
read as follows. Suppose, for example, that we wish to work out whether, when verifying the 
CHAPTER 5 COMBINING VERIFICATION APPROACHES 
 122 
IntegerSorter class using ESC, we can use a version of the Bag class verified using 
FFV. To do this, we look up the ESC row and FFV column and find we can, providing that 
non ESC-compatible post-conditions have lightweight redundant specification substitutes. 
 
Can use classes verified using Approach 
None RAC ESC FFV 
     
Unverified Y Y Y1 Y1 
RAC Y Y Y1 Y1 
ESC N2 Y3,4 Y4 Y5 
FFV N6 N6 N6 Y 
 
Constraints: 
1. Providing that pre-conditions are dynamically checked and do not contain non 
RAC-compatible constructs like unconstrained quantifiers. 
2. Unless all calls of the methods of this class are guarded by appropriate assume 
and assert statements. This will be cumbersome unless the number of calls is 
small. 
3. Providing that the specifications are ESC-compatible. 
4. Using assumption constructs or, if the class is not an external component, iterative 
strengthening of specifications to handle incompleteness problems. 
5. Providing non ESC-compatible post-conditions have lightweight redundant 
specification substitutes. 
6. Unless the FFV approach is weakened to allow assumptions (as discussed in 
section 5.2.3) and all calls of the methods of this class are guarded by appropriate 
assume and assert statements. This will be cumbersome unless the number of calls 
is small. 
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5.2.3   Recommendations for when to use each approach 
The preceding section described the ways in which it is possible to use the approaches 
together. It described which combinations are invalid and the constraints that the 
combinations of the other approaches must satisfy in order to be valid. However, for realistic 
systems, there will still be multiple ways in which the system could be divided up into 
sections where different approaches are used. While there are no definite rules on how to 
select a particular verification approach for each section, and part of the point of our work is 
to give developers flexibility to make such choices themselves, we have created some general 
guidelines to assist the developer. Developers must also be conscious of the consequences of 
their choices of verification approaches for the different classes in their application, and we 
also discuss this. 
General guidelines 
When to use ESC: Our opinion is that ESC, together with dynamic checking of assume 
statements, is the best approach for the majority of classes. We recommend the use of ESC 
unless the class being verified falls into one of the categories described below. 
When to use RAC instead of ESC: ESC requires considerable up-front effort in order to 
provide the tool with enough annotations to perform static modular checking. Even if a 
system has no bugs, the ESC tool will keep reporting warnings until the developer has 
provided sufficient assertion annotations. If this up-front investment is not practically possible 
then RAC can be used instead. In RAC, the verification effort is carried out in the traditional 
testing phase. 
When to use FFV instead of ESC: There are two main situations where a developer might 
prefer FFV to ESC: (1) to verify critical classes and (2) to verify reusable components. If the 
cost of an error in the class is very high then the developer may decide that the additional 
error coverage provided by FFV, albeit at a considerable cost, make it the most desirable 
approach. If RAC or ESC is used to verify a reusable component then the specifications will 
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likely be lightweight and relatively incomplete. This will hamper clients using ESC to verify 
classes that use the component. There may be properties of the component that are needed to 
verify the client’s class but are not expressed in the lightweight specification. Assumption 
constructs will have to be used to address this because the source of an external component is 
not available to be iteratively strengthened. This will involve extra work and complicates the 
use of the components. As a result, if RAC or ESC is used to verify a reusable component 
then it may be better to dynamically check usage of the component using RAC rather than 
using ESC, since clients using RAC do not need to provide additional assumption constructs 
when using components with lightweight specifications. 
When to use none of the approaches: We strongly recommend that at the very least 
developers use lightweight specifications to document key design decisions and RAC to 
report when they are violated. This involves modest additional effort but can greatly assist in 
debugging and provides a springboard to the use of static approaches. 
Structuring the verification of an application 
The decisions about what verification approaches to use for each class in an application 
cannot be taken in isolation. The verification approach we use to verify a class will have 
repercussions for the classes that use it. The main hard requirement is that we cannot use FFV 
to verify a class unless we have used FFV to verify all the classes that it uses. We should also 
look to avoid using unverified classes in ESC verified classes. So, when we use anything 
other than FFV to verify a class, we are restricting the verification of the classes that use it to 
not be FFV, and when we do not use any of the approaches we make it difficult to use ESC. 
Thus it is clear that the interactions between the verification approaches for the classes in the 
application are focussed around the uses relationships, so it may be useful to produce a 
diagrammatic overview of an application and its uses relationships. We can do this by 
breaking the application into horizontal levels where the classes in each level may be used by 
those in levels above but not by those below. The bottom level will be the built-in libraries, 
which necessarily do not use any classes from the application or components from third-party 
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component vendors. Above this will be levels for third-party components which may use the 
built-in libraries but not the classes in the application. Similar levels should be identified 
within the application itself. For example, in a Model-View-Controller (MVC) application, 
the model classes would be below the views and controllers. Figure 1 shows an example of 
how the verification of an MVC application might be structured. 
 
 
As was discussed earlier, a software developer has no control over which verification 
approach was used for library components and third-party components (shown below the 
dashed line in the figure). The limits this imposes on the other classes are clearly visible in the 
diagram above. For example, if 3rd_party_component_1 was verified with RAC 
instead of FFV, then the developer would not be permitted to use FFV for verifying the 
Model and View_3. In order to provide the developer with as much flexibility as possible in 
configuring the verification of their application, we therefore recommend that FFV should be 
used for all third-party components and library components [97]. 
View_1: ESC View_2: RAC View_3: FFV Controller: ESC 
Model: FFV 
3rd_party_component_1: FFV 
Library_component_1: FFV 
3rd_party_component_2: FFV 
Library_component_2: FFV
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5.3   Verification policies 
The Omnibus IDE manages the support for different verification approaches through the 
concept of verification policies. A verification policy defines precisely how to manage the 
verification of the assertion annotations in a class. This consists of whether to use dynamic 
and/or static checking, what checks to generate, the theorem prover to use and various other 
configuration options. RAC, ESC and FFV are defined as built-in verification policies but the 
user is also free to combine aspects of the different approaches to create new policies. A 
single policy can combine the use of run-time checking and static verification and different 
policies can even be used within a single class. 
5.3.1   Configuring the approaches 
In this section we will discuss some ways in which the run-time checking and static 
verification can be configured. Static verification encompasses ESC and FFV. Related work 
includes the configurable options in tools such as ESC/Java2 [30] and PerfectDeveloper [33]. 
Full details of the settings for Omnibus verification policies are given in appendix C. 
Configuring run-time checking 
There are a number of ways in which the run-time checking process, whereby assertion 
annotations are converted into run-time checks, can be customized. The most basic 
customization is the range of checks to perform. The developer may decide that they only 
want to dynamically check certain types of assertions. The case discussed earlier where only 
assume statements are run-time checked is a good example. Another example would be 
reducing the number of checks in order to decrease the time overhead. 
It may also be useful to customize the information contained in the assertion failure 
reports. There is a trade-off between the level of information in the failure messages and run-
time efficiency of the compiled executable. By default, the user may want to include just 
basic information like a description of the failure, the relevant source code and a stack trace. 
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However, if the information in these messages is not sufficient to pinpoint the exact 
circumstances of a failure then they may prefer to generate more comprehensive error reports 
including current parameter, attribute and local variable values at the point of failure, and 
detailed information on the execution path (e.g. how many times was each loop executed). 
There are a number of constructs in the Omnibus assertion language which are not always 
convertible into efficient run-time checks (e.g. quantifiers). Some quantifier expressions can 
be converted into run-time checks, e.g. those using only variable declarations associated with 
a range of integer values, but those without such restrictions cannot be. Even those that can be 
converted into run-time checks will likely be expensive to check. The developer may want the 
system to either ignore (i.e. treat as true) or prohibit (i.e. generate a type checking error if 
found) quantifiers that cannot be dynamically checked, and may want to ignore or translate 
quantifiers that can be dynamically checked. 
Configuring static verification 
Omnibus provides support for both the ESC and FFV static verification approaches. These are 
distinct approaches with different aims, but the underlying processes they use are strikingly 
similar. They are both used in conjunction with a theorem prover, start by translating the 
specifications of the classes and methods used in the application into the logic of the 
corresponding prover, and then generate a range of Verification Conditions (VCs) over these 
specifications. These should be valid if the program is free of the class of errors being 
checked. 
The most immediately apparent difference is that ESC uses relatively lightweight 
specifications whereas FFV requires relatively heavyweight specifications. Our ESC approach 
also makes a range of compromises in soundness in order to make the approach easier to use. 
Loops are analysed by unravelling them a finite number of times, instead of requiring loop 
invariants and proving them inductively. Assumption constructs are permitted to help tackle 
the incompleteness of the lightweight specifications and automated prover. ESC always uses 
an automated prover, whereas FFV can use either automated or interactive provers. Finally, 
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our ESC approach is a code-centric approach where all verification involves analysis of code, 
whereas in FFV it is possible to analyse the consistency of specifications independent of any 
implementation. 
As with run-time checking, the most basic customization is the range of checks that should 
be performed. The user may want to statically check only certain kinds of assertions. The user 
may also want to verify requirements such as invariants in different ways. Either the 
behaviour specifications should imply them (our FFV approach) or the implementation should 
(the ESC approach). 
The next most fundamental way in which static checking can be configured is in the 
choice of theorem prover. Currently our system supports the use of the fully automated 
Simplify prover [36] and the interactive PVS prover [81]. Which prover is appropriate is 
dependent on the skills of the available users and the complexity of the required proof. The 
selection of the prover has repercussions for other customizations, mainly the handling of 
certain heavyweight constructs that the PVS prover can handle but which Simplify often 
cannot. 
The other major configurable options are concerned with the soundness of the process. 
Firstly, users can specify whether loops are required to have loop invariants provided. If the 
approach is to be sound then it must. In this case, a type checking error will be generated if a 
loop without an invariant is found. Otherwise, if a loop invariant is not provided, the loop will 
be analysed by unravelling it up to a finite number of times that can be configured by the user 
(defaulting to 1). Secondly, users can specify whether assumption constructs are permitted. If 
the approach is to be sound it should not permit these. 
As with run-time checking, a number of constructs from the assertion language may cause 
problems, so it may be useful to specify special handling for them. Recursion can cause the 
Simplify prover to either enter into an infinite loop or to crash, and can be difficult to manage 
even in the PVS prover. As such, the user may want to disallow its use in assertions, use 
redundant specifications in its place or ignore it. 
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Creating new approaches 
Through this configuration process, we can create new approaches that combine aspects of the 
traditional approaches. For example, we could develop different configurations for: (i) FFV, 
but with the loop unravelling technique from ESC to avoid the need for loop invariants; (ii) 
ESC and FFV with and without dynamic pre-condition checks; (iii) ESC with and without 
assume statements dynamically checked; (iv) RAC with different levels of failure reports. 
Details of these and other policies is given in appendix C. 
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5.3.2   Verification policy tool support 
There are three main tools that allow the developer to use policies within Omnibus: the policy 
manager, the policy editor and the policy selector. These are discussed in the following 
sections. 
Policy Manager 
The Policy Manager is a tool for managing the definitions of verification policies. It displays 
all the policies currently loaded into the system and provides options to delete them, edit them 
and extend them to create new policies. A screenshot of the tool is shown below. The upper 
area displays the verification policy names along with whether they are built-in or saved in 
the current project. The lower area displays details of the currently selected policy, including 
the policy it is based on and a description of how it differs from the policy it is based on. 
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Policy Editor 
Creation and editing of policies is achieved through the policy editor, a dialogue allowing the 
developer to completely configure a particular policy. A screenshot of this dialogue is shown 
below. The upper area allows the name of the policy, the policy it is based on and the location 
where it is saved to be edited. Immediately below that is a preview of the automatically 
generated description of the policy describing how it differs from the policy it is based on. In 
the centre of the dialogue are a series of tabbed panes for specifying the properties of the 
policy. Information on the configurable properties for policies can be found in appendix C 
along with details of the property settings for the built-in policies. 
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Policy Selector 
Finally, the Policy Selector tool is used to describe how verification policies should be used to 
verify an Omnibus project. This tool contains two parts, the first of which allows the policies 
to be used on a file-by-file basis. A screenshot of this part of the tool is shown below. For 
convenience, the policies to be used for each file can be specified in one of two ways. A 
single policy can be specified for all files in the project, or different policies can be specified 
for each file using the provided table. 
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The second part of the Policy Selector allows particular correctness obligations to be 
identified as special cases and use a different policy from the rest of the file. A screenshot of 
this part of the tool is shown below. For each special case, the file and ID of the obligation are 
given and then the policy to be used for the obligation is selected. 
 
Section 8.5.2 demonstrates the power of the use of special cases. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Safe software component reuse 
In this chapter we consider the use of the Omnibus tool with its integrated verification 
approaches for the development of software components in a way that enables them to be 
reused safely. We assume that the developers of components and the users of the component 
may be distinct. Crucially, we must implement the component, verify it and then distribute it. 
Once it is distributed, we cannot easily alter it to correct errors. So, as responsible component 
vendors, we would like to ensure that our component is well documented and free from errors 
before we distribute it. 
There has been much work on reusable software components. The work of Meyer has 
greatly influenced us. To allow software components to be reused safely Meyer states we 
require two things: 
1. a clear, unambiguous description of what the each component should do [71], and 
2. some form of assurance that it does it [70]. 
6.1   State-of-practice for reusable components 
Currently, in practice, software components are described using type signature interfaces 
supplemented by interface documentation (e.g. javadoc, docgen). A system of digital 
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signatures is typically used to provide assurances of correctness. This approach uses 
encryption techniques to allow components to be digitally signed by an organisation which 
users can decide whether they trust or not. When the producer of the component is an 
organisation like Sun this works relatively well since the interfaces of their libraries of 
components are comprehensively documented and the components contain very few 
implementation errors. However, the system does not always work as well when applied in 
general to third-party component vendors. There are no requirements on the level of 
documentation of reusable component interfaces and so it is often patchy. It is also not clear if 
a hidden implementation of a component can be trusted to be free from errors. The producers 
of the component may attempt to get their code digitally signed by a trusted organisation but 
there are no clear procedures to govern this process and so this causes a signification 
bottleneck [12]. As an alternative, the producers of the component may simply sign their own 
code but then the process has contributed no further assurances. As a result, the reuse of 
software components in this way often introduces problems. To protect themselves against 
this, many programmers develop “not invented here” syndrome and prefer re-implementation 
to reuse of existing components when the implementer of the component is not known to be 
dependable. This has acted to limit the spread of reusable software components. 
6.2   Use of the approaches for reusable components 
In this section we discuss the use of the different verification approaches we have considered 
to support the safe reuse of software components. 
6.2.1   Developing reusable components with RAC and ESC 
Run-time assertion checking and extended static checking help the situation somewhat. The 
assertion annotations on which they are based provide a structured framework which can be 
used to provide unambiguous documentation. The associated verification methodologies also 
give some basis on which to found trust in the hidden implementation. If ESC has been used 
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to verify that the given assertion annotations constituting the interface of the component are 
met by the implementation, then the user of the component can have some reasonable 
confidence in its correctness. Similarly if RAC is used in conjunction with a specified test 
harness (which should also be included in the interface of the component) then we can have 
some confidence that the hidden implementation meets the specification of the component. 
Unfortunately we have to make compromises in the expressiveness of the assertion 
annotations we use in conjunction with these approaches. 
Using ESC we may not be able to verify the correctness of some implementations relative 
to a full, heavyweight specification of correctness and so we may have to use a relatively 
incomplete specification. At this point the assertion annotations and our conception of the 
correctness of the component diverge. We can document the additional requirements in 
interface documentation, but they cannot be included within the assertion annotations because 
they cannot be verified by the approach. This limits the extent to which the vendor can 
provide a clear and comprehensive description of what the component should do. Also, 
concessions have to be made in the soundness of the verification approach (e.g. considering 
loops by unravelling them a finite number of times) in order to make it possible to use an 
automated theorem prover. This limits the extent to which successful verification can be taken 
as an assurance of correctness. 
Using RAC it is possible to check more expressive heavyweight specifications. The main 
problem with the run-time checking of the assertions is that the more expressive the assertion 
annotations are, the more time it will take to execute the run-time checks. This problem can 
be extreme. If full specifications are used then the evaluation of the run-time assertion checks 
will often take at least as long as the execution of the implementation itself (because for full 
specifications both the things that are changed and the things that are not changed must be 
checked, whereas implementations only describe what changes are made). This may be 
acceptable during the testing process performed by the implementer of the component, but 
retaining the full run-time checks after the component is distributed will often compromise 
the efficiency of the component too much. 
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To combat this we can either: 
1. disable the checks of the supplier obligations (e.g. the post-conditions) before 
distribution or 
2. adjust the assertions to make them cheaper to check and then retain the run-time 
checks. 
Disabling the checks of the supplier obligations is fine if the test harnesses that were used 
to check the implementation were sufficient to uncover all possible implementation errors, but 
a dangerous situation arises if they are not. In such a case the user of the component may 
make a call of the component, satisfying their obligations but exposing a scenario not covered 
by the test harness, where the component’s implementation is not correct and violates its 
assertion annotations. Crucially, if the assertion checks in the component’s implementation 
are disabled then an assertion failure will not be automatically triggered and the component 
will simply silently return a value violating its own assertion annotations. Such problems 
could be hard to track down since the user will, rightly, initially assume that the 
implementations of the components meet their specifications. In order to uncover the error 
they will have to consider the possibility that each of the components do not meet their 
obligations. This is highly undesirable and seriously compromises the basis for trusting the 
hidden implementation. 
If we take the alternative approach and adjust the assertion annotations to make them 
cheaper to check (e.g. limiting the use of quantifiers) then we will compromise our ability to 
provide comprehensive descriptions of what the component should do, just as is the case with 
ESC. In this case concessions are made in the completeness of the verification in order to 
make it practical to check the assertion annotations at run-time. 
6.2.2   Developing reusable components with FFV 
The needs of reusable components can be more completely met by the FFV approach. 
Heavyweight specifications can be used to provide comprehensive, unambiguous descriptions 
of what the component should do and the formal verification mechanism can give a rigorous 
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assurance that the implementation does this. Using RAC and ESC we may have to make 
concessions in the specifications we use, but we are not forced to do this in FFV because the 
interactive prover can be used to verify any expressible properties. RAC and ESC also have 
soundness and completeness loopholes which FFV does not. The error coverage of RAC is 
limited by the coverage of the test harness and the completeness of the specifications. The 
error coverage of ESC can be limited by the use of assumption constructs and, again, 
incompleteness of the specifications. FFV can be used to avoid these restrictions. The 
interactive proof mechanism allows complicated properties to be verified, allowing 
programmers to use more sophisticated specifications. The resulting proofs can be re-run by 
any user to independently check the proof. This provides a powerful basis to support the safe 
reuse of software components. 
FFV is, however, a costly approach. Our FFV approach does not support loop invariant 
generation and instead requires the user to devise suitable loop invariants. It can take several 
attempts to get these right, and often the loop invariants can be more error-prone than the 
code itself. It can be discouraging when a product of the verification process is harder to 
debug than the original code. Uncovering errors using interactive verification is also 
particularly costly. It may not be clear whether an obligation should be provable or not. The 
user may believe that it should be, but reach an unprovable sub-goal and be unsure whether 
they made a mistake in their proof attempt or if the original obligation was invalid. Even if 
they decide that the original obligation was faulty, a suitable correction may not be readily 
apparent. 
The costs of FFV will often be beyond acceptable levels unless reliability is critical. 
However, for reusable components, the economies of scale may help justify this additional 
effort. For example, consider the extent to which components in the standard Java libraries are 
reused. It may be considered worthwhile to use FFV to verify these kinds of components so 
that comprehensive heavyweight specifications can be used to describe the interfaces and the 
implementations can be rigorously shown to respect them before distribution. 
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Using FFV for a component also gives clients that use the component maximum freedom 
in which verification approaches to use themselves. We saw earlier that our guideline 4 rules 
out certain combinations of verification approaches. If we verify a component using RAC or 
ESC we cannot verify clients that use the component subject to FFV. If the producer and user 
of the component are the same people, they could adjust the component to use FFV if they 
wished to use FFV for clients. However, if the producer and users are different this may not 
be possible. In that case the clients will have to work around this constraint and only use RAC 
or ESC for their classes which use the RAC- or ESC-verified component. Consider again the 
case of components in standard libraries. If we used RAC or ESC for these, they could not be 
used in projects that are FFV-verified. If we use FFV though, we could use RAC, ESC or 
FFV to verify classes which use the components. 
6.3   Specialised support for open source components 
The Omnibus IDE provides a range of special facilities to directly address the needs of safe 
software component reuse providing that the components have their source code distributed 
with them. These facilities are discussed in this section. Techniques for components which do 
not have their source distributed with them are discussed in section 6.4. 
6.3.1   Interface documentation 
The first requirement for safe software component reuse is a clear, unambiguous description 
of what the each component should do. The assertion annotations in our RAC, ESC and FFV 
approaches provide a framework for the unambiguous specification of the intended behaviour 
of components. It is, however, important that support is provided to extract these 
specifications from the files so the users do not have to refer to the source files themselves to 
find these specifications. 
There is a standard solution to this problem. It is to provide tools to automatically generate 
interface documentation from the source files. The JavaDoc tool [96] provides such support 
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for Java, taking the type signature interface and special documentation comments and 
generating summaries in an HTML form. The JMLdoc [87] tool provides the same facilities, 
but also includes any JML assertion annotations in the generated documentation. We have 
followed this approach in the Omnibus system. 
The Omnibus IDE provides an option to generate interface documentation for each 
Omnibus project. This documentation uses the same frame-based layout as JavaDoc. There is 
an index with links to all the files in the project in the left frame. A summary page for the 
project is initially displayed in the right frame. The summary includes the description of the 
project provided in the Project Window of the Project in the IDE and descriptions of the 
source files taken from their description clauses. 
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Each class in the project has its own specification page which again follows the standard 
JavaDoc structure. The specification of each method is included in the file along with details 
of the requirements specifications and test cases. 
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6.3.2   Verification certificates 
The other requirement for supporting safe software component reuse is some sort of basis for 
trust in the hidden implementation. If the source code of the component is made available to 
the users of the component then the assertion-based verification processes provide such a 
basis, but the users should not have to manually re-verify the component themselves to 
determine the correctness of the component. The Omnibus system uses the concept of 
verification certificates to manage the justification of hidden implementations for open-source 
components. The Omnibus system does not support closed-source components although there 
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are approaches, which we discuss at the end of the chapter, which can be used to handle these. 
Each verification certificate provides a summary of the verification that has been applied to 
the component along with any evidence needed to re-verify the component. 
A verification certificate must be user-readable so that users of the component can refer to 
it and easily find the verification information they need. A summary of the verification details 
could be incorporated into the standard documentation generator. However, it is essential that 
a verification certificate can be re-verified in order to guarantee its validity. If the verification 
information is embedded within the HTML documentation, the HTML could easily be edited 
to adjust the verification summary to make it more favourable before the component is 
distributed. 
One approach to address this is to support the verification of the HTML documentation 
(incorporating the verification certificate) by re-verifying the component, re-generating the 
HTML documentation and then checking the new documentation against the old 
documentation. The files would have to be textually identical to verify the certificate. 
However, this approach is very brittle. If, for example, we changed the format of the 
generated documentation in any way, this process would report that the distributed certificate 
did not match the re-generated one. We really need the verification certificate to have the 
summary of the verification details and nothing else. We need to be able to change the layout 
and add additional explanatory text without breaking the re-verification system. 
So there are two requirements for verification certificates: they must be user-readable and 
they must contain just the raw verification information. These requirements are in apparent 
conflict but XML can be used to address them both. The raw details of the verification 
certificate are written to an XML file and then an XSL stylesheet is used to re-format this data 
into a presentable form. 
The format of the XML file is quite straightforward. Each file has a top-level project entry 
which contains the name of the project, a summary of the verification of the project, and 
details of each of the classes. Each class entry contains the name of the class and a summary 
of the verification for the class. The verification details consist of the total number, passed 
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number, failed number and unchecked number of correctness obligations, run-time assertion 
checks, automated static verification VCs and interactive static verification VCs. An extract 
of an XML verification certificate is shown below. 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?> 
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="certificate.xsl"?> 
<project> 
 <name>LibraryImpl4.opj</name> 
 <verification> 
  <obligations> 
   <total>498</total><passed>487</passed> 
   <failed>0</failed><unchecked>11</unchecked> 
  </obligations> 
  <runtime-checks> 
   <total>1096</total><passed>1092</passed> 
   <failed>0</failed><unchecked>4</unchecked> 
  </runtime-checks> 
  <automatic-static-verification> 
   <total>0</total><passed>0</passed> 
   <failed>0</failed><unchecked>0</unchecked> 
  </automatic-static-verification> 
  <interactive-static-verification> 
   <total>0</total><passed>0</passed> 
   <failed>0</failed><unchecked>0</unchecked> 
  </interactive-static-verification> 
 </verification> 
 <class> 
  <name>Book</name> 
  <verification> 
   <obligations> 
    <total>4</total><passed>4</passed> 
    <failed>0</failed><unchecked>0</unchecked> 
   </obligations> 
   <runtime-checks> 
    <total>16</total><passed>16</passed> 
    <failed>0</failed><unchecked>0</unchecked> 
   </runtime-checks> 
   <automatic-static-verification> 
    <total>0</total><passed>0</passed> 
    <failed>0</failed><unchecked>0</unchecked> 
   </automatic-static-verification> 
   <interactive-static-verification> 
    <total>0</total><passed>0</passed> 
    <failed>0</failed><unchecked>0</unchecked> 
   </interactive-static-verification> 
  </verification> 
 </class> 
 <class> 
  <name>Card</name> 
  ... 
 </class> 
 ... 
</project> 
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This file provides just the raw details of the verification process, without additional 
formatting information. However, it is not very readable. So, it is coupled with an XSL 
stylesheet which translates the XML into a readable form. When the XML certificate file is 
opened, the XSL stylesheet is used to format it and the results are as follows: 
 
This is a more user-readable form. While being user-readable, the verification certificate 
itself in uncluttered by presentation details and so can be easily re-generated and checked 
against the distributed file. The XML file will be the same even if the IDE versions used to 
originally generate and now re-verify the certificate are different. The XSL presentation of the 
certificate may be improved between versions of the IDE, but that does not affect the re-
verification process. 
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Certification Levels 
It is important to provide some kind of assistance for the interpretation of the verification 
information in the verification certificate. The users need to know what the different numbers 
mean and what they should be looking for. 
To do this, we could use a Certification Level system. Such a system could have 4 levels: 
0 to 3. The appropriate certification level would be determined from the status of the 
correctness obligations and the soundness compromises made. Level 0 would be awarded if 
there were any failed correctness obligations. Level 1 would be awarded if there were no 
failures but some correctness obligations were unchecked. Level 2 would be awarded if all 
correctness obligations were passed but this either involved run-time checking which is 
incomplete because of its use of testing or unsound static verification techniques like loop 
unravelling or assumption constructs. Level 3 would be awarded if all correctness obligations 
were justified using static verification without use of unsound facilities. 
Using this approach, ESC could be used to perform verification to level 3 as long as loop 
invariants were provided for any loops, and assumption constructs were either not used or 
separately verified with FFV. 
6.3.3   Distribution and use of components 
It is also important to provide a convenient mechanism for distributing components. The 
Omnibus IDE does this, again following the lead of Java, through jar files. Users can select an 
option in the IDE to build a project jar file. These special jar files contain the original 
Omnibus source files, executable bytecode versions of the source files, any PVS proof files 
(so that PVS proofs can be re-run), documentation files for the project, the verification 
certificate, and other project details including the verification policies used. 
It is easy for other developers to use these jar files: they simply add them as references to 
their projects and they will be automatically extracted and read by the IDE during the 
verification of their project. The IDE provides options to display the documentation and 
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certificate for a jar file. When these are selected, the jar file is automatically extracted and the 
documentation or certificate opened within the IDE. This allows these elements to be 
accessed by users without requiring them to extract the jar file themselves. 
Support for the distribution of reusable software components through component 
repositories is discussed in section 9.3.4. 
6.3.4   Re-verification of components 
Omnibus project jar files contain the original Omnibus source files along with a range of 
derived elements such as executable bytecode versions, documentation files and the 
verification certificate. Of course, the derived elements could be re-generated from the 
Omnibus source, but this would require further use of the IDE which may not be convenient. 
It is more convenient to include copies of these derived elements. However, this introduces 
the potential for these derived elements to be maliciously or accidentally edited, making them 
inconsistent with the original Omnibus source and other derived elements. We may wish to 
re-verify the project jar file to ensure that the derived elements are consistent. We first  
consider how verification certificates can be checked and then consider the other derived 
elements. 
Checking verification certificates 
Users of a component can see the verification details of a component from its verification 
certificate. This certificate is no more than an XML file containing a summary of the 
verification details. As such, it would be possible for malicious users to generate a project jar 
file, extract it, edit the certificate XML file, and repackage it as a jar file. Such a process could 
be used to present the verification of the component as more favourable than it is in reality. If 
verification certificates are to be trustable, it is important to be able to combat this. 
The Omnibus IDE provides facilities to check the verification certificate of a jar file. The 
user simply selects the Verify Certificate for Jar File option and specifies the jar file. The tool 
then opens the project contained in the jar file, re-runs the verification process and checks the 
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verification certificate this produces against the one included in the jar file. This process is 
carried out automatically by re-running the run-time tests and automated prover and checking 
the distributed interactive proofs. For the certificate to be valid, it must be identical to the one 
which is reproduced. 
This process will catch two kinds of malicious alterations. First, if the producer of a 
component manually adjusts the XML certificate, this will be detected because the newly 
generated certificate will not match the manually edited one. Second, if the producer of a 
component manually adjusts the original Omnibus source files for the project and this alters 
the correctness obligations then the newly generated verification certificate will be different 
and an error will again be reported. 
This approach requires the presence of the original Omnibus source files in the jar file. As 
such, it could be termed an open source reuse approach. We could adjust the approach to 
operate without the presence of the original source by password encrypting the jar files. This 
could allow us to ensure that only the IDE can read and write these jar files. Then we would 
know that all verification certificates in one of these jar files would have to have been 
generated by the IDE and so must be consistent with the project. The problem with this 
approach is that encryption processes are always vulnerable to being deciphered, and forged 
assurances of correctness may be at least as damaging as the original system without any 
assurances of correctness. 
Checking other derived elements 
The verification certificate checking process checks that the derived verification certificate is 
consistent with the original Omnibus source. It would be desirable to have similar checks for 
the other derived elements in the jar file: the bytecode implementations and the HTML 
interface documentation. 
It is not as straightforward to check these elements. We could attempt to use the same 
approach as the verification certificates: to re-generate them and compare with the derived 
versions, requiring the distributed versions to be identical to re-generated versions. However, 
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unlike the XML verification certificates which have a simple, fixed format, the bytecode 
implementations and HTML documentation are complicated files with changing formats. For 
example, we may want to add an optimisation to the bytecode generator in the IDE or 
improve the layout of the HTML interface documentation. The problem is that the bytecode 
and HTML generated for a project with versions of the IDE before and after such changes 
would not be identical and so, using this re-generation approach, a failure would be reported. 
One way the problem could be addressed is by recording the versions of the bytecode 
generator and HTML interface generator used to generate a project jar file and having the re-
verifier download these same versions and use them to re-generate the files. The identical file 
comparison could then be used. This process could be automated by separating and archiving 
these generator modules and incorporating a facility to automatically download the 
appropriate versions from some central repository site into the IDE. 
6.4   Specialised support for closed source components 
The previous section presented techniques which can be used to manage the safe reuse of 
components which are distributed with their source code. However, the assertion-based 
verification techniques within the Omnibus system are still relevant for components for which 
the source code is not (and perhaps cannot be) supplied. There is still the need to clearly 
describe what the component should do and to provide this in an accessible form. The 
assertion-based interface specifications and interface documentation generator are still 
sufficient for this. However, the verification certification system is built around the source 
code verification techniques of the Omnibus tool and the executables cannot be re-verified via 
this certificate without the presence of the source code. A fundamentally different approach is 
needed to address this. 
Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [79, 80] is an approach which can be used to certify that 
untrusted code (such as components from unknown third-party component vendors) satisfies 
specific safety rules. Using the approach, a safety proof is produced by the code producer and 
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distributed with the executable. This provides justification that the executable satisfies a set of 
safety rules. The code consumer is then provided with a proof validator tool which they can 
use to easily check that the proof provides adequate justification of the safety of the code. 
PCC has much in common with the Omnibus approach described in the previous section. 
PCC, like the Omnibus approach, is based upon verification rather than the concepts of trust 
and encryption which underpin the digital signatures approach. PCC places the burden of 
producing the safety proof on the code producer just like the Omnibus approach places the 
burden of producing the verification certificate on the component vendor. 
The crucial difference between the approaches is that PCC safety proofs provide 
justification that the executable satisfies the safety property while Omnibus verification 
certificates provide justification that the source code satisfies its specification. By providing 
justification of the executable, the source code is not needed by the code consumer in order to 
re-check the code. However, the ideas of PCC have not been used widely in practice yet and 
one of the biggest outstanding challenges is how the safety proofs are produced. This problem 
is of a similar order of difficulty to the verification process itself and suffers from many of the 
same challenges. Indeed, PCC systems are generally built upon existing formal verification 
techniques. 
Recent work in the MOBIUS project [12] aims to support the PCC approach for a variant 
of Java for the embedded industry. They provide two certification approaches: logic-based 
verification and type-based verification. Their logic-based verification approach is similar to 
the Omnibus approach except extended to support PCC. As in the Omnibus approach, the 
code producer produces an implementation and performs formal verification to demonstrate 
that the code satisfies its specification and any safety rules (expressed using JML in the 
MOBIUS project). A special proof transforming compiler would then be used to produce the 
executables, in place of the standard compiler. This tool takes the source code and source 
level justification and produces a bytecode program and a safety proof for the bytecode 
program corresponding to the source level verification. A new annotation language for Java 
bytecode is being developed in order to support this called the Bytecode Modelling Language 
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(BML) [21]. The supporting tools are still in development but the approach seems to hold 
great promise. 
 152 
Chapter 7 
 
Tool support 
The Omnibus IDE provides tool support for the techniques presented in this thesis. It consists 
of a number of components including a type checker, documentation generator, bytecode 
generator with support for RAC checks, and an integrated static verifier supporting ESC and 
FFV. The components of most technical interest are the bytecode generator and the integrated 
static verifier. The next section discusses the RAC facilities provided via the bytecode 
generator. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to a discussion of the integrated static 
verifier. 
The implementation of the Omnibus IDE was written using the Java programming 
language and verified using testing. It was based upon an earlier system called JOOSE (Java-
based Object-Oriented Symbolic Executor). We were unable to use verification tools such as 
JML’s run-time assertion checker or ESC/Java2 because our implementation required the use 
of version 1.5 of the Java SDK which those tools were not compatible with at the time. This 
was not very desirable but we had to work with the tools that were available when the project 
begun. 
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7.1   Run-time assertion checking 
This section discusses the run-time assertion checking support within the Omnibus IDE. In 
order to be executed, Omnibus files are translated to bytecode via an intermediary Java form. 
Run-time assertion checks are embedded within the generated Java, which is then compiled to 
bytecode using the standard Java compiler. 
Translation of general file structure 
The translation of the Omnibus file structure to the Java file structure is relatively 
straightforward. The package, import and class structures are purposely very similar. 
Special Java methods 
A range of special methods is generated for each class when it is translated to Java, not 
defined explicitly in the corresponding Omnibus class. 
Each class has an equals method which provides an implementation for equality. The 
default is an automatically generated implementation of structural equality which checks the 
other object is an instance of the same class and then compares the corresponding attribute 
values if it is. 
A toString method is also automatically defined. This returns a String containing 
the full name of the class and the attribute values of the object. This method is used by the 
run-time assertion checker to report variable values. 
Finally, special quantifier functions are defined for each quantifier used in an assertion 
within the class. To be executable, each quantified variable in the quantifier must be restricted 
with either a range or in clause. If a range clause is used, a for loop is used to iterate over 
the possible values for the quantified variable. If an in clause is used, an 
omni.lang.Iterator is retrieved from the collection specified and used to iterate over 
the values in the collection. 
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Translation of Omnibus class members 
Omnibus attributes map directly to Java fields. All Omnibus attributes are encoded in Java 
with the protected modifier so as to prevent direct modification from client classes, but 
accessor functions are automatically introduced so the values of the attributes can still be 
read. 
Omnibus functions map to Java methods returning a value of the return type specified in 
the Omnibus declaration. The type checking phase ensures that the class attributes cannot be 
changed by a function, so there can be no side-effect on the value of the this object. 
Omnibus constructors map to Java static methods returning a new object instance of the 
current class. Omnibus operations map to Java instance methods returning a new object 
instance of the current class. 
Omnibus tests are translated to special Java static methods which cannot be directly called 
from normal Omnibus code in method implementations. Instead, these methods are called by 
the IDE to perform testing of the class. A special test_class static method is also defined 
which runs all the tests in the same class. Within the implementation for each test is code to 
record timing info and catch assertion failures generated during the test. 
Translation of method bodies 
The body of each Omnibus method when translated to Java has the same basic form. First, for 
non-static methods, local variables are declared for each of the attributes and initialised to the 
corresponding attribute values. Within the remainder of the code, it is these local variables 
that are manipulated, the attribute values of the object on which the method was called 
remaining unaltered so as to preserve value semantics. Where local method calls are made via 
an implicit or explicit this object, a new object instance of the class is constructed with the 
current attribute variable values. 
Next, checks are written for the pre-condition of the method and any requirements that 
should hold at the start of the method (e.g. the invariants should hold at the start of each 
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operation). After this, the starting of the method is recorded. This involves the opening of a 
new frame in the call stack. The Omnibus run-time system maintains its own call stack, 
independent of the one used by Java, so that line numbers can be reported relative to the 
Omnibus source, not the generated Java. 
The code which is provided as the implementation of the method in the Omnibus source 
file is then translated to Java. This is discussed below. 
If the method is a constructor or an operation, the end of the method is recorded, checks 
are generated for the changes and ensures clauses and appropriate requirements, and a 
new instance of the current class is constructed from the local attribute variables and returned. 
Translation of statements 
Each statement in the Omnibus assertion language is mapped to a series of Java statements. 
The Omnibus implementation language is purposely similar to the Java implementation 
language and so this mapping is quite straightforward. Special additional support that is added 
includes tracking of the current line numbers in the Omnibus call stack and the appropriate 
generation of assertion checks. 
Generation of assertion checks 
Assertion checks are generated for the specifications of methods and assertions within the 
implementations (e.g. assert statements, loop invariants). All the checks have the same 
form. First, the policy for the obligation is looked up and the tool ensures that we are meant to 
use run-time assertion checking for the obligation. A check for the assertion is then generated. 
If it fails, an error message will be reported along with the level of context information 
specified in the corresponding verification policy. A report of the check will be recorded in 
the run-time check report file containing details of the source of the assertion and whether it 
passed or failed. This report file is read by the IDE in order to give details of the assertions 
that were checked and to identify those that were not checked. 
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7.2   Integrated static verifier 
Previously, support for extended static checking and full formal verification have been 
provided by separate tools produced by separate teams. There have been relatively few 
“extended static checkers”, and they have been implemented separately from FFV tools. 
However, ESC and FFV are very similar processes. Both are static verification processes 
which involve the production of theories in the logic of a specific prover. These must then be 
proved either automatically or interactively to successfully complete the verification. These 
theories contain a formalisation of core semantic properties of the language, definitions and 
axioms describing the specifications of the classes in the project, and VCs over these 
specifications. The differences between the approaches are largely concerned with the 
handling of particular language features (such as assumption constructs and loops) and the 
theorem provers used to process the VCs. 
Conventional verification tools are closely linked to a specific theorem prover and 
generated theories in the logic of that prover. However, separate theorem provers can be 
supported if the static verification module instead produces theories in an intermediary 
generic logic which can then be translated into the logic of a specific prover. 
We can use the concept of a generic logic together with a configurable static verifier to 
support both ESC and FFV within one tool. This is what our integrated static verifier does, 
and this chapter describes how it is implemented. We discuss the implementation in three 
parts: the translation into generic logic, the mapping of this generic logic into the logics of 
two specific provers, and prover-specific interfacing. 
7.3   Translation to generic logic 
The first step in the Omnibus static verification process is to produce theories in the generic 
logic. These theories contain axiomatic descriptions of the specifications of the classes in the 
project and the VCs which must be proved. 
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7.3.1   Base level for generic logic specifications 
When attempting to use a generic logic, we have a similar problem to that encountered in the 
definition of specifications within the language: what is the base level for the specifications? 
In this case our specific challenge is: what mathematical apparatus do we use to define the 
specification of the classes within the generic logic? 
Firstly, we must select a core logic and for this we use first-order predicate calculus with 
equality and function symbols. This choice is heavily influenced by the need to support 
effective automated verification to enable extended static checking. Such a logic is expressive 
enough to model interesting properties but not so expressive that it hampers the automation 
level of the verification. This design choice is compatible with our two target theorem 
provers: Simplify [36] and PVS [81]. 
Secondly, it is useful to build some of the core concepts of the language into the generic 
logic itself. The two main built-in functions are is and valid. The is function is equivalent 
to the instanceof expression in Java. It accepts an object and a class and yields true iff the 
specified class is a static class of the object. The valid function accepts an object and a 
class, and yields true iff the object also satisfies the invariants of the specified class. These 
functions are not defined within the generic logic itself and are instead defined separately in 
the specific logics of the underlying provers as we will see later. In this way, they can be 
thought of as being built into the generic logic, but they must then be defined for each of the 
underlying provers. The definition of core concepts in this way is sometimes referred to as the 
background predicate [32]. 
7.3.2   Structure of theories 
The theories in the generic logic simply consist of a series of declarations, axioms and VCs. A 
declaration is used to introduce a function symbol which can be used to model concepts from 
the Omnibus language using functions in logic. Axioms are used in the generic logic to 
describe properties of the introduced functions. Finally, VCs over the defined functions are 
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expressed. A range of context information is stored along with the actual formula to check in 
order to aid error reporting. For example, the following information is stored for each VC: 
1. The source of the VC: parent file, parent method, line number 
2. The corresponding error message 
3. If the VC is from an implementation: the path condition, the path 
information, local variable and parameter values 
7.3.3   Translation of classes into generic logic 
The first phase of the translation of a class into generic logic is a formalisation of the type 
hierarchies. As described in section 2.2.3, a class level is introduced for the public and private 
accessibility levels of each class and the protected level if it has any members. The public 
class level of a class inherits from the protected class level of its superclass, or the public level 
if the superclass has no protected class level. The protected and private class levels of a class 
inherit from the level immediately above them in the class. 
For each class level, axioms are generated describing the built-in is and valid functions 
for the specific class level. The first axiom describes that if an object is an instance of the 
current class level that it is also an instance of the parent class level. The second axiom 
describes the validity for the current class level in terms of the invariants for that level. 
Special functions are introduced for each of the requirements at the current class level, along 
with axioms describing their truth in terms of the corresponding assertions with which they 
are declared. 
If the current class is not declared with the spec or native modifier, axioms are also 
generated for a special build constructor. The build constructor is a special function used 
internally by the static verifier to create an instance of the specified class from a set of 
attribute values. It accepts as its parameters the values for all the template parameters of the 
class and the values for all the attributes of the class. An axiom is used to define the special 
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build constructor for the current class level. Further axioms are used to describe attribute and 
template parameter values for objects constructed using the build constructor. 
 For example, suppose we have an Omnibus class Shape: 
public class Shape {} 
The following declarations and axioms would be generated. The syntax used is that of our 
generic logic. Declarations consist of the declare keyword followed by the name of the 
function, the formal parameters of the function and the return type. Axioms consist of the 
axiom keyword followed by the name of the axiom and then a boolean expression. 
axiom Shape_is_ax: forall (this:Shape): 
           is(this, omni.lang.Object) 
 
axiom priv_Shape_is_ax: forall (this:priv_Shape): 
             is(this, Shape) 
 
axiom Shape_valid_ax: forall (this:Shape): 
             valid(this, Shape) = true 
 
axiom priv_Shape_valid_ax: forall (this:priv_Shape): 
               valid(this, priv_Shape) = true 
 
declare Shape_build():Shape 
 
axiom Shape_build_ax: is(Shape_build(), priv_Shape) 
For an Omnibus class Set with a template parameter: 
public class Set[Element] {} 
The following axioms would be generated: 
axiom Set_is_ax: forall (this:Set): 
          is(this,omni.lang.Object) 
 
axiom priv_Set_is_ax: forall (this:priv_Set): 
            is(this,Set) 
 
axiom Set_valid_ax: forall (this:Set): 
           valid(this,Set) = true 
 
axiom priv_Set_valid_ax: forall (this:priv_Set): 
              valid(this,priv_Set) = true 
 
declare Set_build(ElementClass:Class):priv_Set 
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axiom Set_build_ax: forall (ElementClass:Class): 
            is(Set_build(ElementClass),priv_Set) 
 
declare Set_ElementClass(ElementClass:Class):Class 
 
axiom Set_ElementClass_ax: forall (ElementClass:Class): 
       Set_ElementClass(Set_build(ElementClass)) 
       = ElementClass 
7.3.4   Translation of methods into generic logic 
The inheritance system for methods is built around method levels just as the system for 
classes is built around class levels. Separate method levels are defined for each class and 
accessibility level for which a specification is given, as described in section 2.2. A particular 
method level inherits from the method level immediately above it (if there is one). This will 
be either at a higher accessibility level in the current class or at the lowest accessibility level 
above private in the corresponding definition in a superclass. 
Four special functions are introduced in the generic logic for each method level: the so-
called pre-condition function, post-condition function, guard function and method function. 
The pre- and post-condition functions provide convenient ways to refer to the pre- and 
post-conditions of the method, respectively. The pre-condition function is a predicate over the 
input parameters of the method. Its axiom describes that the predicate is true when the 
specified pre-condition of the method is met. The post-condition function is a predicate over 
the input parameters and result of the method. Its axiom describes that the predicate is true 
when the specified post-condition of the method is met. 
Unlike the pre- and post-condition functions, the guard and method functions are defined 
only once for the root of the method level hierarchy, but axioms are provided for all the 
method levels. The guard function is used to express the pre-condition of a method in a 
manner compatible with dynamic binding. Because of dynamic binding, it is not possible to 
define precisely what the pre-condition of a method is for this purpose since the same method 
may have different pre-conditions at different method levels. So, we introduce a special guard 
function along with axioms describing when that guard is true for each specific level only. 
This is achieved using an implication rather than an equality in the axiom. If we had used 
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equality, there would have been a possible contradiction if the pre-condition was weakened 
since for the additional values allowed by the subclass, the superclass would claim the pre-
condition was false whereas the subclass would claim it was true. 
The method function is the most important of the functions for a method. It models to the 
original method within the logic. It accepts the input parameters of the method and produces 
the appropriate result. It is only defined for the root of the method level hierarchy to permit 
dynamic binding. The axioms describing the method at each method level are formed by 
substituting the result variable (either result or this) in the post-condition, with an 
instance of the method applied to the input parameters. 
For example, suppose we have the following Shape class with an area method: 
public abstract class Shape { 
 public abstract function area():integer 
  ensures result >= 0 
} 
The method does not define a pre-condition and so no pre-condition or guard functions are 
generated. The method does not override a method in another class, so a new function symbol 
is defined for the method. 
declare Shape_area_pub_post(this:Shape,result:integer):bool 
 
axiom Shape_area_pub_post_ax: forall (this:Shape, 
                   result:integer): 
     Shape_area_pub_post(this,result) = result >= 0 
 
declare Shape_area(this:Shape):integer 
 
axiom Shape_area_pub_ax: forall (this:Shape): 
              Shape_area(this) >= 0 
Now consider a Rectangle class which extends the Shape class and overrides the 
area function. 
public class Rectangle isa Shape { 
 private attribute width:integer 
 private attribute height:integer 
 
 public model function width():integer 
  private ensures result = width 
 {  ...  } 
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 public model function height():integer 
  private ensures result = height 
 { ... } 
  
 public constructor ofSize(w:integer, h:integer) 
  requires w >= 0 && h >= 0 
  ensures width() = w, height() = h 
 { ... } 
  
 public function area():integer 
  ensures result = width() * height() 
 { ... } 
} 
The Rectangle class has public width and height model functions which are 
described at the private level in terms of private width and height attributes. The public 
ofSize constructor can be used to create instances of the Rectangle and the public area 
function overrides the definition in class Shape. 
Firstly, functions are defined for the private attributes: 
declare Rectangle_width_att(this:Rectangle):integer 
 
declare Rectangle_height_att(this:Rectangle):integer 
Now consider the width function. It has public and private behaviour specifications. At 
the public level it is declared to be a model function while at the private level its behaviour is 
described in terms of the width attribute. This leads to the following axioms: 
declare Rectangle_width(this:Rectangle):integer 
 
declare Rectangle_width_priv_post(this:Rectangle, 
                 result:integer):bool 
 
axiom Rectangle_width_priv_post_ax: 
      forall (this:Rectangle,result:integer):bool 
        Rectangle_width_priv_post(this,result) = 
             (result = Rectangle_width_att(this)) 
 
declare Rectangle_width(this:Rectangle):integer 
 
axiom Rectangle_width_priv_ax: forall (this:Rectangle): 
       Rectangle_width(this) = Rectangle_width_att(this) 
The height function is defined similarly. 
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The ofSize constructor has a pre-condition, so pre-condition and guard functions are 
defined. 
declare Rectangle_ofSize_pub_pre(w:integer,h:integer):bool 
 
axiom Rectangle_ofSize_pub_pre_ax: 
      forall (w:integer,h:integer): 
        w >= 0 && h >= 0 
 
declare Rectangle_ofSize_guard(w:integer,h:integer):bool 
 
axiom Rectangle_ofSize_pub_guard_ax:  
      forall (w:integer,h:integer): 
       w >= 0 && h >= 0 ==> Rectangle_ofSize_guard(w,h) 
 
declare Rectangle_ofSize_pub_post(w:integer,h:integer, 
                 this:Rectangle):bool 
 
axiom Rectangle_ofSize_pub_post_ax:  
      forall (w:integer,h:integer,this:Rectangle): 
       Rectangle_ofSize_guard(w,h) ==> 
         Rectangle_ofSize_pub_post(w,h,this) = 
           (Rectangle_width(this) = w 
             && Rectangle_height(this) = h) 
 
declare Rectangle_ofSize(w:integer,h:integer):Rectangle 
 
axiom Rectangle_ofSize_pub_ax: 
      forall (w:integer,h:integer): 
       Rectangle_ofSize_guard(w,h) ==> 
         Rectangle_width(Rectangle_ofSize(w,h)) = w 
        && Rectangle_height(Rectangle_ofSize(w,h)) = h 
The definition of the area function in the Rectangle class overrides the definition in 
the Shape class. For this reason, a new function symbol is not introduced for the method 
and, instead, the method axiom refers to the root function definition Shape_area. 
declare Rectangle_area_pub_post(this:Rectangle, 
                result:integer):bool 
 
axiom Rectangle_area_pub_post_ax: 
      forall (this:Rectangle,result:integer): 
         Rectangle_area_pub_post(this,result) = 
            result = Rectangle_width(this) 
                * Rectangle_height(this) 
 
axiom Rectangle_area_pub_ax: forall (this:Rectangle): 
       Shape_area(this) = Rectangle_width(this) 
                * Rectangle_height(this) 
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7.3.5   Generation of VCs 
Once the specifications of the classes in the project have been translated into logic, the 
verification process can begin. Verification is performed via the generation of a range of VCs 
which must then be discharged using a theorem prover. The VCs are also expressed in the 
generic logic so that they can be translated into the logic of the appropriate theorem prover. 
There are two types of VCs: specification consistency VCs and implementation VCs. 
Specification consistency VCs 
In Omnibus, requirements specifications can be verified in one of two ways. They can either 
be proved to follow from the behaviour specifications of the methods in the class or from the 
implementations. For FFV, the requirements should follow from the behaviour specifications. 
This provides a powerful mechanism for verifying the correctness of the behaviour 
specifications. The laws described in section 2.3.2 can be used to check this. 
The previous sections have described the process whereby the behaviour and requirements 
specifications are translated into the generic logic. Specifically, we have a special function for 
each requirement and special functions for the pre- and post-conditions of each method. We 
can make direct use of these functions in the definition of our specification consistency VCs. 
To illustrate this, consider the following PosCounter specification. 
public spec class PosCounter { 
 model function value():integer 
  
 initially value() = 0 
 invariant value() >= 0 
 constraint value() != old value() 
  
 constructor zero() 
  ensures value() = 0 
  
 operation inc() 
  changes value 
  ensures value() = old value() + 1 
   
 operation dec() 
  requires value() > 0 
  changes value 
  ensures value() = old value() - 1 
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} 
This simple class has an abstract state consisting of a single integer value. The initially, 
invariant and constraint requirement specifications state that the value should be initialised to 
0 by all constructors, must always be greater than or equal to 0 and should be changed by all 
operations, respectively. There is a single constructor and operations to increment and 
decrement the value. The corresponding specification consistency VCs are as follows: 
vc vc_1: forall (this:PosCounter): 
      PosCounter_zero_pub_post(this) 
      ==> PosCounter_invariant_0(this) 
 
vc vc_2: forall (this:PosCounter): 
      PosCounter_zero_pub_post(this) 
      ==> PosCounter_initially_0(this) 
 
vc vc_3: forall (old_this:v_PosCounter, this:PosCounter): 
       PosCounter_inc_pub_post(old_this,this) 
       ==> PosCounter_invariant_0(this) 
 
vc vc_4: forall (old_this:v_PosCounter, this:PosCounter): 
       PosCounter_inc_pub_post(old_this,this) 
       ==> PosCounter_constraint_0(old_this,this) 
 
vc vc_5: forall (old_this:v_PosCounter, this:PosCounter): 
       PosCounter_dec_pub_pre(old_this) 
        && PosCounter_dec_pub_post(old_this,this) 
       ==> PosCounter_invariant_0(this) 
 
vc vc_6: forall (old_this:v_PosCounter, this:PosCounter): 
       PosCounter_dec_pub_pre(old_this) 
        && PosCounter_dec_pub_post(old_this,this) 
       ==> PosCounter_constraint_0(old_this,this) 
 VCs 1 and 2 check that the behaviour specification of the zero constructor satisfies the 
invariant and initially. VCs 3 and 4 check that the inc operation satisfies the invariant and 
constraint. VCs 5 and 6 check that the dec operation satisfies the invariant and constraint. 
Verification Conditions are also generated to ensure that the use of inheritance is 
consistent with the principle of substitutability. To illustrate the generation of generic logic 
VCs for this, consider the following example: 
spec class CurrentAccount { 
 model function balance():integer 
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 constructor open() 
  ensures balance() = 0 
  
 operation withdraw(amount:integer) 
  requires amount >= 0 
  changes balance 
  ensures balance() = old balance() - amount 
   
 operation deposit(amount:integer) 
  requires amount >= 0 
  changes balance 
  ensures balance() = old balance() + amount 
} 
This class represents a simple bank account with withdraw and deposit operations. 
There are no restrictions on the balance: users of the class may withdraw more than they 
deposit. Now suppose we define a SavingsAccount class as a subclass of this class. 
spec class SavingsAccount isa CurrentAccount { 
 invariant balance() >= 0 
  
 constructor open() 
  ensures balance() = 0 
  
 operation withdraw(amount:integer) 
  requires amount >= 0, balance() >= amount 
   // error: strengthens pre-condition 
  changes balance 
  ensures balance() = old balance() - amount 
} 
The corresponding generic logic VCs for the SavingsAccount class are as follows: 
vc vc_1: forall (this:SavingsAccount): 
       SavingsAccount_open_pub_post(this) 
       ==> SavingsAccount_invariant_0(this) 
 
vc vc_2: forall (old_this:v_SavingsAccount, amount:integer, 
          this:SavingsAccount): 
       CurrentAccount_withdraw_pub_pre(old_this,amount) 
        && SavingsAccount_withdraw_pub_post(old_this, 
                        amount,this) 
       ==> SavingsAccount_invariant_0(this) 
 
vc vc_3: forall (this:v_SavingsAccount, amount:integer): 
       CurrentAccount_withdraw_pub_pre(this,amount) 
       ==> SavingsAccount_withdraw_pub_pre(this,amount) 
 
vc vc_4: forall (old_this:v_SavingsAccount, amount:integer, 
          this:SavingsAccount): 
       CurrentAccount_withdraw_pub_pre(old_this,amount) 
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        && SavingsAccount_withdraw_pub_post(old_this, 
                        amount,this) 
       ==> CurrentAccount_withdraw_pub_post(old_this, 
                        amount,this) 
 
vc vc_5: forall (old_this:v_SavingsAccount, amount:integer, 
          this:SavingsAccount): 
       SavingsAccount_deposit_pub_pre(old_this,amount) 
        && SavingsAccount_deposit_pub_post(old_this, 
                        amount,this) 
       ==> SavingsAccount_invariant_0(this) 
VC 1 checks that the open constructor of the SavingsAccount class satisfies the 
invariant that the balance should be non-negative. VC 2 checks that the withdraw 
operation maintains the invariant. Note that the pre-condition from the overridden method is 
used since that is all the caller can be assured to have established. VCs 3 and 4 check that the 
specification of the withdraw method provided in the SavingsAccount class is 
consistent with the specification it overrides in the CurrentAccount class. Finally, VC 5 
checks that the deposit method inherited from the CurrentAccount class satisfies the 
newly defined invariant. The reader may note that VC 3 is not valid: the pre-condition of the 
withdraw operation as defined in CurrentAccount does not imply the pre-condition of 
the withdraw operation as defined in SavingsAccount. 
Implementation VCs 
Implementations are verified using a symbolic execution process [55, 56]. This section 
includes the details of the symbolic execution rules for the Omnibus language. These provide 
a description of the semantics of the language. A worked example of the symbolic execution 
process is given in appendix D. 
Symbolic execution is a process for the symbolic analysis of implementations. It is used 
within the Omnibus project to support static verification. A component which performs the 
symbolic execution process is called a symbolic executor. 
The basic idea behind symbolic execution is to generalise the normal execution rules for a 
language to support algebraic symbols. Assumptions can be made about the initial validity of 
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these symbols. Then the implementation can be executed with these values, with any 
additional assumptions recorded as the execution progresses. Any assertions that are met 
should be provable from the assumptions of the specific path. This approach allows general 
properties of the correctness of implementations to be verified as it is not tied to any specific 
concrete test values. 
During the standard execution of a method, the system must keep track of the next 
statement to be executed (the program counter) and the current values for each variable in the 
program. The symbolic executor is a generalisation of this. In the normal execution of a 
method, only one path through the implementation is considered for each invocation. In 
symbolic execution, all paths are considered. If there is a branching point then the different 
branches are all considered in parallel under their own specific assumptions. The state of the 
symbolic executor reflects this. Instead of a single mapping of variables to values, there is one 
for each path. The symbolic executor allows symbolic values (i.e. expressions containing 
unevaluated symbols) as well as conventional concrete values (i.e. values evaluated to literal 
values without symbols) to be assigned to variables. Each path also has a Path Condition 
which is an expression used to keep track of the assumptions that are known to be valid for 
that specific path. The state information is arranged into a hierarchy of scope levels which can 
be opened and closed to be consistent with scope level system within the Omnibus language. 
Symbols are a crucial part of the symbolic execution approach. A symbol is simply an 
arbitrary constant value of a specific type whose precise value is not known. They allow the 
verification of a system to be modularised via the interfaces of the different modules. For 
example, suppose we wish to verify the correctness of a method with declared pre- and post-
conditions. We are interested in its correctness for all values, not just specific test values. We 
know from the static typing information that the parameters of the method have specific 
known types but we do not know their specific values. Therefore, we can assign symbol 
constants of the specified type to these parameters. We may assume that the pre-condition 
holds over the symbolic values, provided that we separately verify that all calls of this method 
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satisfy it. We can then execute the implementation using the symbolic values, and verify at 
the end of the implementation that the post-condition is met. 
We will often find that we need to verify the correctness of an assertion during the 
symbolic execution of an implementation. We stated earlier that any encountered assertions 
should follow from the assumptions that are known to be true for the specific path being 
considered. This can be checked by ensuring that the specific path condition logically implies 
the assertion to be proved. The formulae to check this is referred to as a Verification 
Condition (VC). 
Symbolic execution primitives 
A procedure must be defined for the handling of each construct in the language by the 
symbolic executor. For each statement, a symbolic execution rule must be defined to describe 
how the statement is executed. Likewise, procedures must be defined for the verification of 
each class and method. Finally, the process of evaluating each expression and checking of the 
pre-conditions within a method must be defined. 
These symbolic execution procedures are defined in terms of a set of primitive statements 
for manipulating the state of the symbolic executor. 
Variable manipulation primitives 
declare varName, type The declare primitive declares a new variable of the 
specified type. The typing information is used in the 
production of a suitable symbol. 
init varName The init primitive initialises a new variable with an 
undefined value. 
reassign varName The reassign primitive assigns a fresh symbolic value to the 
specified variable. No information about the variable’s value 
is known other than its validity. This is analogous to havoc 
statements in Boogie. 
reassignExcept varNames The reassignExcept primitive assigns fresh symbolic values 
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to all the variables which can be assigned to, apart from 
those in the passed list. No information about the new 
variable values are known other than their validity. 
Knowledge manipulation primitives 
assume exp The assume primitive conjoins an expression to the Path Condition 
of the current path. The expression is evaluated first. 
check exp The check primitive generates a VC to check that the specified 
assertion is satisfied. The generated VC checks that current path 
condition logically implies the specified assertion. The expression is 
evaluated first. 
clearKnowledge The clearKnowledge primitive clears the Path Condition for the 
current path. In does this by assigning the Path Condition to the 
boolean literal true. 
deny exp The deny primitive is similar to the check primitive except that the 
desired truth of the corresponding VC is false, not true. The 
expression is evaluated first. 
localAssume exp The localAssume primitive adds an assumption that is included 
within the Path Condition but it is removed when the current scope 
level is closed. The expression is evaluated first. 
Scope level primitives 
openLevel The openLevel primitive opens a new temporary scope level where 
variables can be added which will be subsequently removed when 
the scope level is closed. 
closeLevel The closeLevel primitive closes the current scope level, removing 
any local variables. 
Branching primitives 
branch The branch primitive allows the symbolic execution procedure for a 
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construct to be defined in separate cases. 
terminate The terminate primitive indicates that termination should halt at the 
specified point and execution should not continue into subsequent 
statements. 
Expression primitives 
value(exp) The value function is used to evaluate a particular expression. It 
yields the evaluated equivalent of the expression. This function is 
defined recursively for each expression construct as outlined below. 
checkPres exp The checkPres primitive is used to check that the pre-conditions of 
all the sub-expressions within a specified expression are met. This is 
defined recursively for each expression construct as outlined below. 
Statement primitives 
execute stmt The execute primitive is used to symbolically execute a specific 
statement. This is defined recursively for each statement as outlined 
below. 
Constants 
For convenience, we introduce a range of special constants to refer to elements from the class 
or method definition. The classAttributes, classInvariants and classTemplateParameters 
constants refer to the attributes, invariants and template parameters of the current class, 
respectively. The methodPrecondition and methodPostcondition constants refer to the pre- 
and post-conditions of the current method, respectively. 
Symbolic execution procedures 
This section gives the symbolic execution procedures for each language construct in terms of 
the primitives defined in the previous section. 
Classes and class members 
package packPath; 
uses usesList; 
load ‘top level package variables’ 
load ‘imported + local class variables’ 
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class name[tempParams] isa suprCls { 
 members 
} 
load ‘local + inherited methods’ 
declare “this”, name 
declare tempParams 
declare classAttributes 
process members 
function name(params):type 
behaviour 
{ 
 code; 
} 
openLevel 
clearKnowledge 
declare params 
reassign classTemplateParameters 
reassign classAttributes 
reassign params 
assume methodPrecondition 
assume classInvariants 
execute code 
closeLevel 
constructor name(params) 
behaviour 
{ 
 code; 
} 
openLevel 
clearKnowledge 
declare params 
reassign classTemplateParameters 
init classAttributes 
reassign params 
assume methodPrecondition 
execute code 
closeLevel 
operation name(params) 
behaviour 
{ 
openLevel 
clearKnowledge 
declare params 
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 code; 
} 
reassign classTemplateParameters 
reassign classAttributes 
reassign params 
assume methodPrecondition 
assume classInvariants 
execute code 
check methodPostCondition 
closeLevel 
test name { 
 code; 
} 
openLevel 
clearKnowledge 
execute code 
closeLevel 
Statements 
assert exp; checkPres exp 
check exp 
target := exp; checkPres exp 
assign target, exp 
assume exp; checkPres exp 
assume exp 
var varName:type; checkPres type 
declare varName, type 
init varName 
var varName:type := exp; checkPres type 
checkPres exp 
declare varName, type 
assign varName, exp 
deny exp; checkPres exp 
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deny exp 
if (cond) { 
 trueCode; 
} 
checkPres cond 
branch 1 branch 2 
assume cond assume !cond 
execute trueCode 
if (cond) { 
 trueCode; 
} else { 
 elseCode; 
} 
checkPres cond 
branch 1 branch 2 
assume cond assume !cond 
execute trueCode execute elseCode 
To symbolically execute an if statement, the system splits the statement up into branches 
for each of the paths through the statement. Firstly, it considers the case where the 
condition of the if is true. In this case, it assumes the condition of the if, executes the 
statements in the if and then continues execution after the if. Then, for each of the elseif 
clauses, it assumes the condition of the elseif along with the negation of the preceding 
conditions, executes the statements in the elseif and then continues execution after the if. 
Finally, it assumes the negation of the if and elseif conditions, if an else clause is 
provided, then it executes the statements in it and continues execution after the if. 
while (cond) 
 alters alts 
 maintains maint 
{ 
 code; 
} 
checkPres maint 
check maint 
reassignExcept alts 
assume maint 
checkPres cond 
branch 1 branch 2 
assume !cond assume cond 
 execute code 
 check maint 
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 terminate 
There are two techniques for symbolically executing loops: invariant-based proofs and 
loop unravelling. A loop invariant can be provided via alters and maintains 
clauses. If a loop invariant is provided, symbolic execution is used to prove that the 
invariant holds initially and that it is maintained by an arbitrary execution of the loop 
body. This involves the following steps: 
1. Checking the loop invariant holds initially: 
a. The maintains expression is checked, ensuring that the loop 
invariant holds initially. 
2. Checking the loop invariant is maintained by an arbitrary iteration 
of the loop: 
a. All variables in the alters clause are assigned fresh symbolic 
values. 
b. The knowledge is adjusted to hold only the maintains 
clause and the loop condition. 
c. The body of the while loop is executed. 
d. The maintains clause is checked and  
3. Checking the remainder of the method: 
a. All variables in the alters clause are assigned fresh 
symbolic values. 
b. The knowledge is adjusted to hold only the 
maintains clause and the negation of the loop 
condition. 
while (cond) { 
 code; 
} 
checkPres cond 
branch 1 branch 2 
assume !cond assume cond 
 execute code 
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 assume !cond 
Verification using loop invariants is the only sound way of proving code involving loops. 
However, it can be extremely difficult to devise suitable loop invariants. As such, the 
developer may prefer to use the loop unravelling technique which checks some finite 
number of iterations of the loop. Loop unravelling will be used if no loop invariant is 
specified and loop unravelling is enabled. Unravelling the loop 0 times involves assuming 
the negation of the loop condition and then executing the remainder of the method. 
Unravelling the loop once involves assuming the loop condition, executing the body of 
the loop once, assuming the negation of the loop condition and then executing the 
remainder of the method. And so on. 
return exp; checkPres exp 
declare “result”, methodReturnType 
assign “result”, exp 
check methodPostcondition 
terminate 
The return statement supports abrupt termination, i.e. all paths executing a return 
statement terminate with that statement. The ensures and changes clauses should 
also be checked along with requirements if the developer selected to check requirements 
hold over the implementations. Before these checks are made, the value to be returned is 
assigned to the special result variable. 
unreachable; check false 
terminate 
Like the return statement, the unreachable statement also terminates execution paths. 
When it is encountered during symbolic execution, the system attempts to prove the truth 
of the assertion false. The only way that this can be proved is if there is a contradiction 
in the current path condition signifying that there is a logical flaw in the assumptions 
taken in selecting the current execution path. 
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Expression evaluation and pre-condition checking 
Standard binary operators 
The following rules apply for the standard binary operators: addition (‘+’), subtraction (‘-’), 
multiplication (‘*’), equality (‘=’, ‘!=’), inequality (‘<’, ‘<=’, ‘>’, ‘>=’), static typing (‘is’, 
‘as’) and logical equivalence (‘<==>’). 
left op right checkPres left 
checkPres right 
value(left) op value(right) 
Division operators 
The following rules apply for the division (‘/’) and modulus (‘%’) operators. 
left op right checkPres left 
checkPres right 
check right != 0 
value(left) op value(right) 
Short-circuited logical operators 
The following rules apply for the disjunction (‘||’) operator. 
left op right checkPres left 
openLevel 
localAssume ! left 
checkPres right 
closeLevel 
value(left) op value(right) 
The following rules apply for the conjunction (‘&&’) and implication (‘==>’) operators. 
left op right checkPres left 
openLevel 
localAssume left 
checkPres right 
closeLevel 
value(left) op value(right) 
The following rules apply for the if..then..else.. operator. 
if cond then trueExp checkPres cond if value(cond) 
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     else falseExp openLevel 
localAssume cond 
checkPres trueExp 
closeLevel 
openLevel 
localAssume ! cond 
checkPres falseExp 
closeLevel 
     then value(trueExp) 
     else value(falseExp) 
Method calls 
The following rules apply for method calls in expressions. 
object.methodName(params) checkPres object 
check object.methodName_guard(params) 
 
value(object).methodName(values(params)) 
Variables 
name  Returns corresponding 
variable value (may be a 
package, class, template 
parameter type, “this” or a 
normal variable value) 
7.4   Mapping generic logic to specific provers 
The verification process starts with the generation of the generic logic definitions, axioms and 
VCs. Once this has been completed, the generic logic is translated into the logic of the 
appropriate prover. 
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The Omnibus static verifier currently supports two theorem provers: Simplify and PVS. 
For each prover, we must define how to formalise the background, how to express definitions, 
axioms and VCs, and how to translate all elements of the expression language. 
Translation of generic logic into Simplify 
Simplify [36] is a fully automated theorem prover developed specifically with ESC in mind. 
Simplify’s input language is an untyped first-order logic with function symbols and equality, 
and a LISP-style syntax. It includes a theory of arithmetic defining function symbols +, -, * 
and relation symbols >, <, >=, <= with the usual meaning. While the theory is untyped, it 
distinguishes between propositional values and terms. An important consequence of this is 
that propositional operators such as IMPLIES and < cannot be used as terms. 
Definition of background in Simplify: The definition of the background is and valid 
functions in Simplify is relatively straightforward. Simplify does not need these to be declared 
in the background before they can be referred to in the generated axioms. 
The main purpose of the background axioms in Simplify is to define term-space 
equivalents of the predicate symbols. Simplify provides built-in functions for equality, 
implication, negation, inequality, conjunction, disjunction, etc. but they are defined as 
predicates. As such, they cannot be used as sub-expressions. We follow Cok’s solution to this 
problem [32]: we define term-space equivalents for each predicate and use these in our 
expressions. The effect of this is that everything is lifted into the term-space and the 
distinction can then be ignored. We will see later that this does, however, complicate the 
handling of quantifiers. 
The first step in this process is to define term symbols for the logical values true and 
false. This can be done as follows in terms of a single special symbol |@true|. The 
following logic is included within the axiom file passed to Simplify on start-up. 
(EQ true |@true|) 
(NEQ false |@true|) 
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Let us now, for example, consider the conjunction operator. Simplify has a built-in 
predicate AND which takes two predicates and evaluates to true iff both are true. To 
illustrate the problem, we could not use a call of a boolean method as one of the operands of 
an AND predicate since methods are defined using function symbols that are part of the term-
space. However, we can introduce a new term-space operator && which is equal to the special 
term true iff both its operands are equal to true, defined using the AND predicate. The 
axiom formalising this is: 
(FORALL (x y) 
 (PATS (&& x y)) 
 (IFF 
  (EQ (&& x y) true) 
  (AND (EQ x true) (EQ y true)) 
 )) 
A special predicate, PRED, is defined at the start of each Simplify logic file. PRED is a 
predicate which accepts a boolean term value and is equivalent to a predicate asking whether 
the value is equal to the true symbol. This allows boolean expressions in the term space to 
be lowered to the predicate space. 
(DEFPRED (PRED x) (EQ x true)) 
These axioms and definitions are the only things that we need to define in the Simplify 
background in order to translate Omnibus classes and methods into Simplify. 
Translation of expressions into Simplify: A mapping must be defined for each 
expression in the Omnibus expression language to a corresponding expression in Simplify. 
The framework established makes this relatively easy for the basic operators. For example, 
we saw how a special term-space && operator is defined for conjunction. So to translate an 
Omnibus conjunction into Simplify we write “(&&”, translate the two operands of the 
conjunction and then write “)”. 
The translation of method calls is also relatively straightforward. We simply write a call of 
the special function used to define the method. 
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The main challenge is in the handling of quantifiers. Quantifier predicates can be defined 
in Simplify but, as was explained earlier, in the translation of Omnibus into Simplify all 
expressions are lifted into the term-space. So, we can translate a quantifier to Simplify if it is 
used as the top-level expression in an axiom or VC but not as a sub-expression, say, within a 
post-condition assertion. To combat this, term-space skolem functions are introduced, and 
axioms are added describing them in the same way that term-space equivalents of the built-in 
logical operators were defined in the background. 
For example, consider the following specification of a Set class. The post-condition 
contains a quantification. 
public spec class Set[Element] { 
 public model function contains(e:Element):boolean 
  
 public constructor empty() 
  ensures forall (e:Element): 
        !contains(e) 
} 
Consider the translation of the following axiom for the post-condition. 
declare Set_empty_pub_post(ElementClass:Class,this:Set):bool 
 
axiom Set_empty_pub_post_ax: forall (ElementClass:Class, 
                   this:Set): 
     Set_empty_pub_post(ElementClass,this) 
     = (forall (e:Element): !Set_contains(this, e)) 
Within the post-condition axiom, the forall quantification is the right operand of an 
equality operator. When the equality operator is translated to Simplify, it takes two term 
parameters and so we cannot use the built-in FORALL predicate. The universal quantification 
is left in its unevaluated Omnibus form, surrounded by double angle brackets, in the following 
piece of Simplify. 
 (BG_PUSH 
 (FORALL (ElementClass this) 
  (PATS (Set_empty_pub_post ElementClass this) ) 
  (PRED 
   (==> 
    (is this Set) 
    (= 
     (Set_empty_pub_post ElementClass this) 
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     << forall (e:Element): !contains(e) >> 
    ) 
   ) 
  ) 
 ) 
) 
Note how the type information of the this variable is formalised within the body of the 
quantifier expression using an implication preceding the original quantified expression. 
The solution we adopt for the expression of the quantification is to introduce a special 
boolean term skolem function for each quantifier and define its meaning using a separate 
axiom at the start of the Simplify file. The post-condition axiom then becomes: 
 (BG_PUSH 
 (FORALL (ElementClass this) 
  (PATS (Set_empty_pub_post ElementClass this) ) 
  (PRED 
   (==> 
    (is this Set) 
    (= 
     (Set_empty_pub_post ElementClass this) 
     (forall_0 ElementClass this) 
    ) 
   ) 
  ) 
 ) 
) 
With the forall_0 skolem function defined as follows: 
(BG_PUSH (FORALL (ElementClass this) 
 (PATS (forall_0 ElementClass this)) 
 (IFF 
  (EQ (forall_0 ElementClass this) true) 
  (FORALL (e) 
   (PRED 
    (==> 
     (is this Set) 
     (! (Set_contains this e) ) 
    ) 
   ) 
  ) 
 ) 
)) 
Translation of declarations, axioms and VCs into Simplify: The axioms and VCs in the 
generic logic are written to a Simplify logic file ready to be processed by the prover. The 
declarations do not need to be translated since Simplify does not require the declaration of 
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function symbols. Axioms can be defined in this file using the BG_PUSH instruction. PRED 
must be used within BG_PUSH to convert the term-space expression back to the predicate-
space which BG_PUSH requires. If the top-level expression is a quantifier, then the use of 
PRED and a skolem function may be avoided by directly using the built-in quantifier 
predicates and using PRED within its body. 
VCs can be defined by simply including the corresponding expression in the logic file. 
Again, PRED may need to be used to lower the term-space expression to the predicate space. 
As an example of the translation of an axiom from the generic logic into Simplify, 
consider the following axiom defining the invariant of the Rectangle class we saw earlier. 
declare Rectangle_invariant_0(this:Rectangle):bool 
 
axiom Rectangle_invariant_0_ax: forall (this:Rectangle): 
       Rectangle_invariant_0(this) =  
              Rectangle_width(this) >= 0 
               && Rectangle_height(this) >= 0 
This is translated into the following Simplify axiom. 
(BG_PUSH 
 (FORALL (this) 
  (PATS (Rectangle_invariant_0 this) ) 
  (PRED 
   (==> 
    (is this Rectangle) 
    (= 
     (Rectangle_invariant_0 this) 
     (&& 
      (GE (Rectangle_width this) 0) 
      (GE (Rectangle_height this) 0) 
     ) 
    ) 
   ) 
  ) 
 ) 
) 
Note the use of the && and GE operators which are the term-space equivalents of the built-
in AND and >= predicates. 
As an example of the translation of a VC, consider this VC from the PosCounter class 
we saw earlier. 
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vc vc_6: forall (old_this:v_PosCounter, this:PosCounter): 
       PosCounter_dec_pub_pre(old_this) 
        && PosCounter_dec_pub_post(old_this,this) 
       ==> PosCounter_constraint_0(old_this,this) 
This is translated into the following Simplify: 
(FORALL (old_this this) 
 (PRED 
  (==> 
   (&& 
    (&& 
     (is old_this PosCounter) 
     (valid old_this PosCounter) 
    ) 
    (is this PosCounter) 
   ) 
   (==> 
    (&& 
     (PosCounter_dec_pub_pre old_this) 
     (PosCounter_dec_pub_post old_this this) 
    ) 
    (PosCounter_constraint_0 old_this this) 
   ) 
  ) 
 ) 
) 
The key aspect here is the use of the built-in valid function. This comes from the fact 
that the type of old_this in the axiom is v_PosCounter, i.e. a valid instance of 
PosCounter and thus satisfying its invariants as well as being an instance of 
PosCounter. 
Translation of generic logic into PVS 
PVS (Prototype Verification System) [81] is a sophisticated theorem prover developed by SRI 
International. It is available for Linux and Solaris systems and is executed as a plug-in for the 
emacs editor. The PVS system contains a specification language, a parser, a type checker, a 
prover, specification libraries and various associated tools. The specification language is 
based upon typed higher-order logic. PVS specifications are made up of theories which may 
contain, among other things, collections of type and constant definitions, axioms and 
conjectures. PVS types can be defined from the base types (Booleans, integers, etc.) using 
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functions, records and a range of other standard formal mechanisms. PVS also allows the 
definition of additional, uninterpreted base types and predicate sub-types (a subset of 
individuals from another type which satisfy some predicate). The inclusion of predicate sub-
types means that type checking is undecidable and may lead to the production of proof 
obligations called Type Correctness Conditions (TCCs) which must be proved in order to 
show that a theory is well-typed. In PVS, all functions are total, but partial functions can be 
modelled using predicate subtypes to restrict the domain of the input parameters. There is a 
range of built-in proof tactics for semi-automating proofs. For example the (grind) tactic 
applies rewrite rules, simplifies using decision procedures, and carries out heuristic quantifier 
instantiation. 
PVS has a declare-before-use requirement within its theories. This can cause a problem in 
the formalisation of languages such as Omnibus which have no such requirements 
themselves. In Omnibus, the ordering of methods within a class is irrelevant: the specification 
of any method can refer to any other method. To address this problem we followed the 
approach taken by the LOOP project [49] of splitting the generated PVS theories into levels. 
At the top level we have the formalisation of the background in PVS. Then we have the 
definition of the special PVS types for each class. This is followed by the type signature 
declarations of the functions defined by the generic logic declarations, declarations of any 
required symbol constants, and then the generic logic axioms. Finally, there are conjecture 
files for each class to be verified along with lemma files for defining useful intermediary 
lemmas for use in the proof of multiple VCs. 
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Definition of background in PVS: The definition of the background starts with the 
definition of the basic concepts of objects and classes in PVS. There is a non-empty set of 
Classes and a set of Objects. For each class we will introduce a Class constant and subtype 
of Object for the object instances of that class. We then also declare the built-in is and 
valid predicates which each accept an object and class. For convenience we also introduce 
InstanceOf and v_InstanceOf predicate subtypes. These accept a Class constant and 
yield a type for the object instances and valid object instances of that class, respectively. 
Class: TYPE+ 
  
ObjectClass: Class 
Object: TYPE 
  
is: [Object,Class -> bool] 
valid: [Object,Class -> bool] 
 
InstanceOf(c:Class): TYPE = {this:Object | is(this,c)} 
v_InstanceOf(c:Class): TYPE = {this:InstanceOf(c) | 
valid(this,c)} 
The above definitions constitute the application-independent PVS prelude for Omnibus in 
its entirety. These definitions establish a framework within PVS which is sufficient to 
describe Omnibus classes and methods. No further definitions are needed, e.g. there is no 
formalisation of a heap. 
Axioms 
Header 
Types 
Signatures 
Semantics 
Footer 
Lemmas 
Obligations 
Lemmas 
Obligations 
Lemmas 
Obligations 
CHAPTER 7 TOOL SUPPORT 
 187 
Let us now consider the generation of the type information for each class. The system is 
simplest for classes without template parameters. Consider the Shape class: 
public class Shape {} 
Special class constants and types for valid and invalid objects are defined for each class 
level. Here, there are no protected members and the class is not declared to be spec or 
native so there are two class levels: public and private. The object types are declared as 
predicate subtypes of their corresponding super class levels. The public Shape class level 
(‘Shape’ without an accessibility prefix) inherits from the public omni.lang.Object 
class level, and the private Shape class level inherits from the public Shape class level. 
ShapeClass: Class 
Shape: TYPE = {this:omni_lang_Object | is(this,ShapeClass)} 
v_Shape: TYPE = {this:Shape | valid(this,ShapeClass)} 
  
priv_ShapeClass: Class 
priv_Shape: TYPE = {this:Shape | is(this,priv_ShapeClass)} 
v_priv_Shape: TYPE = {this:priv_Shape | 
valid(this,priv_ShapeClass)} 
The situation is a bit more complicated when it comes to classes with template parameters. 
Consider a parameterised Set class. 
public class Set[Element] {} 
The first stage is the same as for the Shape class, defining SetClass, Set, v_Set, 
priv_SetClass, priv_Set and v_priv_Set elements in the same way. A special 
function is also defined for the template parameter. This function maps the Set object to the 
actual template parameter value for the Set. Predicate subtypes are then defined for Set 
with a specific template parameter. The predicate restrictions assert that the value of the 
template parameter type is equal to the type passed. 
Set_ElementClass: [Set -> Class] 
  
SetOf(ElementClass:Class): TYPE = { this:Set | 
Set_ElementClass(this) = ElementClass} 
v_SetOf(ElementClass:Class): TYPE = { this:v_Set | 
Set_ElementClass(this) = ElementClass} 
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priv_SetOf(ElementClass:Class): TYPE = { this:priv_Set | 
Set_ElementClass(this) = ElementClass} 
v_priv_SetOf(ElementClass:Class): TYPE = { this:v_priv_Set | 
Set_ElementClass(this) = ElementClass} 
Translation of expressions into PVS: The translation of Omnibus expressions to PVS is 
more straightforward than the translation into Simplify. There is no hard distinction between 
terms and predicates, so the built-in operators and quantifiers can be used directly. 
For example, reconsider the declaration and axiom for the post-condition of the Set class 
discussed earlier. 
declare Set_empty_pub_post(ElementClass:Class,this:Set):bool 
 
axiom Set_empty_pub_post_ax: forall (ElementClass:Class, 
                   this:Set): 
     Set_empty_pub_post(ElementClass,this) 
     = (forall (e:Element): !Set_contains(this, e)) 
The translation of this declaration and axiom into PVS is relatively straightforward. First 
there is the declaration of the type signature of the post-condition function in the 
Signatures section. Then there is the axiom describing the function. The built-in FORALL 
quantifier is used directly within the expression. This was possible in Simplify because of the 
separate term and predicate spaces. Note how the v_InstanceOf predicate subtype is used 
in the translation of the quantification over Element. 
Set_empty_pub_post(ElementClass:Class, this:Set):bool 
 
Set_empty_pub_post_ax: AXIOM 
 (FORALL (ElementClass:Class), (this:Set): 
   (Set_empty_pub_post(ElementClass, this) = (FORALL 
(e:v_InstanceOf(ElementClass)): 
     (NOT Set_contains(this, e)) 
   )) 
 ) 
Translation of declarations, axioms and VCs into PVS: Declarations, axioms and VCs 
are again relatively straightforward to formalise in PVS. Declarations map naturally to PVS 
function declarations and the axioms of the generic logic map naturally to PVS axioms. The 
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function declarations are added to the Signatures section. The VCs in the generic logic map to 
PVS conjectures. 
As an example of the translation of generic logic declarations and axioms to PVS, consider 
the area function in the Rectangle class we saw earlier. Crucially, this method overrides 
the definition given in the Shape class. There are two axioms for this method, one for the 
post-condition function and one for method function itself. There is no declaration for the 
method function, it just provides an axiom for reasoning about the corresponding root method 
function which it overrides. 
declare Rectangle_area_pub_post(this:Rectangle, 
                result:integer):bool 
 
axiom Rectangle_area_pub_post_ax: 
      forall (this:Rectangle,result:integer): 
         Rectangle_area_pub_post(this,result) = 
            result = Rectangle_width(this) 
                * Rectangle_height(this) 
 
axiom Rectangle_area_pub_ax: forall (this:Rectangle): 
       Shape_area(this) = Rectangle_width(this) 
                * Rectangle_height(this) 
In the generated PVS, the post-condition function is declared in the Signatures section. No 
declaration is needed for the method axiom. The post-condition and method function axioms 
are fairly direct translations of the generic logic axioms. 
Rectangle_area_pub_post(this:v_Rectangle, result:int):bool 
 
Rectangle_area_pub_post_ax: AXIOM 
 (FORALL (this:v_Rectangle), (result:int): 
   (Rectangle_area_pub_post(this, result) = (result = 
(Rectangle_width(this) * Rectangle_height(this)))) 
 ) 
AUTO_REWRITE+ Rectangle_area_pub_post_ax 
  
Rectangle_area_pub_ax: AXIOM 
 (FORALL (this:v_Rectangle): 
   (Shape_area(this) = (Rectangle_width(this) * 
Rectangle_height(this))) 
 ) 
AUTO_REWRITE+ Rectangle_area_pub_ax 
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Again let us consider the translation of the VC to verify that the dec operation of the 
PosCounter class satisfies the constraint. The VC in the generic logic was: 
vc vc_6: forall (old_this:v_PosCounter, this:PosCounter): 
       PosCounter_dec_pub_pre(old_this) 
        && PosCounter_dec_pub_post(old_this,this) 
       ==> PosCounter_constraint_0(old_this,this) 
This is translated into the following PVS: 
vc_6: CONJECTURE 
 (FORALL (old_this:v_PosCounter), (this:PosCounter): 
   ((PosCounter_dec_pub_pre(old_this) AND 
PosCounter_dec_pub_post(old_this, this)) IMPLIES 
PosCounter_constraint_0(old_this, this)) 
 ) 
The PVS version of this VC is more concise than the Simplify version. This is because the 
typing information of the quantified variables is expressed through the typing, whereas it must 
be explicitly described within the quantified expression in the Simplify version. 
7.5   Prover-specific interaction 
The Omnibus IDE provides a range of support for managing the process of proving the 
generated VCs. 
7.5.1   Simplify prover support 
The automated verification process starts with the generation of generic logic axioms and 
VCs and the translation of these into Simplify. The generated file is then passed to the 
Simplify prover for processing. The prover is automatically launched by the Omnibus IDE 
and its output monitored. This process is carried out in a new thread so that the user can carry 
out other tasks while the prover is running. The automated prover pane (shown below) allows 
the user to track the process of the prover and gives them the option to terminate it. 
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When the prover has finished, the IDE checks that each VC has the expected validity. If a 
VC has the wrong validity then the corresponding error message stored with that VC is 
displayed. An example error message is displayed below. 
 
The full details of the proof process are recorded and can be viewed through the check 
viewer. 
7.5.2   PVS prover support 
The interactive verification process starts with the generation of a set of PVS theories from 
the generic logic definitions, axioms and VCs. Each Omnibus project has a setting for where 
the PVS files should be generated. The PVS prover should then be independently used by the 
developer to prove the conjectures in the generated files. Lemma files are automatically 
generated and can be used to support reuse within proofs. Proof files are used by PVS to 
record proof attempts. The IDE generates default proofs for each VC. These simply consist of 
the (grind) tactic. However, together with the auto-rewrites, this is sufficient to prove 
many simple VCs. 
The IDE tool is able to track the progress of the user-made proofs in PVS by parsing the 
proof files. This information on the validity of the PVS VCs can be viewed via the check 
viewer in the same way that it is used for the automated verifier. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Case study 
This chapter discusses a case study carried out using Omnibus. The initial version of the 
project was written by a student as part of their Honours dissertation and this was used as a 
basis for a case study in verification with Omnibus. Our aim was to gain feedback on the ease 
with which the Omnibus system could be applied by a member of our target audience, 
someone without extensive formal methods training. The student produced an implementation 
and a heavyweight specification of correctness. This gave us an example with real errors 
generated by another person to which we could apply the Omnibus process. We derived 
lightweight specifications from the heavyweight specifications and then carried out the 
verification process and corrected errors. The case study does not provide industrial-scale 
justification of the Omnibus approach but does allow the ideas it contains to be explored in 
some more detail. 
We start the discussion of the verification of the case study by presenting an 
implementation with assertion annotations and using the Omnibus tool to RAC-check it. This 
process uncovers some errors which we correct. We then attempt to ESC-check the RAC-
corrected implementation. This uncovers further errors which we, again, correct. Next we 
consider the FFV approach and verify that a heavyweight behaviour specification, with 
corrections that are equivalent to those made after RAC and ESC checking, meets its 
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requirements. This uncovers still further errors which we correct. Finally, we explore the 
benefits of greater levels of integration between the approaches using verification policies. 
We are not recommending that the verification approaches be applied to real examples in 
this way. We perform verification using each of the approaches on the same example in order 
to permit direct comparison of their error coverage. 
The assertion annotations are adapted from those produced by the student and, 
unsurprisingly, contain errors. Often it was possible for us to spot these errors without the use 
of the verification tools. However, we purposely retained these errors in our adapted versions 
so that we could test the error detection facilities of the Omnibus verification tool. 
8.1   Process used in the development of the Library system 
This section describes the process that was used to develop the Library system. The initial 
version of the Library case study was produced following a process devised for use with the 
Omnibus FFV approach. First, a specification was produced and checked, and then a 
corresponding implementation produced and checked. This process consists of the following 
steps, taken from section 3.1 of the student’s dissertation [14]: 
1. Produce a heavyweight specification 
a. Elicit requirements and model the problem. This initial work must be done 
outside the Omnibus language, perhaps using UML use case diagrams. 
b. Outline the public type signature interface of the class, perhaps using a 
variation of UML class diagrams. Skeleton class definitions can then be 
described in Omnibus. Methods must be divided up into constructors, 
functions and operations. 
c. Select a subset of the functions of the class that together represent the 
abstract state of object instances of the class and declare these as model 
functions. If the functions in the class are not sufficient to do this then 
additional specification-only functions should be introduced to enable this 
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to be done. Define the remaining functions in terms of the model 
functions. 
d. Write requirements over the model functions using initiallys, invariants 
and constraints. What should hold over the model functions initially? 
What should hold over them at all times? How should they be allowed to 
change? 
e. Describe the constructors and operations in terms of the model functions 
using requires, changes and ensures clauses. Care should be taken to use 
the changes clauses correctly. 
f. Verify that the behaviour specifications satisfy the requirements. 
2. Produce an implementation for the specification 
a. Devise private attributes to implement the model functions and hence 
provide a concrete representation for the state of each class. 
b. Write any additional requirements over the attributes using private 
initiallys, invariants and constraints. 
c. Describe the model functions in terms of the attributes using private 
ensures clauses. 
d. Write code for all the methods in the class. The specifications should be 
used to guide the developer in the production of the code. 
e. Verify that the implementation satisfies the behaviour. 
The student derived the requirements of her Library system from a range of formal 
specification textbooks. She produced an informal description of the requirements together 
with a series of UML use case diagrams. The design of the system then began through the use 
of UML class diagrams. This class diagram was then translated into Omnibus type signature 
interfaces for the classes in the system. 
Heavyweight specifications were then produced for each of the classes. First the functions 
were split into model functions and derived functions and their behaviour specified. Then 
high-level requirements were defined over these, using invariants. Specifications could then 
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be provided for the constructors and operations for each class. The next stage in the process 
outlined above was to verify that the behaviour specifications satisfied the requirements 
specifications. The author of this thesis attempted to verify properties of the specification 
using the Omnibus static verifier and PVS theorem prover. The errors which were found are 
reported in section 3.1.4.5 of the student’s dissertation [14] and described later in this chapter. 
Errors are uncovered by this process when an unprovable VC is discovered. During the proof 
process, the user has to think quite deeply about the specification and often has a clear idea of 
where the specification is erroneous by the time the proof is abandoned. For example, the user 
may have expected to have a piece of knowledge available to them but found that it was not 
because it had not been provided by a suitable requires clause. 
The student then produced an implementation of the heavyweight specification. Since the 
heavyweight specification was very detailed, this stage was relatively straightforward. A 
private attribute was introduced for each model function and the model functions defined in 
terms of them using private ensures clauses. Implementations were then provided for the other 
methods in the classes of the system. The implementation of each method was derived from 
the heavyweight specification of its behaviour as described in the ensures clause of the 
method. The student used a number of coding patterns developed by the author of this thesis 
in order to convert assertions involving quantifiers into Omnibus code. Finally, the author of 
the thesis used the Omnibus static verifier and PVS theorem prover to check that the 
implementations of the selected methods satisfied their behaviour specifications. Again, errors 
are uncovered by the discovery of unprovable VCs. 
This process produced a heavyweight specification for the system along with a 
corresponding implementation. This was ideal for use with the FFV approach. In order to 
enable the RAC and ESC approaches to be used, the author of this thesis adapted the 
heavyweight specification produced by the student to make it amenable to RAC and ESC. 
This involved a reduction in the detail provided in the ensures clauses of the behaviour 
specifications, e.g. only specifying how the sizes of collections should be changed rather than 
precisely specifying what elements the resulting collection should hold. 
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The use of the RAC approach requires the development of test cases to exercise the 
implementations suitably to ensure that all the assertions checks are executed. Tests should be 
defined for each usage scenario, e.g. adding/updating/deleting a book or loaning/returning an 
item. The crucial thing is that the tests for the class should involve the execution of all the 
assertion checks in all of the methods in the class. This may require that there are multiple 
invocations for a single method in the tests to cover the different paths through that method. 
The obligation viewer can be used to determine which assertion checks are being covered and 
which are not. If an assertion check is not being covered then the test cases should be adjusted 
to check it. The process for the definition of a test case is as follows:  
1. Declare and instantiate variable to hold object instance of the class containing the 
test, i.e. the class to be tested. 
2. For each operation within the particular usage scenario: 
a. Apply the operation to the instance of the object to be tested. Declare 
variables for each of the parameters of the operation, instantiate them with 
appropriate values, and then pass these variables when the operation is 
called. 
b. Check the values of any relevant derived functions through assert 
statements preceded by declarations of variables for any values needed to 
be passed as parameters to the functions 
Errors are detected by the RAC approach via run-time assertion failure messages. These 
indicate the precise assertion check which has failed along with the relevant context 
information such as the parameters of the call and the current attribute values. These can be 
used by the user to determine the logical cause of the failure. 
The rest of this chapter describes the system as if it was developed first for use with RAC 
and then adapted for use with ESC and FFV. We feel that this order of presentation is more 
natural. The RAC and ESC Omnibus tools were not used as part of the original case study by 
the student because they had not been fully implemented at the time. If they had been, we 
would have applied the tools in this order. 
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8.2   Informal description 
The Library contains a set of Items which can be loaned out. Each Item has a unique 
itemNo and a title. There are three concrete types of Item: Books, CDs and DVDs. In 
addition to its itemNo and title, a Book has an ISBN, a list of authors (which should not 
contain duplicates), a publisher and a published date. A CD has an itemNo, a title, a 
group (i.e. the band or artist name) and a release date. A DVD has an itemNo, a title, a 
list of actors (which should not contain duplicates), a director and a release date. 
The Library can hold multiple copies of each Item. Each Copy has a unique copyNo 
along with the itemNo identifying the item of which it is a copy. Each copy also has a status 
which is either ‘available’ or ‘lost’. Items and copies can be searched, added, deleted or 
changed. The addition of a new item automatically creates a new copy and the deletion of the 
last copy of an item automatically deletes the Item’s details from the system. 
People must register with the library as members before they can loan out a copy of an 
item. There is a Member record in the library for each member. This contains a unique 
memberNo, their name, their address, their telephone number, whether they are an adult, 
whether they are a member of staff, their current status (either active, inactive or banned), the 
amount of any fines they owe, and the PIN for use when logging into the system. Each 
Member has associated with them a Card with a unique cardNo and the memberNo. 
Members can be searched, added, deleted or changed. 
Members of the library can loan out copies of items in the library. For each Loan, the 
details of the memberNo, copyNo and start and end dates of the Loan are recorded. A 
member can choose to renew or return their copy at any time. Fines may be made if the 
endDate of the loan is exceeded. The details of the loans can be searched, added, deleted or 
changed via a standard loan/return/renew procedure. 
The system is described in more detail in section 3.1 of [14]. 
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8.3   Run-time assertion checking 
In this section, we will consider the production of an implementation with lightweight 
assertion annotations and its verification using run-time assertion checking with associated 
test cases. 
The full implementation consists of 15 classes with a total of 2278 lines of Omnibus code 
(including lightweight assertion annotations and test cases). There are 1034 separate assertion 
checks generated. The remainder of this section discusses interesting aspects of the example. 
8.3.1   Auxiliary classes 
Most of the classes in the Library case study are simple data structures that are used by the 
main Lib class. 
Simple data structure classes 
The following classes all follow the same simple structure: Book, CD, Card, Copy, DVD, 
Item, Loan, Member and Name. The files which define them contain a number of sections: 
the abstract state, a constructor and update operations. 
As an example, consider the Book class. The public accessor functions should be declared 
to be model functions so we can use them in changes clauses. They can be implemented by 
returning the corresponding attribute value. We could include private specifications 
describing the methods in terms of the private attributes at the private level but, for run-time 
assertion checking, this is not required. 
public class Book isa Item { 
 private attribute isbn:ISBN 
 private attribute authors:List[Name] 
 private attribute publisher:String 
 private attribute pubDate:Date 
  
 public model function isbn():ISBN { 
  return isbn;  
 } 
  
 public model function authors():List[Name] { 
  return authors; 
 } 
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 public model function publisher():String { 
  return publisher; 
 } 
  
 public model function pubDate():Date { 
  return pubDate; 
 } 
Requirement specifications such as invariants should be used to describe restrictions 
on the abstract state. For example, there should not be any duplicates in the list of authors. 
The omni.lang.List class that is used to model the lists contains a function called 
containsDuplicates which can be used to describe this. 
 public invariant noDuplicatesInAuthors: 
  !authors().containsDuplicates() 
The constructor is implemented by assigning the passed parameters to the corresponding 
attribute. 
 public constructor newBook(iNo:integer, t:String, 
isbnNo:ISBN, auths:List[Name], pub:String, pDate:Date) 
 { 
  itemNo := iNo;   
  title := t; 
  isbn := isbnNo; 
  authors := auths; 
  publisher := pub; 
  pubDate := pDate; 
 } 
Finally, the operations to support the updating of the newly introduced state elements are 
added. These are declared to change the relevant state element. 
 public operation setISBN(isbnNo:ISBN) 
  changes isbn 
 { 
  isbn := isbnNo; 
 }  
  
 public operation setAuthors(auths:List[Name]) 
  changes authors 
 { 
  authors := auths; 
 } 
   
 public operation setPublisher(pub:String) 
  changes publisher 
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 { 
  publisher := pub; 
 } 
   
 public operation setPubDate(pDate:Date) 
  changes pubDate 
 { 
  pubDate := pDate; 
 } 
} 
Predicate restricted classes 
The ISBN class consists of a single state element, a String, whose range of values is 
restricted to be within some valid range. The methods of the class guard assignments to the 
internal value with checks of the validity assertion. This provides a means of ensuring that all 
values that can be encapsulated by such a class satisfy its validity requirement. 
The definition of the class starts with the declaration of the private attribute and public 
model function for the value. 
public class ISBN { 
 private attribute value:String 
  
 public model function value():String { 
  return value;  
 } 
The validity requirement is defined using a static boolean function, here called 
isValidISBN. The invariant is then defined using this function. 
 public static function isValidISBN(s:String):boolean 
  ensures result = (s.length() = 13 &&  
   (forall (i:integer := 0 to s.length()-1): 
    Character.isDigit(s.charAt(i)) 
    || s.charAt(i) = '-' 
    || s.charAt(i) = ' ')) 
 { 
  if (s.length() != 13) { 
   return false; 
  } 
  for (j := 0 to s.length()-1) { 
   if (!Character.isDigit(s.charAt(j)) 
     && s.charAt(j) != '-' 
     && s.charAt(j) != ' ') { 
    return false; 
   } 
  } 
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  return true; 
 } 
 
 public invariant ISBN.isValidISBN(value()) 
Finally, the constructor accepts a value for the internal value and checks in a requires 
clause that the value is valid. 
 public constructor fromString(s:String) 
  requires ISBN.isValidISBN(s) 
    ensures value() = s  
 { 
  value := s;  
 } 
} 
Enumeration classes 
The ItemStatus and MemberStatus classes are similar to the ISBN class in that they 
guard a single value to ensure that it is valid as defined by some invariant. However, these 
classes have a small number of known possible values. Each of the possible values is 
allocated an integer value and an invariant ensures that the value of the state element is 
always one of these valid values. Constructors are then defined for each value, constructing an 
object with the corresponding value. For convenience, functions can also be defined to easily 
check which of the values the object has. 
public class ItemStatus { 
 private attribute value:integer 
  
 public model function value():integer { 
  return value;  
 } 
  
 public invariant value() >= 0 && value() <= 1 
  
 public constructor lost() 
  ensures value() = 0 
 { 
  value := 0;  
 } 
   
 public constructor available() 
  ensures value() = 1 
 { 
  value := 1;  
 } 
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 public function isLost():boolean 
  ensures result = true <==> value() = 0  
 { 
  if (value = 0){ 
   return true;  
  } else { 
   return false;  
  } 
 } 
  
 public function isAvailable():boolean 
  ensures result = true <==> value() = 1 
 { 
  if (value = 1){ 
   return true;  
  }  else { 
   return false;  
  } 
 } 
} 
Miscellaneous classes 
Finally, there is the Date class which does not fit into any of the other categories. It has an 
abstract state consisting of day, month and year elements. There is a constructor for 
creating a new Date object. There are static functions for querying properties of the date and 
local functions for carrying out date calculations. 
public class Date { 
 private attribute day:integer 
 private attribute month:integer 
 private attribute year:integer 
 
 public model function day():integer { 
  return day;  
 } 
  
 public model function month():integer { 
  return month; 
 } 
  
 public model function year():integer { 
  return year;  
 } 
 
 public invariant day() <= 31 
 public invariant month() <= 12 
  
 public constructor newDate(d:integer, m:integer, y:integer) 
 { 
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  day := d; 
  month := m; 
  year := y; 
 } 
    
 public function nDaysLater(n:integer):Date 
 { ... } 
  
 public static function isLeapYear(year:integer):boolean 
  ensures result = (year % 4 = 0) 
 { ... } 
  
 public static function isNewYear(day:integer, 
month:integer):boolean 
  ensures result = ((day > 31) && (month = 12)) 
 { ... } 
  
 public static function isNewMonthAfterThirty(day:integer, 
month:integer):boolean  
  ensures result = (((month = 4) || (month = 6) || (month = 
9) || (month = 11)) 
    && day > 30) 
 { ... } 
  
 public static function isNewMonthAfterThirtyOne 
           (day:integer, month:integer):boolean 
  ensures result = (((month = 1) || (month = 3) || (month = 
5) || (month = 7)  
    || (month = 8) || (month = 10)) && day > 31) 
 { ... } 
  
 public function calcDaysLate(d:Date):integer 
  requires d.laterThan(this) 
 { ... } 
  
 public function laterThan(d:Date):boolean 
  ensures result =  !(year() < d.year() 
   || year() = d.year() && month() < d.month() 
   || year() = d.year() && month() = d.month() && day() < 
d.day()) 
 { ... } 
} 
8.3.2   Central Lib class 
The bulk of the code of the application is within the Lib class. This contains the items, 
copies, members, cards and loans currently in the library along with methods to manipulate 
them. 
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Accessor functions 
Again, the accessor functions for the private attributes should be declared as public model 
functions to enable them to be used in changes clauses. 
The model functions for the Lib class are: 
 public model function items():Collection[Item] { 
  return items;  
 } 
  
 public model function copies():Collection[Copy] { 
  return copies;  
 } 
  
 public model function members():Collection[Member] { 
  return members; 
 } 
  
 public model function cards():Collection[Card] { 
  return cards;  
 } 
 
 public model function loans():Collection[Loan] { 
  return loans;  
 } 
Formalisation of invariants of Lib class 
Seven high-level correctness properties are laid out in the undergraduate student’s informal 
specification [14]. Four properties state that the identification numbers used for each item, 
copy, card and member (item number, copy number, card number and member number, 
respectively) are unique. Two properties state that the copies and members that are referred to 
in any loan must be in the library’s recorded copies and members, respectively. The final 
property expresses that a single copy cannot be recorded as on loan more than once at any one 
time. 
These correctness properties can be expressed as invariants within the Lib class. To 
define the uniqueness of the identification numbers we can use nested universal quantifiers. 
For example, the invariant that the itemNos of the Items in the items collection are 
unique is: 
 public invariant itemNosInItemsUnique:  
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   forall (i:Item in items()): 
   forall (i2:Item in items()): 
    i.itemNo() != i2.itemNo() || i = i2 
We can use the following as the invariant that every copy that is on loan is in the copies 
collection with a similar invariant for the memberNo for each loan. 
 public invariant allCopiesOnLoanInCopies:  
   forall (l:Loan in loans()): 
    exists (c:Copy in copies()): 
      l.copyNo() = c.copyNo() 
For the invariant that no copies are on loan more than once we can assert that if two loans 
have the same copyNo, they must be equal.    
 public invariant noCopiesOnLoanMoreThanOnce: 
  forall (l:Loan in loans()): 
   forall (l2:Loan in loans()): 
    l.copyNo() != l2.copyNo() || l = l2 
Lib operations 
As an example of the definition of an operation from the Lib class, consider the 
takeOutCopy operation which is used to take a copy of an item from the library and loan it 
out to a member. This method accepts a member number (memNo), a copy number (cNo) and 
a date (date) and takes out a new loan. 
 public operation takeOutCopy(memNo:integer, cNo:integer, 
date:Date) 
  requires exists (m:Member in members()): 
     m.memberNo() = memNo, 
    exists (c:Copy in copies()): 
     c.copyNo() = cNo, 
    forall (l:Loan in loans()): 
     l.copyNo() != cNo 
  changes loans 
  ensures loans().size() = old loans().size() + 1 
 { 
  loans.add(Loan.borrows(memNo, cNo, date,  
         calcNewDate( 
            lookupItemFromCopy(cNo).itemNo(), 
            date))); 
 }    
The requires clause asserts that there must be a Member in members with memNo as 
its memberNo, that there must be a Copy in copies with cNo as its copyNo and that there 
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should not be any Loan in loans which has cNo as its copyNo. These assertions help 
assure that after the new Loan is added with the passed details that the invariants are 
maintained. The changes clause specifies only the loans element (referring to the public 
model function) and so the other state elements (the other public model functions) should not 
be changed. A lightweight specification of the behaviour of the method is given in the 
ensures clause. This simply states that the size of the loans collection increases by one. 
Of course, this is an incomplete characterisation of the behaviour of the method but it is 
sufficient as a simple assertion to run-time check for this method. 
The implementation constructs a new Loan object with memNo, cNo, the passed date as 
the start date of the loan and an end date calculated using the calcNewDate function. The 
lookupItemFromCopy function is used to retrieve the itemNo of the copy to pass to this 
function. 
As an example of one of the update methods, consider the changeMemberName 
operation which is used to change the name associated with a member of the library. This 
accepts a memberNo, a first and last name and updates the name of the Member with this 
memberNo to hold this value. 
 public operation changeMemberName(memberNo:integer, 
f:String, s:String) 
  requires exists (m:Member in members()): 
         m.memberNo() = memberNo 
  changes members 
  ensures members().size() = old members().size(), 
   lookupMember(memberNo).name() = Name.newName(f, s) 
 { 
  var memberObj:Member:= lookupMember(memberNo); 
  members.remove(memberObj); 
  memberObj.setName(Name.newName(f, s)); 
  members.add(memberObj); 
 } 
The requires clause of the operation asserts that there should be a Member with the 
specified memberNo. This is required to ensure that the lookupMember function will 
always succeed. The changes clause specifies that only the members state element is 
changed. The ensures clause gives a lightweight specification of the behaviour of the 
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method. It asserts that the size of the members collection should not have changed and that, 
after the method, the member with the specified memberNo should have the passed name. 
The implementation starts by using the lookupMember function to retrieve the Member 
object with the specified memberNo. It removes this Member from the members collection, 
updates it using the setName operation and then re-adds it to members. As a result, the old 
Member with this memberNo should have been renamed and all other Members should 
have been unchanged. 
Lib functions 
There are also functions to query aspects of the library. For example, consider the 
lookupBookFromISBN function which is an example of one of the lookup functions. This 
function accepts an ISBN and returns a Book with that ISBN from books. 
 public function lookupBookFromISBN(isbn:ISBN):Book 
  requires exists (i:Item in items() where i is Book): 
    (i as Book).isbn() = isbn 
  ensures result.isbn() = isbn, 
   items().contains(result) 
 { 
  foreach (i:Item in items){ 
   if (i is Book){ 
    var book:Book := i as Book; 
    if (book.isbn() = isbn){ 
     return book;  
    } 
   } 
  } 
  unreachable; 
 } 
The requires clause asserts that there should be an Item in the items collection 
which is a Book and has the specified ISBN. The ensures clause asserts that the isbn of 
the returned Book should equal the passed ISBN and that the Book should be in the items 
collection. 
The implementation iterates through the elements in the items collection. If it finds a 
Book, it checks the isbn and returns that Book if it matches the passed ISBN. The 
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unreachable statement should never be reached because, from the requires clause, the 
return statement should be reached for one of the iterations through the loop. 
The memberLoans function is an example of one of the search functions. This accepts a 
memberNo and returns a collection containing all the Items for which a Copy is on loan to 
that Member. 
 public function memberLoans(memberNo:integer) 
                    :Collection[Item] 
  ensures forall (i:Item in result): 
    exists (l:Loan in loans()): 
     l.memberNo() = memberNo 
     && lookupItemFromCopy(l.copyNo()).itemNo() 
           = i.itemNo() 
 { 
  var memberLoansCol:Collection[Item] 
               :=Collection[Item].empty(); 
  foreach (l:Loan in loans){ 
   if (l.memberNo() = memberNo){ 
    memberLoansCol.add(lookupItemFromCopy(l.copyNo())); 
   } 
  } 
  return memberLoansCol; 
 } 
There is no requires clause. If there is no Member with the specified memberNo, an 
empty collection will be returned. The ensures clause gives a lightweight specification of 
the behaviour of the function. It asserts that for all the Items in the returned collection, there 
should be a loan with the passed memberNo and a Copy of the Item. 
The implementation creates an empty collection and then iterates through the Loan 
objects in loans, adding Items which are on loan to the specified Member. The collection 
is then returned at the end of the function. 
8.3.3   Testing 
Verification with run-time assertion checking is built around the use of testing. Tests must be 
used to ensure that the application performs its intended function without violation of any of 
the assertion annotations. 
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In Omnibus, we can test the application in one of three ways: defining a command-line 
application, using a separate GUI or defining test cases. 
Command-line applications 
Omnibus provides the facilities to define command-line applications. We can define a 
command-line application to test out the Lib class and then execute it. Application start 
points are defined by defining a subclass of the omni.app.Application class. The 
following application adds a new CD and loans it out to the existing member named Joe. 
uses omni.app 
 
public class Main isa Application { 
 public constructor init() {} 
  
 public operation execute(args:List[String], 
              var env:Environment) { 
  env.println("Starting Library..."); 
  var lib:Lib := Lib.testDataLibrary(); 
  printState(var env, lib); 
  env.println("Adding Eels Souljacker CD..."); 
  var sjCopyNo:integer := lib.getNewCopyNo(); 
  lib.acquireCD("Souljacker", "Eels", 
          Date.newDate(24,9,2001)); 
  printState(var env, lib); 
  env.println("Loaning Eels Souljacker CD to Joe..."); 
  var joeMemNo:integer := 1; 
  lib.takeOutCopy(joeMemNo, sjCopyNo, 
           Date.newDate(16, 5, 2007)); 
  printState(var env, lib); 
 } 
  
 private operation printState(var env:Environment, 
                lib:Lib) 
 { 
  env.println("Members:"); 
  foreach (m:Member in lib.members()) { 
   env.println(" "+m.memberNo()+":"+m.name().fName() 
          +" "+m.name().sName()); 
  } 
  env.println("Items:"); 
  foreach (i:Item in lib.items()) { 
   env.println(" "+i.itemNo()+":"+i.title()); 
  } 
  env.println("Copies:"); 
  foreach (c:Copy in lib.copies()) { 
   env.println(" "+c.copyNo()+": copy of item " 
          +c.itemNo()); 
  } 
  env.println("Loans:"); 
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  foreach (l:Loan in lib.loans()) { 
   env.println(" loan of "+l.copyNo()+" to " 
          +l.memberNo()); 
  } 
 } 
} 
This application can be executed to perform limited testing of the application. The check 
viewer can be used to see exactly which assertions have been checked: 
 
This tells us that there were 1036 run-time assertions generated. 148 of them were checked 
at least once. The remaining 888 were not checked by this particular test. 
A separate GUI 
Another way to test the application is through the use of a GUI written in another language. 
The student implemented a GUI for the Library Omnibus application in Java. This can be 
used to interact with the application and perform tests. 
The following screenshots show the use of the GUI to login, loan out a book, lookup the 
details of the loan, renew it on the same day without a fine and then return it late with a fine. 
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The check viewer (shown below) can be used in the same way to check the details of the 
run-time assertion checks that are made during this manual test. This test covered 245 of the 
1036 assertions in the file. However, to repeat the test the user would have to repeat their 
actions with the GUI. 
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Test cases 
Omnibus provides the facility to define test cases within each class. These can then be 
automatically re-executed by the user at any time. 
To cover all the assertion checks we can use 7 tests: emptyTest, loginTest, 
bookTest, cdTest, dvdTest, memberTest and loanTest. Each of these tests a 
particular aspect of the example. As an example, the bookTest is displayed below. This 
tests the addition, retrieval, updating and changing of the loan status of books. 
 test bookTest { 
  var lib:Lib := Lib.testDataLibrary(); 
   
  // check addition of book 
  // declare new book details 
  var cplTitle:String 
        := "Comparative Programming Languages"; 
  var cplISBN:ISBN := ISBN.fromString("0-201-71012-0"); 
  var rgcName:Name := Name.newName("Robert G.", "Clark"); 
  var lbwName:Name := Name.newName("Leslie B.", 
                   "Wilson"); 
  var cplAuths:List[Name] :=  
        List[Name].empty().add(rgcName).add(lbwName); 
  var cplPub:String := "Addison Wesley"; 
  var cplPubDate:Date := Date.newDate(6,11,2000); 
  var cplItemNo:integer := lib.getNewItemNo(); 
  var cplCopyNo:integer := lib.getNewCopyNo(); 
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  // add the new book 
  lib.acquireBook(cplTitle, cplISBN, cplAuths, cplPub, 
           cplPubDate); 
 
  // check details of added book 
  var cplItem:Item := lib.lookupItem(cplItemNo); 
  assert cplItem is Book; 
  var cplBk:Book := lib.lookupBook(cplItemNo); 
  assert cplItem = cplBk; 
  // check search functions 
  assert lib.lookupItemFromTitle(cplTitle) = cplBk; 
  assert lib.lookupBookFromISBN(cplISBN) = cplBk; 
  var cplOnlyList:Collection[Book] 
          := Collection[Book].empty().add(cplBk); 
  assert lib.lookupBooksFromAuthor(rgcName).size() = 1; 
  assert lib.lookupBooksFromAuthor(rgcName) 
                  .contains(cplBk); 
  var rgcBooks:Collection[Book] 
          := lib.lookupBooksFromAuthor(rgcName); 
  assert lib.lookupBooksFromAuthor(rgcName) 
                   = cplOnlyList; 
  assert lib.lookupBooksFromPublisher(cplPub) 
                   = cplOnlyList; 
  assert lib.lookupBooksFromPubYear(cplPubDate.year()) 
                   = cplOnlyList; 
  // check details of copy 
  assert lib.lookupCopy(cplCopyNo).copyNo() = cplCopyNo; 
  assert lib.lookupCopy(cplCopyNo).itemNo() = cplItemNo; 
  assert lib.lookupItemFromCopy(cplCopyNo) = cplBk; 
   
  // change book details 
  var cplTitle2:String :=  
    "Comparative Programming Languages (Third Edition)"; 
  lib.changeItemTitle(cplItemNo, cplTitle2); 
  assert lib.lookupBook(cplItemNo).title() = cplTitle2; 
  var cplISBN2:ISBN := ISBN.fromString("9780201710120"); 
  lib.changeBookISBN(cplItemNo, cplISBN2); 
  assert lib.lookupBook(cplItemNo).isbn() = cplISBN2; 
  var cplAuths2:List[Name] :=  
             List[Name].empty().add(rgcName); 
  lib.changeBookAuthors(cplItemNo, cplAuths2); 
  assert lib.lookupBook(cplItemNo).authors() = cplAuths2; 
  var cplPub2:String := "Addison-Wesley"; 
  lib.changeBookPub(cplItemNo, cplPub2); 
  assert lib.lookupBook(cplItemNo).publisher() = cplPub2; 
  var cplPubDate2:Date := Date.newDate(1,1,2001); 
  lib.changeBookPubDate(cplItemNo, cplPubDate2); 
  assert lib.lookupBook(cplItemNo).pubDate() 
                    = cplPubDate2; 
   
  // change book copy status 
  assert lib.lookupCopy(cplCopyNo).status() 
                   .isAvailable(); 
  assert !lib.lookupCopy(cplCopyNo).status().isLost(); 
  lib.changeCopyStatus(cplCopyNo, ItemStatus.lost()); 
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  assert lib.lookupCopy(cplCopyNo).status().isLost(); 
  assert !lib.lookupCopy(cplCopyNo).status() 
                   .isAvailable(); 
  lib.changeCopyStatus(cplCopyNo,  
               ItemStatus.available()); 
  assert lib.lookupCopy(cplCopyNo).status() 
                   .isAvailable(); 
  assert !lib.lookupCopy(cplCopyNo).status().isLost(); 
   
  // delete book 
  var oldCopiesCount:integer := lib.copies().size(); 
  lib.disposeOfCopy(cplCopyNo); 
  assert !(exists (c:Copy in lib.copies()): 
            c.copyNo() = cplCopyNo); 
  assert lib.copies().size() = oldCopiesCount - 1; 
 } 
The check viewer (shown below) shows us that all the assertions have been checked this 
time. To achieve this, we had to produce tests totalling 240 lines excluding comments. These 
cover every generated run-time assertion check at least once. 
 
8.3.4   Errors detected 
As you would expect, some errors were made in the specification and implementation of the 
library system by the student. In this section we will discuss some of the errors that the run-
time assertion checking process enabled us to uncover. 
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Missing olds 
The most common error that was detected by the run-time assertion checking process was 
missing old operators in ensures clauses of operations. For example, consider the 
specification of the disposeOfCopy operation as originally produced by the student. 
 public operation disposeOfCopy(copyNo:integer) 
  requires exists (c:Copy in copies()): 
    c.copyNo() = copyNo 
  changes copies, items 
  ensures copies().size() = old copies().size() - 1, 
   if (isOnlyOneCopy(lookupCopy(copyNo).itemNo())) then 
    items().size() = old items().size() - 1 
   else 
    items() = old items() 
 { ... } 
This operation should remove the Copy with the specified number and, if it is the last 
Copy, delete the associated Item. On run-time assertion checking this operation, we get the 
following error reported where line 248 is the location of the closing curly bracket at the end 
of the disposeOfCopy operation. 
   ** Executing bookTest test... 
C:\Program 
Files\eclipse\workspace\OmnibusIDE\myprojects\Impl4-
rac\Lib.obs:248: Failure of public requires clause of the 
lookupCopy function declared in Lib at line 780 
Source: 
     exists ((c:Copy) in copies()): c.copyNo() = copyNo 
Attributes: 
     members: {omni.lang.Collection: [Member: memberNo: 2, 
name: [Name: fName: Kate, sName: Brown], address1: 1A 
London Road, address2: Stirling, postcode: FK9 1BB, 
telNo: 1786477557, isAdult: true, isStaff: true, status: 
[MemberStatus: value: 0], fineDue: 0, pinNo: 5555], 
[Member: memberNo: 1, name: [Name: fName: Joe, sName: 
Bloggs], address1: 17 Queen Street, address2: Stirling, 
postcode: FK9 1AA, telNo: 1786466666, isAdult: true, 
isStaff: false, status: [MemberStatus: value: 0], 
fineDue: 0, pinNo: 5555]} 
     loans: {omni.lang.Collection: } 
     copies: {omni.lang.Collection: [Copy: copyNo: 1, itemNo: 
1, status: [ItemStatus: value: 1]]} 
     items: {omni.lang.Collection: [Book: isbn: [ISBN: value: 
01-303-23-772], authors: {omni.lang.List: [Name: fName: 
Doug, sName: Bell]}, publisher: Prentice Hall, pubDate: 
[Date: day: 1, month: 7, year: 2001], itemNo: 1, title: 
Java For Students]} 
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     cards: {omni.lang.Collection: [Card: cardNo: 1, memberNo: 
1]} 
Parameters: 
     copyNo: 2 
Call stack: 
 at Lib.disposeOfCopy(Lib:248) 
 at Lib.test_bookTest(Lib:1307) 
       -- Test aborted after 93 ms 
The functions isOnlyOneCopy and lookupCopy are used in the condition of the if 
expression in the ensures clause. The intention was to assert that if there was only one copy 
of the associated Item before the operation then the size of the items collection is reduced 
by one; otherwise it stays the same. However, the calls of isOnlyOneCopy and 
lookupCopy, without an old operator prefix, refer to the library after the operation, not 
before it. Thus, the evaluation of lookupCopy with the specified copyNo after the 
operation will result in a violation of its requires clause since the Copy with that copyNo 
will have been removed by the end of the method. Instead, the user should have used the old 
operator before both of these function calls to indicate that these functions should have been 
evaluated at the start of the implementation. The ensures should have been written as 
follows: 
  ensures copies().size() = old copies().size() - 1, 
   if (old isOnlyOneCopy( 
          old lookupCopy(copyNo).itemNo())) then 
    items().size() = old items().size() - 1 
   else 
    items() = old items() 
This alteration allows the operation to be successfully run-time assertion checked. 
Genuine mistakes 
There were a number of conventional mistakes that were made in the specification of the 
library system and picked up by the run-time assertion checker. A good example is from the 
acquireBook operation. 
 public operation acquireBook(title:String, isbn:ISBN, 
authors:List[Name], pub:String, pubDate:Date) 
  changes items, copies 
  ensures 
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  if (forall (i:Item in old items() where i is Book): 
         ((i as Book).title() != title 
          && (i as Book).authors() != authors)) then 
   items().size() = old items().size() + 1 
   && copies().size() = old copies().size() + 1 
  else  
   copies().size() = old copies().size() + 1 
   && items() = old items() 
 { 
  var countOfCopies:integer := 0; 
  foreach (i:Item in items){ 
   if (i is Book){ 
    var b:Book := i as Book; 
    if (b.title() = title && b.authors() = authors){ 
     countOfCopies := countOfCopies + 1;  
    } 
   } 
  } 
  if (countOfCopies = 0){ 
   items.add(Book.newBook(getNewItemNo(), title, isbn, 
               authors, pub, pubDate)); 
  } 
  copies.add(Copy.newCopy(getNewCopyNo(),  
     lookupItemFromTitle(title).itemNo())); 
 
 }   
Again, items() was originally used instead of old items() but we have made that 
correction first. Even after that correction, the run-time assertion checker reports a failure of 
the ensures clause at the end of the operation. 
The intention of the operation is to check for an existing Book with the specified title and 
authors, if there is one, add a new Copy of it and if there is not then add a new Item and 
Copy. On invoking the run-time assertion checker, we get the following error where line 172 
is the closing curly bracket of the acquireBook implementation and line 1312 is the point 
in the bookTest test where a second Book authored by ‘Robert G. Clark’ is added. 
   ** Executing bookTest test... 
C:\Program 
Files\eclipse\workspace\OmnibusIDE\myprojects\Impl4-
rac\Lib.obs:172: Failure of public ensures clause of the 
acquireBook operation declared in Lib at line 145 
Source: 
     if (forall ((i:Item) in old items() where i is Book): ((i 
as Book).title() != title && (i as Book).authors() != 
authors)) then (items().size() = old items().size() + 1 
&& copies().size() = old copies().size() + 1) else 
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(copies().size() = old copies().size() + 1 && items() = 
old items()) 
Attributes: 
     members: {omni.lang.Collection: [Member: memberNo: 2, 
name: [Name: fName: Kate, sName: Brown], ...], [Member: 
memberNo: 1, name: [Name: fName: Joe, sName: Bloggs],  
...]} 
     loans: {omni.lang.Collection: } 
     copies: {omni.lang.Collection: [Copy: copyNo: 3, itemNo: 
3, ...], [Copy: copyNo: 2, itemNo: 2, ...], [Copy: 
copyNo: 1, itemNo: 1, ...]} 
     items: {omni.lang.Collection: [Book: authors: 
{omni.lang.List: [Name: fName: Robert G., sName: Clark]}, 
title: Programming in Ada: A First Course, ...], [Book: 
authors: {omni.lang.List: [Name: fName: Robert G., sName: 
Clark]}, title: Comparative Programming Languages (Third 
Edition), ...], [Book: authors: {omni.lang.List: [Name: 
fName: Doug, sName: Bell]}, title: Java For Students, 
...]} 
     cards: {omni.lang.Collection: [Card: cardNo: 1, memberNo: 
1]} 
Old Attributes: 
     old members: {omni.lang.Collection: [Member: memberNo: 2, 
name: [Name: fName: Kate, sName: Brown], ...], [Member: 
memberNo: 1, name: [Name: fName: Joe, sName: Bloggs], 
...]} 
     old loans: {omni.lang.Collection: } 
     old copies: {omni.lang.Collection: [Copy: copyNo: 2, 
itemNo: 2, ...], [Copy: copyNo: 1, itemNo: 1, ...]} 
     old items: {omni.lang.Collection: [Book: authors: 
{omni.lang.List: [Name: fName: Robert G., sName: Clark]}, 
title: Comparative Programming Languages (Third Edition), 
...], [Book: authors: {omni.lang.List: [Name: fName: 
Doug, sName: Bell]}, title: Java For Students, ...]} 
     old cards: {omni.lang.Collection: [Card: cardNo: 1, 
memberNo: 1]} 
Parameters: 
     title: Programming in Ada: A First Course 
     pubDate: [Date: day: 31, month: 5, year: 1985] 
     isbn: [ISBN: value: 9780521257282] 
     authors: {omni.lang.List: [Name: fName: Robert G., sName: 
Clark]} 
     pub: Cambridge University Press 
Call stack: 
 at Lib.acquireBook(Lib:172) 
 at Lib.test_bookTest(Lib:1312) 
       -- Test aborted after 109 ms 
The implementation iterates through the items collection and counts the number of 
Books that have the specified title and authors. If this is zero, it adds a new Item and then in 
all cases it adds a new Copy. 
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The ensures clause consists of an if expression. The condition checks whether all the 
Books have a different title and list of authors from those passed to acquireBook. This is 
inconsistent with the implementation which counts the number of Books whose title and list 
of authors are the same as those passed. Instead, the condition of the if expression in the 
ensures clause should check that either the title or the authors are different from those 
passed. The corrected ensures clause is shown below. 
 ensures 
  if (forall (i:Item in old items() where i is Book): 
        ((i as Book).title() != title  
         || (i as Book).authors() != authors)) then 
   items().size() = old items().size() + 1 
   && copies().size() = old copies().size() + 1 
  else  
   copies().size() = old copies().size() + 1 
   && items() = old items() 
After this correction, the operation can be run-time assertion checked without errors. 
This error was only picked up because of the comprehensiveness of the bookTest test 
case. The inconsistency between the quantification in the condition of the if expression and 
the implementation is only exposed when a new Book is added with the same title but 
different authors or same authors but different title. It would have been easy to have missed 
this scenario in our test case, in which circumstance the error would have gone undetected by 
the run-time assertion checking process. 
8.3.5   Conclusions 
The student was able to produce an implementation of the described library system in 
Omnibus and we were able to use run-time assertion checking to verify it. This allowed us to 
identify a range of errors in the original application. However, as we will see in later sections, 
there are other errors which the run-time assertion checking approach was not able to detect. 
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8.4   Extended static checking 
Next we will consider the use of the extended static checking approach to check the library 
project. We will take as our starting point the Omnibus implementation with lightweight 
specifications produced in the previous section. We will see that ESC allows us to uncover 
errors that were not detected by RAC. 
8.4.1   Using the ESC tool 
ESC tools are straightforward to use: the programmer simply selects the ESC policy in the 
Policy Selector and then clicks ‘Verify Project’. The tool generates appropriate theories in the 
generic logic and then invokes the automated Simplify prover. While the prover is running, its 
progress can be tracked via the Prover pane. 
 
8.4.2   New errors detected 
The ESC tool uncovers a range of errors and omissions which were not detected by the run-
time assertion checking process. 
Missing private specifications for public model functions 
In the specifications produced for the RAC approach, we did not give private specifications 
for the public model functions. These were not needed to run-time check the classes and so in 
accordance with the freedoms of lightweight specifications we were allowed to omit them. 
For example, the public model functions for the Item class were declared as follows: 
 public model function itemNo():integer { 
  return itemNo; 
 }   
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 public model function title():String { 
  return title;  
 } 
The Item class contains a single operation setTitle which is declared with a 
changes clause expressing that only the title model function should be changed, i.e. the 
itemNo model function should not be changed. 
 public operation setTitle(t:String) 
  changes title 
 { 
  title := t;  
 } 
On attempting to ESC-check this file we get the following error: 
C:\Program 
Files\eclipse\workspace\OmnibusIDE\myprojects\Impl4-
esc\Item.obs:23: Unable to verify the implementation of 
the setTitle operation respects the public changes clause 
at line 20 
Attributes: 
     title: t_0 
     itemNo: itemNo_0 
Old Attributes: 
     title: title_0 
     itemNo: itemNo_0 
Parameters: 
     t: t_0 
Knowledge: 
     {itemNo_0:integer}, 
     {title_0:String}, 
     {t_0:String}, 
     true 
Assertion to check (unevaluated): 
     old itemNo() = itemNo() 
Assertion to check (evaluated): 
     this{itemNo := itemNo_0, title := title_0}.itemNo() = 
this{itemNo := itemNo_0, title := t_0}.itemNo() 
Path: 
     Started setTitle operation 
     Check the implementation of the setTitle operation 
respects the public changes clause at line 20 
1 error 
The problem is that the ESC tool is unable to deduce the relationship between the 
itemNo() function and the itemNo attribute because there is no specification of this 
relationship. Remember that our ESC tool uses modular checking and can only reason about 
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other methods using their specifications. The relationship between the model function and the 
attribute is clear from the trivial implementation of the function, but the tool cannot refer to 
this from within the setTitle operation. 
To address this problem, we must add a private specification to the public model functions 
expressing the relationship between the public model functions and the private attributes. We 
could adjust the definitions of the public model functions in Item to be the following: 
 public model function itemNo():integer 
  private ensures result = itemNo 
 { 
  return itemNo; 
 }   
  
 public model function title():String 
  private ensures result = title 
 { 
  return title;  
 } 
This allows the file to be ESC checked. These missing specifications are not really a 
mistake in the original code, more an additional annotation burden for using ESC. We note 
that it was not clear from the error message that this was the problem. 
Missing requires clauses 
When producing lightweight specifications, it is acceptable to specify as little as the 
programmer wishes in the ensures clauses. However, the requires clauses should 
completely describe the assumptions which a method makes about the state in which it is 
called. A method can only reasonably expect that the caller respects its declared requires 
clause and so if the requires clause of a method is met and then an assertion failure occurs 
during the execution of the method, that is a mistake in the called method. 
Consider the Book class as implemented by the student and RAC-checked. It is declared 
with an invariant that there are no duplicates in the authors. 
 public invariant noDuplicatesInAuthors: 
  !authors().containsDuplicates() 
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Two methods have the ability to change the authors: the newBook constructor and the 
setAuthors operation. 
 public constructor newBook(iNo:integer, t:String, 
isbnNo:ISBN, auths:List[Name], pub:String, pDate:Date) 
 { 
  itemNo := iNo;   
  title := t; 
  isbn := isbnNo; 
  authors := auths; 
  publisher := pub; 
  pubDate := pDate; 
 } 
 
 public operation setAuthors(auths:List[Name]) 
  changes authors 
 { 
  authors := auths; 
 } 
If we try to ESC-check this file we get the following errors: 
C:\Program 
Files\eclipse\workspace\OmnibusIDE\myprojects\Impl4-
esc\Book.obs:51: Unable to verify the implementation of 
the newBook constructor establishes the public invariant 
at line 35 
... 
C:\Program 
Files\eclipse\workspace\OmnibusIDE\myprojects\Impl4-
esc\Book.obs:68: Unable to verify the implementation of 
the setAuthors operation maintains the public invariant 
at line 35 
... 
2 errors 
The problem is that the author lists that are passed into the newBook and 
setAuthors methods are not constrained to not contain duplicates. The ESC tool correctly 
picks up this omission. 
We can address the problem by adding the following requires clause to both the 
newBook constructor and setAuthors operation. 
  requires !auths.containsDuplicates() 
The RAC approach was not able to detect this missing requires clause. The first reason 
for this was that the associated test cases were written to test correct execution for expected 
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values, not graceful failure for invalid inputs. We did not define a test case to check the 
rejection of the addition of a Book with duplicate authors. Let us consider what would have 
happened if we had defined such a test. We could allow for the addition of a second book by 
RGC into bookTest just before the deletion of the first book. 
test bookTest { 
  ... 
   
  // add second book by RGC 
  var paTitle:String 
          := "Programming in Ada: A First Course"; 
  var paISBN:ISBN := ISBN.fromString("9780521257282"); 
  var paAuths:List[Name] :=  
            List[Name].empty().add(rgcName); 
  var paPub:String := "Cambridge University Press"; 
  var paPubDate:Date := Date.newDate(31,5,1985); 
  var paItemNo:integer := lib.getNewItemNo(); 
  var paCopyNo:integer := lib.getNewCopyNo(); 
  // add the new book 
  lib.acquireBook(paTitle, paISBN, paAuths, paPub,  
            paPubDate); 
   
  // delete book 
  ... 
} 
Without the requires clause in the newBook constructor we would get the following 
error when executing the test case: 
   ** Executing bookTest test... 
C:\Program 
Files\eclipse\workspace\OmnibusIDE\myprojects\Impl4-
rac\Book.obs:36: Failure of public invariant declared in 
Book at line 24 at end of newBook constructor 
Source: 
     !authors().containsDuplicates() 
Parameters: 
     auths: {omni.lang.List: [Name: fName: Robert G., sName: 
Clark], [Name: fName: Robert G., sName: Clark]} 
     iNo: 3 
     isbnNo: [ISBN: value: 9780521257282] 
     t: Programming in Ada: A First Course 
     pub: Cambridge University Press 
     pDate: [Date: day: 31, month: 5, year: 1985] 
Call stack: 
 at Book.newBook(Book:36) 
 at Lib.acquireBook(Lib:165) 
 at Lib.test_bookTest(Lib:1312) 
       -- Test aborted after 78 ms. 
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So, we get a failure report for the invariant at the end of the newBook constructor. Since 
this is not a requires clause failure, this should indicate an error by the implementer of the 
newBook constructor. However, it is not an error in the implementation, it is the omission of 
a suitable requires clause. This is a much more awkward way to detect missing 
requires clauses than the ESC tool. 
Truisms in ensures clauses 
A subtle mistake was made in the entry of the changeFineDue operation in the Member 
class. The operation was defined by the student as follows: 
 public operation changeFineDue(fine:integer) 
  changes fineDue 
  ensures fineDue() = fineDue() 
 { 
  fineDue := fine;  
 } 
This was obviously an entry error and what they intended was: 
 public operation changeFineDue(fine:integer) 
  changes fineDue 
  ensures fineDue() = fine 
 { 
  fineDue := fine;  
 } 
The later specification asserts that the fineDue function is equal to the passed fine 
value after the operation whereas the former specification simply asserts that the fineDue 
function is equal to itself, which tells us nothing useful about its value. 
However, the error was not picked up by the run-time assertion checker since 
fineDue() = fineDue() always evaluates to true and so no assertion failure is ever 
triggered in the execution of the test cases. Error detection within run-time assertion checking 
is built upon the failure of assertion checks. 
The same problem occurs in the ESC-checking of the Member class. The ensures 
clause is checked at the end of the implementation of the changeFineDue operation and it 
evaluates to true, as it would regardless of what the implementation of the method did. 
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Unlike in the RAC-checking, the error is picked up though when we check the Lib class, 
specifically the changeMemberFine operation. The lightweight specification of this 
operation asserts that the fineDue for the specified Member should be set to the passed 
value. This is implemented via a call of the changeFineDue operation in the body of the 
method. 
 public operation changeMemberFine(memberNo:integer, 
fineDue:integer) 
  requires exists (m:Member in members()): 
         m.memberNo() = memberNo 
  changes members 
  ensures members().size() = old members().size(), 
   lookupMember(memberNo).fineDue() = fineDue 
 { 
  var memberObj:Member := lookupMember(memberNo); 
  members.remove(memberObj); 
  memberObj.changeFineDue(fineDue); 
  members.add(memberObj); 
 } 
As always, when reasoning about another method in ESC, the specification of that method 
is used. Here the specification of the changeFineDue operation is used to reason about 
how memberObj is changed. But that specification does not give us the information we 
require to prove that the fineDue function of memberObj is changed to fineDue. Thus, 
an error is reported, picking up the mistake in the changeFineDue operation. 
This mistake was not picked up in this way by RAC because RAC interprets other 
methods by executing their implementations, not by reasoning about their specifications. It is 
this property of RAC which makes it excellent for working with external components with 
limited specifications but here it is a hindrance and prevents the detection of a genuine error. 
8.4.3   Limitations of the ESC tool 
The Omnibus ESC tool is not able to verify the Lib and Date classes. If the programmer 
attempts to verify these files then the prover hangs. The specification of the Lib class is too 
sophisticated to be ESC-checked. The problem with the Date class is that it was not 
completely specified. 
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8.4.4   Conclusions 
ESC was able to detect a range of further mistakes that RAC was not able to detect. This is, 
firstly, because the ESC process considers the execution of the methods for arbitrary symbolic 
values, not a specific set of inputs covered by associated test cases. In particular, this helped 
identify errors in the handling of invalid input values which required additional requires 
clauses. Also, when verifying a method the ESC approach reasons about other methods using 
their specifications and this can help us find errors in the specifications. However, the tool 
was not able to verify the entire project because some of the specifications were too complex 
or incomplete. 
8.5   Full formal verification 
Finally, we consider the full formal verification of the library project. We will see that FFV 
discovers further issues that even ESC did not detect. 
Instead of considering an implementation with lightweight specifications, in this section 
we consider a heavyweight specification. Using RAC and ESC, the behaviour of methods can 
be described using very incomplete ensures clauses. Requirements such as invariants 
are verified separately at the end of each constructor/operation. In FFV, the behaviour of 
methods should be described more completely in the ensures clauses. Crucially, in our 
FFV approach the requirements must follow from the behaviour specifications. This helps 
ensure a greater level of completeness in the specifications. 
8.5.1   Automatic and interactive FFV 
Full formal verification can be performed using either an automated or interactive theorem 
prover. 
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FFV with an automated prover 
After corrections, it is possible to verify the specifications of the auxiliary classes (i.e. all the 
classes in the project apart from Lib) using the automated Simplify prover. This involves the 
proof of 19 VCs which are discharged in 2 seconds. 
The verification of the central Lib class with the automated prover is less successful. The 
first 7 VCs corresponding to the proofs of each of the invariants for the empty constructor 
are proved in a total of just over 4 seconds, but then the prover hangs whilst trying to prove 
the main operations. This is not an unexpected result and is consistent with previous attempts 
to use the Simplify prover for full formal verification projects. 
FFV with an interactive prover 
To fully verify the main Lib class we must use an interactive prover. The Omnibus IDE uses 
PVS as its interactive prover. 
As an example of the interactive verification of the Lib class, consider the verification 
that the registerMember operation satisfies the invariants. The registerMember 
specification is given below. It is quite straightforward, simply constructing a new Member 
with the passed attributes and adding it to the members collection. 
public operation registerMember(name:Name, ad1:String, 
ad2:String, pCode:String, telNo:integer, isAdult:boolean, 
isStaff:boolean) 
 changes members 
 ensures members() = old members().add( 
   Member.newMember(old getNewMemberNo(), 
     name, ad1, ad2, pCode, 
     telNo, isAdult, isStaff)) 
The memberNo for the new Member is calculated using the getNewMemberNo 
function. The specification of this function simply states that it returns an integer which is not 
being used as the memberNo of any Member in the members collection. 
public function getNewMemberNo():integer 
 ensures !(exists (m:Member in members()): 
        m.memberNo() = result) 
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Now let us consider the verification of the invariants. We can assume that the invariants 
hold before the operation is called and we must demonstrate that they hold at the end of the 
operation. The changes clause specified that only the public members model function is 
changed, so any invariant which does not refer to members will be trivially maintained 
because its truth will not be altered by the method. This covers the 5 of the 7 invariants from 
the Lib class, which are repeated below. 
 public invariant itemNosInItemsUnique: 
  forall (i:Item in items()): 
   forall (i2:Item in items()): 
    i.itemNo() != i2.itemNo() || i = i2 
 public invariant copyNosInCopiesUnique: 
  forall (c:Copy in copies()): 
   forall (c2:Copy in copies()): 
    c.copyNo() != c2.copyNo() || c = c2 
 public invariant cardNosInCardsUnique: 
  forall (c:Card in cards()): 
   forall (c2:Card in cards()): 
    c.cardNo() != c2.cardNo() || c = c2 
 public invariant allCopiesOnLoanInCopies: 
   forall (l:Loan in loans()): 
    exists (c:Copy in copies()): 
      l.copyNo() = c.copyNo() 
 public invariant noCopiesOnLoanMoreThanOnce: 
  forall (l:Loan in loans()): 
   forall (l2:Loan in loans()): 
    l.copyNo() != l2.copyNo() || l = l2 
Next, we have the invariant that for all memberNos referred to in an entry in the loans 
collection there is a Member with that memberNo in the members collection. This is also 
relatively trivial to demonstrate since we have made an addition to the members collection, 
and hence all elements that were previously in the members collection will still be in it. 
 public invariant allMembersWithLoansInMembers: 
  forall (l:Loan in loans()): 
    exists (m:Member in members()): 
     l.memberNo() = m.memberNo() 
Finally, consider the invariant that there are no two Members in the members collection 
with the same memberNo. This is slightly more complicated and relies on the specification of 
the getNewMemberNo function. The getNewMemberNo function returns an integer value 
which is not used as the memberNo of any of the Members in the members collection 
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before the operation is called, so it should be allowable to add a new Member with that 
memberNo. 
 public invariant memberNosInMembersUnique: 
  forall (m:Member in members()): 
   forall (m2:Member in members()): 
    m.memberNo() != m2.memberNo() || m = m2 
As an illustration of the PVS proof process, the verification of this invariant is worked 
through in detail in appendix E. 
8.5.2   New errors detected 
The full formal verification process requires more sophisticated specifications, leading to 
detection of further errors and omissions. 
Missing ensures clauses 
As part of the ESC process, we had to add requires clauses to the newBook and 
setAuthors methods in order to ensure the invariant. However, we did not have to provide 
ensures clauses since the invariant was checked at the end of the implementation of each 
method. The specifications sufficient to ESC-check the Book class were: 
 public constructor newBook(iNo:integer, t:String, 
isbnNo:ISBN,  auths:List[Name], pub:String, pDate:Date) 
  requires !auths.containsDuplicates() 
 
 public operation setAuthors(auths:List[Name]) 
  requires !auths.containsDuplicates() 
  changes authors 
When using FFV, we must verify that the specification alone is sufficient to verify the 
invariant. If we attempt to verify this class using automated FFV, we get the following errors: 
C:\Program 
Files\eclipse\workspace\OmnibusIDE\myprojects\Impl4-
ffv\Book.obs:13: Unable to verify the public behaviour of 
the newBook constructor satisfies the public invariant at 
line 7 
C:\Program 
Files\eclipse\workspace\OmnibusIDE\myprojects\Impl4-
ffv\Book.obs:27: Unable to verify the public behaviour of 
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the setAuthors operation satisfies the public invariant 
at line 7 
2 errors 
This is because there are no ensures clauses to describe how the value of the public 
authors model function relates to the passed auths lists at the end of the methods. We 
must add ensures clauses to describe this. 
 public constructor newBook(iNo:integer, t:String, 
isbnNo:ISBN,  auths:List[Name], pub:String, pDate:Date) 
  requires !auths.containsDuplicates() 
  ensures itemNo() = iNo, 
   title() = t, 
   isbn() = isbnNo, 
   authors() = auths, 
   publisher() = pub, 
   pubDate() = pDate 
 
 operation setAuthors(auths:List[Name])  
  requires !auths.containsDuplicates() 
  changes authors 
  ensures authors() = auths 
On the addition of these assertions, the file can be automatically verified. 
Ensures clauses not strong enough 
We have already made a number of corrections to the acquireBook operation. Using RAC 
we detected missing old operators in the ensures clause and a mistake in the checking for 
an existing instance of the Book. Using ESC we detected a missing requires clause. 
However, there is still a remaining error in the heavyweight specification produced by the 
student. This specification with all the existing corrections is shown below. 
public operation acquireBook(title:String, isbn:ISBN, 
authors:List[Name], pub:String, pubDate:Date) 
 requires !authors.containsDuplicates() 
 changes items, copies 
 ensures if (forall (i:Item in old items() 
                   where i is Book): 
         (i.title() != title  
         || (i as Book).authors() != authors)) then 
   items() = old items().add( 
          Book.newBook(old getNewItemNo(), title, 
              isbn, authors, pub, pubDate)) 
   && copies() = old copies().add( 
        Copy.newCopy(old getNewCopyNo(),  
         old lookupItemFromTitle(title).itemNo())) 
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  else  
   copies() = old copies().add( 
        Copy.newCopy(old getNewCopyNo(), 
         old lookupItemFromTitle(title).itemNo())) 
This specification is not sufficient to verify the invariant that the itemNos in the items 
collection are unique. 
 public invariant itemNosInItemsUnique:  
   forall (i:Item in items()): 
   forall (i2:Item in items()): 
    i.itemNo() != i2.itemNo() || i = i2 
The problem is that in the case where there is an existing entry for the Book, the new 
value of items() is not described. It is not assumed to be unchanged from the changes 
clause because it is mentioned there to allow it to be changed when a new Book needs to be 
created. The intention was that, when a new Book is not to be added, the contents of items 
should not be changed, but this is not documented in the ensures clause. This is clearly the 
result of the programmer thinking in imperative terms about the declarative specification. 
The problem can be addressed by the addition of an explicit assertion that items does not 
change in the else part of the existing assertion. 
 else  
  copies() = old copies().add( 
        Copy.newCopy(old getNewCopyNo(), 
         old lookupItemFromTitle(title).itemNo())) 
  && items() = old items() 
This permits the invariant to be verified. 
The problem was not picked up by RAC because RAC does not test the completeness of 
ensures clauses. It was not picked up by ESC because, when verifying the Lib class, the 
invariant was checked at the end of the implementation and not from the specification. We 
would have been able to identify the omission if we had checked ESC-checked a class that 
uses the Lib class and needed to assert some property about the items collection after the 
addition of a new copy of a Book. 
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8.5.3   Conclusions 
FFV allows the specifications of the project to be improved still further. Richer specifications 
can be used since the user can guide the PVS prover through proofs that are beyond the 
automated Simplify prover. However, the costs are much higher. Appendix E describes the 
proof of a single VC. This proof took considerable time and mathematical ingenuity and 
would be beyond many users. 
8.6   Integrated verification 
In the preceding sections we considered the use of the different approaches, in turn, to verify 
the entirety of the library project. In this section we consider how we can use the different 
verification approaches offered by Omnibus in a more integrated fashion. We use the example 
to demonstrate how the different features of the integrated support can be used to fully exploit 
the integration. 
8.6.1   Using different policies for different files 
The simplest way in which we can combine the use of the different approaches is to select 
different verification policies for different files in the project. For example, ESC was very 
good at verifying the auxiliary classes in the library project but it could not handle the central 
Lib class or the incompletely specified Date class. The Policy Selector permits different 
policies to be specified for different files. So we could select the RAC policy for the Lib and 
Date classes and ESC for the others, as shown below. 
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The integrated verification process can be started via the Verify project option. If the 
versions of the files before corrections are used then the errors will be detected and displayed 
together in the Errors tab, as shown below. 
 
If we use the corrected versions, no errors will be reported and the check viewer will 
report that all run-time assertion checks in the Date and Lib classes were covered and all 
the automated VCs for the other classes were proved. This is shown below. 
CHAPTER 8 CASE STUDY 
 235 
 
All the classes were translated into Java and compiled to bytecode, but only Lib and 
Date had their assertions translated into run-time checks because only those classes used a 
policy with run-time checks enabled. The ESC policy used by the other classes incorporates 
no run-time checks. 
This absence of run-time pre-condition checks violates guideline 3 from section 5.2.2 and 
causes a clash between the approaches. The tests used to run-time check the assertions in the 
Lib class use instances of the other classes which were statically verified and have no run-
time pre-condition checks. This means the tests may be silently violating the pre-conditions of 
the other classes, invalidating their verification which was based on the assumption that the 
pre-conditions of their methods are respected by calls. 
Consider the acquireBook operation in the Lib class as an example. There are 
correctness obligations for the changes and ensures clauses at the end of the method 
body and these have been checked via the generated run-time checks for the Lib class. 
However, there is also a correctness obligation that the pre-condition of the newBook 
constructor is respected when the new Book object is created. This has not been checked 
because the ESC policy was used for the Book class which has no run-time assertion checks 
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at all. So, the tool is right to present a warning as can be seen by the exclamation mark next to 
the relevant statement in the screenshot below. 
 
To address this problem we should follow guideline 2 and generate run-time checks of the 
pre-conditions of the Book class since we use it in an RAC-verified class. We can do this by 
changing the verification policy for the Book class to be ‘ESC with RAC client checks’. This 
policy includes run-time checks of the pre-conditions as well as statically verifying the 
implementation. The change is made via the Policy Selector, as shown below. 
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The pre-condition of the newBook constructor will now be checked when the call is 
made. This provides justification for the correctness obligation when the project is re-verified. 
Note how in the screenshot below, the exclamation mark has been replaced by a tick. 
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8.6.2   Fully integrating the verification approaches 
Special cases and targeted tests can be used to support higher levels of integration between 
the different approaches. This section describes how these facilities can be used to fulfil a 
number of purposes. A summary of the uses we consider is given in the following table. The 
contents of the table are described in the rest of this section. 
Policy for 
class 
Feature Purpose 
RAC ESC/FFV special case Statically verify to omit non RAC-compatible 
obligations 
" " Statically verify pre-condition of method 
without any run-time checks 
" ESC targeted test Check ESC-compatibility 
ESC RAC special case and 
RAC targeted test 
Run-time checking non ESC-compatible 
obligations 
" FFV special case Interactive proof of non ESC-compatible 
obligation 
Automated 
FFV 
FFV special case Interactive proof of non ESC-compatible 
obligation 
(not discussed) 
ESC/FFV RAC targeted test Check presence and RAC-compatibility of run-
time pre-condition checks 
FFV ESC targeted test Check ESC-compatibility 
Using static verification special cases to omit non RAC-compatible 
obligations 
Policy for class: RAC 
Feature used: ESC/FFV special case 
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Certain obligations in an RAC-checked project may not be RAC-compatible. They may use 
constructs that cannot be translated into run-time checks or may be too costly to evaluate. 
Assertions in methods that are called frequently can often be too costly to run-time check. So 
it may be worthwhile to statically verify particular obligations in an RAC-checked project. 
As an example, consider items model function of the Lib class. We did not produce any 
specification for this method because none was required to RAC-verify the class. However, 
we may wish to add one in order to make the specification of the class more amenable to ESC 
verification of client code. To use ESC, private ensures clauses are essential for the public 
model functions. So let us add a private ensures clause like the following. 
public model function items():Collection[Item] 
 private ensures result = items 
{ 
 return items; 
} 
If we now re-verify the application the Omnibus IDE runs out of memory and crashes 
whilst reading the run-time check report file. The problem is that these functions are called so 
often in the application that their check reports flood the check report file. Using the standard 
test cases which cover all the assertions in the project, the private ensures clause of the 
items function alone is executed 1,531 times. 
One option would be to remove the assertion. We may deem that it is not RAC-compatible 
because it cannot be efficiently run-time checked. When using RAC, we must be conscious of 
the limitations of the verification approach and adjust our specifications to what can be 
efficiently run-time checked. Of course, then there would be no specification of how the 
public items function relates to the private items attribute. This could prevent us using 
ESC within any part of the file because we would need to know that to use ESC. 
A better option would be to define the verification of the private ensures clause of the 
items function as a special case. We could then use ESC to verify it instead of RAC. The 
method is easy to statically verify, and this approach enables us to retain the specification and 
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ensure that it is respected. This can be done using the Policy Selector as shown in the 
screenshot below. 
 
If we open the obligations, we can see that it is justified by a VC, unlike the other 
obligations which are all run-time checked: 
 
This technique can also be used to statically check obligations that cannot be translated 
into run-time checks by our tool. For example, obligations involving quantifiers that are not 
restricted to enumerable ranges could be statically verified as special cases. 
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Statically checking missing run-time pre-condition checks 
Policy for class: RAC 
Feature used: ESC/FFV special case 
We have already seen that statically verified classes must contain run-time checks of their 
pre-conditions if they are to be called from RAC-checked code or else unjustified correctness 
obligations will be reported. If the class is to be reusable by classes that are RAC-checked 
then the distributor of the component should generate their code with run-time pre-condition 
checks, but what if they do not? One option open to users of the component is to define the 
correctness obligation to check the pre-condition of the method as an ESC or FFV special 
case. 
Consider the Name class in the Library project. We have seen that a Book is constructed 
with, among other things, a list of author names. Suppose we want to define a new function in 
Name which constructs a Book with the specified parameters and this Name as the only 
author. We could implement this as follows. 
public class Name { 
 ... 
 function bookByMe(iNo:integer, t:String, isbn:ISBN,  
       pub:String, pDate:Date):Book { 
  return Book.newBook(iNo, t, isbn, 
             List[Name].empty().add(this), 
             pub,pDate); 
 } 
 ... 
} 
Now suppose that the Book class uses the ESC policy which has no run-time pre-
condition checks. We would have an outstanding proof obligation that the requires clause 
of the Book constructor is respected. This can be seen in the screenshot below as an 
exclamation mark next to the return statement and in the comment following it. 
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We could define this obligation as a special case and use ESC for it (as shown below). 
While RAC requires that pre-condition checks are generated within the called method, ESC 
checks the pre-condition independently, using the specification of the method. So the fact that 
the newBook constructor does not have run-time pre-condition checks does not cause it 
problems. 
 
We can see below that this technique enables us to justify the correctness obligation that 
the requires clause of the newBook constructor is respected. The justification is provided 
by ESC even though the rest of the file is RAC-checked. 
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Check ESC-compatibility of RAC-verified class 
Policy for class: RAC 
Feature used: ESC targeted test 
RAC specifications are often not ESC-compatible. The problem is generally that they do not 
have expressive enough ensures clauses. We can use ESC targeted tests to detect these 
insufficiencies. 
Consider the lightweight specification of the RAC-checked Book class. It has extremely 
minimal specifications. That is acceptable to RAC-check the file, and RAC does not report 
errors for omissions in specifications. 
public class Book isa Item { 
 ... 
 public model function isbn():ISBN { 
  return isbn;  
 } 
 ... 
 constructor newBook(iNo:integer, t:String, isbnNo:ISBN,  
       auths:List[Name], pub:String, pDate:Date) 
 { 
  itemNo := iNo;   
  title := t; 
  isbn := isbnNo; 
  authors := auths; 
  publisher := pub; 
  pubDate := pDate; 
 } 
 ... 
} 
CHAPTER 8 CASE STUDY 
 244 
This specification is acceptable for RAC, but is it acceptable for ESC? It would be 
desirable to discover the answer to this question before distributing the class. We may do this 
using an ESC targeted test. 
test bookTest 
 policy "ESC" 
{ 
 var cplItemNo:integer := 0; 
 var cplTitle:String := "Comparative Programming Languages"; 
 var cplISBN:ISBN := ISBN.fromString("0-201-71012-0"); 
 var rgcName:Name := Name.newName("Robert G.", "Clark"); 
 var lbwName:Name := Name.newName("Leslie B.", "Wilson"); 
 var cplAuths:List[Name] := 
List[Name].empty().add(rgcName).add(lbwName); 
 var cplPub:String := "Addison Wesley"; 
 var cplPubDate:Date := Date.newDate(6,11,2000); 
 // add the new book 
 var b:Book := Book.newBook(cplItemNo, cplTitle, cplISBN, 
cplAuths, cplPub, cplPubDate); 
 // check details of book 
 assert b.itemNo() = cplItemNo; 
 assert b.title() = cplTitle; 
 assert b.isbn() = cplISBN; 
 assert b.authors() = cplAuths; 
 assert b.publisher() = cplPub; 
 assert b.pubDate() = cplPubDate; 
} 
When we now re-verify the file, the tool will check the main body of the class with RAC 
but verify the ESC targeted bookTest test case using the specification of the Book class. 
This process checks that the specification is expressive enough for use with ESC. In this case 
it is not. The newBook constructor has no ensures clause, so we cannot deduce that the 
model functions of Book have the respective values passed into the constructor. As a result 
we get errors shown below in the ESC-compatibility test. 
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To be ESC-compatible, a specification should be sufficient to ESC-check simple 
properties such as these. 
Run-time checking non ESC-compatible obligations 
Policy for class: ESC 
Feature used: RAC special case and RAC targeted test 
There are limits to what can be proved with automated provers. For example, the automated 
Simplify prover used by Omnibus is poor at handling recursion, arithmetic and complex 
quantified expressions. This can lead to VCs which should be provable being reported as 
failures by the ESC tool. Within ESC we could combat this by adjusting the specifications to 
remain within the bounds of what the tool can do or using assumption constructs. 
Alternatively, we could define the troublesome VCs as special cases and use RAC with 
associated tests to justify them. 
To illustrate one of the limitations of ESC, consider the simple Shape and Rectangle 
classes shown below. This example is not, in fact, part of the case study described in the rest 
of this chapter but we include it here because it illustrates the point we are discussing nicely. 
public abstract class Shape { 
 public abstract function area():integer 
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  ensures result >= 0 
} 
 
public class Rectangle isa Shape { 
 ... 
 public invariant width() >= 0 && height() >= 0 
 ... 
 public function area():integer 
  ensures result = width() * height() 
 { 
  return width * height; 
 } 
} 
The abstract area function in the Shape class has an ensures clause asserting that the 
result of the function should be non-negative. This method is overridden in the Rectangle 
class where its value is defined as being equal to the product of the width and height. 
Both the width and height are constrained to be non-negative by an invariant and so the 
behaviour of the area method in Rectangle should be consistent with the definition in 
Shape. 
However, the Simplify prover is not very good at arithmetic and cannot, by default, deduce 
that the product of two non-negative numbers is non negative. This shows up via the error 
shown below. 
 
To address this we can define the correctness obligation as a special case and use RAC. 
However, without the definition of any test cases, the obligation will still be unjustified. We 
could add a normal test case to the file but then while we could use the test to execute the 
assertion check, we would also have to ESC-check it because all normal tests in an ESC-
checked class must be ESC-checked. What we need is an RAC targeted test which we can use 
to define a test to cover the run-time assertion check, without the burden of also having to be 
ESC-checked. 
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This technique can also be used to define assumptions within the ESC process which are 
then justified by RAC checks. A similar facility is available directly through the verification 
policy system. A policy can define separate handling of assumption constructs for static 
verification and run-time checking. Specifying that the static verifier should treat them as 
assumptions and the run-time checker should check them gives the same thing. 
Interactive proof of non ESC-compatible obligation 
Policy for class: ESC 
Feature used: FFV special case 
When faced with the limitations of the ESC tool, another alternative is to use the interactive 
prover to verify the obligation. 
This works similarly to the use of RAC in the previous section except that it does not 
require the use of a targeted test since FFV does not require the production of a test suite. This 
technique can be used to give a form of lemma reuse across approaches. An assume 
statement can be used to introduce an assumption in ESC with the corresponding VC being 
proved as an FFV special case. 
Check presence and RAC-compatibility of run-time pre-condition checks 
Policy for class: ESC/FFV 
Feature used: RAC targeted test 
We must ensure that any statically verified classes have RAC-compatible pre-conditions that 
are run-time checked if they are to be called from RAC-verified classes. We can use RAC 
targeted tests to check for this. 
Consider the Book class in the Library project. The abstract state of this class consists of 
an itemNo, title, ISBN, list of authors, publisher and publish date. There is an 
invariant that the list of authors should not contain duplicates and corresponding pre-condition 
checks to guard the constructor and setAuthors operation. Suppose that we are ESC-
verifying this class. The ESC tool reports no errors as long as we include the pre-conditions of 
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the constructor and the setAuthors operation, so we may conclude that the class is correct 
and distribute it to clients. 
However, clients that use the class from RAC-verified code will encounter unjustified 
correctness obligations corresponding (indicated in the screenshot below via exclamation 
marks) for the pre-conditions of the constructor and setAuthors operation of Book. This 
is because, while we statically verified the Book class, we used the ESC policy which does 
not include run-time pre-condition checks. The users of the class may send us feedback of this 
problem and we could then re-build the project with these checks. But it would be better for 
the developers of the component to detect these problems before distribution of the 
component. 
 
RAC targeted test cases give us a way of simulating the conditions of RAC-verified client 
code. For example, we could define a test in our Book class and specify the use of the RAC 
policy to verify it. This test carries out a simple construction of a new Book. 
test bookTest 
 policy "RAC" 
{ 
 var cplItemNo:integer := 0; 
 var cplTitle:String := "Comparative Programming Languages"; 
 var cplISBN:ISBN := ISBN.fromString("0-201-71012-0"); 
 var rgcName:Name := Name.newName("Robert G.", "Clark"); 
 var lbwName:Name := Name.newName("Leslie B.", "Wilson"); 
 var cplAuths:List[Name] := 
List[Name].empty().add(rgcName).add(lbwName); 
 var cplPub:String := "Addison Wesley"; 
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 var cplPubDate:Date := Date.newDate(6,11,2000); 
 // add the new book 
 var b:Book := Book.newBook(cplItemNo, cplTitle, cplISBN, 
cplAuths, cplPub, cplPubDate); 
 // check details of book 
 assert b.itemNo() = cplItemNo; 
 assert b.title() = cplTitle; 
 assert b.isbn() = cplISBN; 
 assert b.authors() = cplAuths; 
 assert b.publisher() = cplPub; 
 assert b.pubDate() = cplPubDate; 
} 
If we now re-verify the Book class we get an unjustified obligation (indicated in the 
screenshot below via an exclamation mark) that the requires clause of the constructor is 
respected. This is the problem of the missing run-time pre-condition checks, but the test has 
enabled us to detect it ourselves before distribution. 
 
The RAC tests also allow us to check other aspects of the RAC-compatibility of the class 
such as the efficiency of the checks and the use of assertion constructs that cannot be 
converted into run-time checks. 
The RAC tests also permit conventional test cases to be defined which can be used to 
check the performance of the class for specific concrete values. Even when a class has been 
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statically verified, it is still a good idea to define conventional tests for concrete values. RAC 
targeted tests can be used to do this. 
Check ESC-compatibility of FFV-verified class 
Policy for class: FFV 
Feature used: ESC targeted test 
Like RAC specifications, FFV specifications may not be ESC-compatible. With FFV 
specifications the problem is generally that the ensures clauses are too expressive and 
specify properties beyond what can be checked by ESC’s automated prover. Again, ESC 
targeted tests can be used to detect ESC-compatibility. 
Consider the following extract of the specification of an FFV-verified List class. It has a 
relatively rich specification. While it can be interactively verified using FFV, it is not clear if 
it is ESC-compatible. Again, this example is not taken directly from the library case study but 
is used here for convenience. 
class List[Element] { 
 model function size():integer 
 model function elementAt(i:integer):Element 
  requires i >= 0 && i < size() 
   
 invariant size() >= 0 
 
 function contains(e:Element):boolean 
  ensures result = (exists (i:integer := 0 to size()-1): 
elementAt(i) = e ) 
 constructor empty() 
  ensures size() = 0 
 operation add(e:Element) 
  changes size,elementAt 
  ensures size() = old size() + 1,  
    elementAt(size()-1) = e, 
    forall (j:integer := 0 to old size()-1): 
     elementAt(j) = old elementAt(j) 
 function indexOf(e:Element):integer 
  ensures if !contains(e) then 
     result = -1 
    else 
     result >= 0 && result < size() 
     && elementAt(result) = e 
     && !(exists (i:integer where i >= 0 && i < result): 
      elementAt(i) = e ) 
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 operation removeFirstOf(e:Element) 
  requires contains(e) 
  changes size, elementAt 
  ensures size() = old size() - 1, 
   forall (j:integer := 0 to old indexOf(e) - 1): 
    elementAt(j) = old elementAt(j), 
   forall (k:integer := old indexOf(e) to size()-1): 
    elementAt(k) = old elementAt(k+1) 
} 
To check the ESC-compatibility of this specification, we can write an ESC targeted test. 
We can manipulate an instance of the class in this test and the system will attempt to ESC-
check it. 
test lstTest 
 policy "ESC" 
{ 
 var int0:IntegerObject := IntegerObject.withValue(0); 
 var int1:IntegerObject := IntegerObject.withValue(1); 
 var int2:IntegerObject := IntegerObject.withValue(2); 
   
 var lst:List[IntegerObject] := List[IntegerObject].empty(); 
 assert lst.size() = 0; 
 assert !lst.contains(int0); 
 lst.add(int1); 
 assert lst.size() = 1; 
 assert lst.elementAt(0) = int1; 
 deny lst.elementAt(0) = int0; 
 assert lst.contains(int1); 
 deny lst.contains(int0); 
 lst.add(int2); 
 assert lst.size() = 2; 
 assert lst.elementAt(1) = int2; 
 assert lst.elementAt(0) = int1; 
 assert lst.contains(int2); 
 assert lst.contains(int1); 
 deny lst.contains(int0); 
 assert lst.indexOf(int1) = 0; 
 deny lst.indexOf(int2) = 2; 
 assert lst.indexOf(int0) = -1; 
 lst.removeFirstOf(int2); 
 assert lst.size() = 1; 
 assert lst.elementAt(0) = int1; 
} 
The ESC tool is able to prove all but the final assertion. After some further 
experimentation we can deduce that the specification of the removeFirstOf operation is 
not ESC-compatible. The quantifications are too complicated for the automated prover to 
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handle. If this class is to be used in ESC-checked classes, it should provide a lightweight 
substitute via a which ensures clause. 
Such a substitute could be the following which simply describes whether an element is 
contained in the List after the removal but says nothing about the indices. 
 which ensures size() = old size() - 1, 
  forall (e2:Element): 
   if e = e2 then 
    ! contains(e2) 
   else 
    contains(e2) = old contains(e2) 
8.7   Summary 
The Library system described in this chapter was fully run-time assertion checked relative to 
the lightweight specification described in section 8.2. A set of test cases was developed which 
were sufficient to exercise every assertion check generated by the tool from the lightweight 
assertion annotations. However, a range of errors still remained after this process and they 
were picked up by the use of the other approaches. 
The ESC approach was used to check all of the classes in the Library system apart from 
the Lib and Date classes. This checking was relative to the lightweight specification based 
on the one produced for the RAC approach with enhancements described in section 8.3. This 
offered increased error coverage which allowed further errors to be detected. 
The FFV approach was used to fully verify a heavyweight specification of the Library 
system. The classes other than Lib and Date were fully verified. This involved interactively 
proving that the behaviour specifications satisfied the requirements specifications. Selected 
parts of the Lib class were also fully verified. The FFV approach offered the greatest error 
coverage and required the production of more complete behaviour specifications. 
Finally, a number of ways of using verification policies were explored which enable 
greater levels of integration between the different verification approaches. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Conclusions and future work 
This section starts with a presentation of the conclusions of this thesis. These are split in to 
two sections: one on the language and one on the integrated tool support. Some areas of 
possible future work are then discussed. 
9.1   Conclusions on the Omnibus language 
This thesis presented the details of the new Omnibus language. In this section we assess the 
contribution of the language and discuss the conclusions we have drawn from its 
development. 
9.1.1   Suitability of the language for different purposes 
Good for modelling classes 
The Omnibus language is well suited to the specification of modelling classes. The model 
function approach provides adequate facilities to describe the base levels of the specifications 
of a project. The contribution by Omnibus is the changes clause semantics which extend the 
classical base function approach with a useful frame-condition facility. This makes it suitable 
for static verification approaches without the need for the developer to manually write frame-
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conditions. Appendix B describes how the language can be used to model core set, sequence 
and map classes. 
Usable for applications 
While being well suited for modelling classes, the Omnibus language is also usable as an 
implementation language for applications. This was illustrated by the library case study. The 
example was a reasonable size with the implementation consisting of 2278 lines of Omnibus 
code. The code generation seems to be reasonably efficient, with the full tests involving the 
execution of over 8000 assertion checks and taking only 734 milliseconds. The code 
generation also seemed to fare relatively favourably to the similar PerfectDeveloper tool when 
compared using benchmarks [14]. Of course, there would be the potential for efficiency 
problems in larger applications but we are encouraged by these results. 
Problems with use for applications 
Our library case study showed that it was possible to use Omnibus for the implementation of 
applications but Omnibus was not ideal for this task. The main problems stemmed from the 
use of value semantics. The library application needed to manage a series of mutable data 
structures which cross-referenced each other. Such a scenario would be naturally 
representable using reference semantics but does not naturally fit the value semantics model. 
Using reference semantics we could simply store references to objects in fields of other 
objects. The built-in aliasing would allow all the objects accessed via these references to be 
automatically updated. We could not use the same approach in our value semantics language. 
The problem is that an update to one of the references to an aliased object would create a new 
object and leave the value of the object accessed via the other references unchanged. 
To get around this, the student had to essentially manually implement reference semantics. 
Special identification numbers were introduced for each of the referenceable objects (the 
Members, Items, Copys, etc.). Collections of all the objects were held by the central Lib 
class. If a reference to another object was required (e.g. a reference to an Item within a 
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Copy), the identification number of the associated object was stored and functions were 
provided in Lib to lookup the values of objects from their identification number. The lookup 
functions provide a manual implementation of dereferencing. 
Operations had to be added to the Lib class to update the details of any of the state 
elements. The referenceable objects could not be updated via objects retrieved from the 
lookup functions for the same reason. Attempts to update them would create new objects, 
leaving their values held by the Lib class unchanged. The requirement to provide update 
operations for all the state elements contributed to a large Lib class of nearly 1500 lines. 
Much of the code for the update operations was very similar, consisting of the same get-
update-set pattern for the different elements of the referenceable objects. This is clearly 
undesirable. It directly inhibits the modularity of the system, which is a bad thing for a 
language to do. 
Native reference semantics 
This is further evidence that native support for references is certainly needed. This support 
must be managed in some kind of structured way, such as the Universe type system discussed 
in chapter 4, in order to make it amenable to static modular verification. However, some of 
the problems we encountered in our case study are likely to be shared by these approaches 
since they use a similar kind of hierarchical structuring mechanism. 
9.1.2   Problems with the use of the language 
There were some other problems with the use of the language in our case study which were 
not specific to our language itself and may apply equally to other languages. 
Specifications more prone to errors than implementations 
A disappointing aspect of the case study was the lack of implementation errors that were 
detected. The vast majority of the errors that were detected using the different approaches 
were mistakes or omissions in the specifications. Part of the reason for this was that the 
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implementation was tested conventionally without assertion annotations first, before the full 
verification support was available. Thus, the implementations had been checked in some way 
by the time we received them while the specifications had not. 
Despite this bias, we can still speculate that the specifications produced by most 
programmers are more prone to errors than their implementations. This should not be a 
particularly surprising result since these programmers have been taught to think in the 
imperative style of implementations. By far the most common error that was made in the case 
study was missing instances of the old keyword. This seemed to result from the developer 
thinking in an imperative style about the declarative specifications.  
We believe this problem will always be present in some form until assertions are 
incorporated more prominently into the software development world and featured more 
prominently in software engineering courses. 
Repetition between heavyweight specifications and implementations 
When using the Omnibus language to perform full formal verification, the developer can end 
up writing the same description of the method twice in two slightly different ways: once in the 
heavyweight specification and once in the implementation. All assertion-based verification 
approaches require some level of redundancy in order to perform their verification, but in our 
full formal verification approach, this seems to have gone too far. It is not so much of a 
problem in our RAC and ESC approaches since the developer only writes lightweight 
specifications that express some particular properties of the implementation. In FFV, for both 
the specification and implementation, the developer attempts to completely describe the 
desired behaviour of the method. 
There seem to be two alternative approaches to this problem: automatically generating 
specifications from implementations or automatically generating implementations from 
specifications. A number of tools have aimed to automatically generate specifications for 
implementations. Daikon [39] and Houdini [40] seem to be the most prominent of these, both 
having achieved some success at assisting a developer in adding annotations. However, a 
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crucial flaw is that these processes generate specifications over the private attributes of the 
class rather than the public methods. As a result, they are better suited to the detection of 
invariants than pre- or post-conditions. There are different ways that an implementation could 
be automatically generated from a specification. PerfectDeveloper [33] uses a fairly standard 
assertion language and automatically generates implementations for some specifications. If an 
implementation cannot be automatically generated, then the user must give one. 
Assertion expressiveness 
The Omnibus assertion language is built upon the expression language with a few additions 
which include an old operator, quantifiers (universal and existential) and additional logical 
operators like implication. Most assertion languages are based upon the same principles. 
Unfortunately, an assertion language containing only these facilities is not expressive enough 
to fully describe the behaviour of all the methods programmers write. In our work with 
Omnibus we sometimes encountered methods that we could implement but were unable to 
specify using the assertion language without the use of recursion. We tried to avoid the use of 
recursion in specifications wherever possible because we found static proofs involving 
recursion to be extremely difficult and time-consuming. 
JML incorporates a number of additions that help address this issue. For example, 
generalised quantifiers allow you to express that a value is equal to the sum, product, 
maximum, minimum or count of the values satisfying a given predicate and allows 
specifications to be given in terms of “model programs”, simple imperative descriptions given 
using the implementation language. Many JML tools, such as LOOP [49], also allow 
unspecified Java methods to be reasoned about using their implementation. OCL [98] 
provides a range of special Collection operations which help express many properties which 
cannot otherwise be specified. The iterate operation is the most general of these, 
representing a generic loop operation. These offer the greatest expressiveness but are difficult 
to perform proofs with for the same reasons that it is hard to prove properties of recursive 
specifications. 
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We believe it would be useful to have a specification construct for iteratively describing 
properties and verifying them inductively. The challenge is to combine expressive power with 
ease of verification. 
9.2   Conclusions on our integrated verification approach 
The thesis also described an integrated verification approach which allows RAC, ESC and 
FFV to be used together in different parts of a single application. In this section we assess the 
contributions of this work. 
9.2.1   Combining approaches to address limitations 
Different error coverage and ease of use of approaches 
For the library case study, we started by using RAC, ESC and FFV, in turn, for the project in 
its entirety. We found that the approaches offered increasing error coverage in return for 
increasing user burdens such as the need for more comprehensive specifications and, for FFV, 
user assistance in the proof process. This provides justification for our claim that the 
approaches offer different balances between error coverage and ease of use, making them 
suitable for different parts of a project with different reliability requirements. 
Main problems with the different approaches 
All of the approaches we support have key problems that prevent them being an ideal solution 
on their own. 
The main problem with RAC is the need for users to produce test harnesses to sufficiently 
exercise the project to check all the assertion annotations. Part of the problem is that it may 
not be clear whether all the assertion annotations are being checked. The Omnibus IDE’s 
check viewer helps somewhat by allowing the user to easily identify which assertion checks 
have been covered by a specific test harness. The problem of producing the test cases still 
remains, but users should produce test cases anyway and the assertion check coverage 
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provides a useful measure for the sufficiency of these tests. As such, we see RAC as the most 
practically accessible of the verification approaches we support. There is work on the 
automated generation of test cases which could help address this problem [17, 100]. 
ESC is a very powerful approach allowing projects to be statically verified automatically. 
It does not require test cases or user-guided proofs. However, it has limits. For example, we 
were unable to verify the central Lib class of the library project using ESC. Many of the VCs 
were beyond the limits of the associated automated prover. This can lead to the situation 
where the user is not sure whether an ESC error report corresponds to a real error or results 
from a limitation in the prover. To determine which of these is the case requires intimate 
knowledge of the underlying prover. 
Our FFV approach requires the use of the interactive PVS prover to discharge the 
generated VCs. Default proof attempts are generated by the system and these were sufficient 
to prove a handful of the VCs in the auxiliary classes of the library project. We were able to 
verify the rest of the auxiliary classes relatively easily. However, many of the VCs from the 
central Lib class were very challenging to prove and we were not able to complete proofs of 
them all. Appendix E includes the details of the proof of just one of these VCs. It is clear from 
this that the burden of our FFV approach is very high. This has prompted us to focus most of 
our efforts on the RAC and ESC approaches. 
Using different approaches for different files 
Our verification policy system enables us to use different verification approaches for different 
files within a single project. For example, we were unable to use ESC for the entire library 
case study, but we were able to use ESC successfully for the auxiliary files and RAC for the 
remaining classes. When doing this, it is possible for there to be conflicts between the 
different verification approaches. We defined a set of guidelines for avoiding these conflicts 
and our tool can be used to ensure that they are obeyed. 
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Greater levels of integration with special cases 
Our tool offers the possibility of even greater levels of integration between the different 
approaches through special cases. The special cases facility hinges on the correctness 
obligations concept. The correctness obligations of a file are the abstract properties which 
must all be verified in some way in order to complete the verification process. A verification 
policy may define that some types of correctness obligations be run-time checked and others 
statically verified. For example, an ESC policy may be adjusted to include run-time checks of 
assume statements so that all correctness obligations will be covered. Specific correctness 
obligations may also be defined as special cases and have a different policy. This gives great 
flexibility and means other approaches can be used to directly address the key flaws in the 
other approaches. 
9.2.2   Supporting the safe reuse of software components 
The assertion-based verification approaches we considered provide for two of the basic 
requirements of safe software component reuse: clear descriptions of what the components 
should do, and some assurance that the implementations do this. The assertion annotations in 
the interface specifications provide the clear descriptions and the verification process provides 
the basis for trusting the implementations follow these descriptions. However, without 
specialised support: 
1. users would have to either browse the source or re-generate the documentation to 
get clear descriptions, 
2. users would have to manually re-verify the component to ensure that it was 
correct, and 
3. component producers would have to develop their own means of packaging and 
distributing their components. 
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The Omnibus IDE provides dedicated tool support for addressing these three problems. 
The first two problems relate to the identified theoretical requirements for safe reuse, while 
the final one addresses a practical need for managing the distribution of components. 
We follow the lead of JavaDoc and JMLdoc in providing facilities to automatically 
generate interface documentation from the input files. The documentation of each file 
contains the type signature details, any textual documentation provided in the files, and details 
of the interface specifications. 
The assertion-based verification approaches provide the basis for trusting the hidden 
implementations. Verification certificates are used to present a summary of the verification of 
the component in an accessible form. A certification level system is proposed to distil the 
verification information into a single reliability value based on how the different verification 
approaches were used together to verify the component. 
Finally, the tool allows project jar files to be built which contain the original Omnibus 
source, executable bytecode implementations, HTML interface documentation and the 
verification certificate of the component, among other things. These jar files are a convenient 
way of distributing components. These jar files can be used directly in Java applications. The 
IDE supports the automatic extraction and opening of the interface documentation of a project 
jar file and the checking of verification certificates. The checking of bytecode 
implementations and HTML interface documentation was also discussed. 
9.3   Future work 
There are a number of ways in which the work presented in this thesis could be extended. An 
overview of these is presented in this section. 
9.3.1   Formal definition for the Omnibus language 
It would be desirable to have a formal definition of the Omnibus language. This thesis 
described the semantics of the language in informal terms and indirectly through its 
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translation to logic via the static verification process. It would be better to also have an 
independent formal definition for the language. This should include a formalisation of the 
type system as well as full details of the semantics of the language. One of the motivating 
goals of the Omnibus language was to produce a language which was well-suited to formal 
verification. If we have achieved this goal then the formal definition of the language should 
be comparatively straightforward. The presentation of such a relatively simple formal 
definition would help justify the language. 
9.3.2   Combining value and reference semantics 
The language presented in this thesis is primarily built upon value semantics. This enables us 
to reduce annotation burdens and make formal verification more amenable to automation. 
However, support for reference semantics is required to increase the expressiveness and 
efficiency of the language. It would be desirable for the language presented in this thesis to be 
extended to include facilities for modelling reference semantics. However, this would be 
challenging.  
The first problem with combining support for value and reference semantics is a 
superficial one. In Java, all objects are implicitly accessed via reference. In Omnibus, all 
objects are implicitly treated as values. This makes things easy to parse and understand. 
Whenever the name of a class is used as a type then this is interpreted as a reference in Java 
and a value in Omnibus. In each language there is one concept which is the default. However, 
if we are to combine the value semantics and reference semantics then there will be two 
concepts. This immediately complicates the language and could lead to confusion and 
mistakes by the programmers. It may complicate the language sufficiently that a prospective 
user of the language finds it too alien and rejects it. On a syntactic level, how should the 
language differentiate between the two forms of objects? We could introduce additional type 
modifiers to indicate whether a type is to be treated as a value or reference. However, this 
increases the verbosity of the language, something which we should look to limit as much as 
possible. One measure we could take to combat this would be to adopt one of the approaches 
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as the default and not require type modifiers in that case. But which form should be the 
default? Since our work is primarily focused on value semantics, it would be natural for us to 
adopt that as the default. However, if we adopted reference semantics as the default and 
required type modifiers where value semantics was intended, then this could be viewed by 
programmers as an extension of Java. We note that C++ [94] has the same problem. In JML, 
value semantics classes are manually implemented and tagged with the pure modifier. 
The second, and more technical problem with extending our work to incorporate support 
for reference semantics is that we would need to extend our run-time checking and static 
verification techniques to handle the complexities of reference semantics. Currently we are 
able to make a range of simplifications through our use of value semantics exclusively. For 
example, we do not need any formal model of the heap for the static verification process and 
we can use simpler, more lightweight specification techniques. If we are to support reference 
semantics then we will have to develop a formal model of the heap and support the kinds of 
heavyweight specification techniques of languages like JML. However, there has been much 
work in this area and it has been well documented. In particular, the work on ownership type 
systems is of great relevance and could act as a foundation for a restricted form of reference 
semantics. We hope we can use the existing state-of-the-art techniques for reference 
semantics to provides us with a good starting point for our new support. 
While we wish to add support for reference semantics, we do not simply wish to produce a 
replica of the JML language with specialised value semantics support. JML is designed to be 
fully backward compatible with Java. We would like to explore the development of a Java-
like language with reference semantics but will not take full backward compatibility with Java 
as a hard requirement. This will allow us to explore restrictions that can be made which ease 
the task of formal verification by compromising backward compatibility. 
We also need to extend the language to handle a range of other facilities that are essential 
for commercial programming. These include static data and exceptions. 
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9.3.3   Integrating latest theorem provers and model checkers 
Currently the Omnibus IDE supports extended static checking through the fully-automated 
Simplify theorem prover and full formal verification through the interactive PVS theorem 
prover. Both of these theorem provers are used by a number of leading verification projects. 
The most notable project to use PVS is LOOP, while both ESC/Java2 and Spec# both still 
currently use Simplify. There are problems with both of these provers. The interactive PVS 
prover is only available for the Linux and Solaris Operating Systems, and uses its own 
language which people would also have to become familiar with in order to perform 
interactive verification with it. The main problem with the fully-automated Simplify prover is 
that it is no longer being maintained. Work stopped on the project some time ago and, while 
the source and binary versions are available, it is unable to keep pace with the demands of the 
verification tool developers. As a consequence of this, both the ESC/Java2 and Spec# projects 
have said they are looking for replacements. The fact that these two clearly imperfect theorem 
provers are being used by a number of current projects suggests that there are currently no 
ideal theorem provers for verification. This is a problem and we are dependent on people in 
the theorem proving field to develop better tools. The SMT-LIB project seems to be one of 
the most promising projects. We also note that the presentation of proofs in terms of the input 
language appears to make the proof process far more accessible to everyday programmers. 
However, to support this we would need to develop our own theorem prover which we are 
reluctant to do. 
We currently only support run-time checking, extended static checking and full formal 
verification. Crucially, we provide no support for model checking. Traditionally, model 
checking has been used for verifying properties of concurrent or communicating systems, and 
has relied on the use of special temporal and modal logics for specification, e.g. the 
JavaPathFinder project. However, the SpEx project [88] has developed a way of applying 
model checking to JML. Their tool is built on top of the extensible Bogor model checker in a 
similar way that our ESC is built upon the Simplify prover and our FFV is built upon the PVS 
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prover. The tool takes JML-annotated Java programs and translates them into the input 
languages of the Bogor model checker. It would be possible to use this approach to add model 
checking to our integrated verification suite. However, we note that the SpEx project had to 
implement a range of custom model checking optimisations in order to make the process 
suitably efficient. 
9.3.4   Distribution of reusable software components 
We have discussed our support for the description and certification of reusable components. 
However, component description and certification are just two of the challenges inhibiting the 
full adoption of software component reuse. Other questions involve the deployment and 
retrieval of reusable components. How should third parties make their components available? 
How can software developers find the components they need? There may be many versions of 
each component; how is this managed? 
Specialised tool support could be provided to support the distribution and retrieval of 
components. This could focus on repository manager and component finder tools. The 
repository manager would support the automatic construction and maintenance of online 
component repositories. These could be built into web servers and provide access to the 
components through a web interface. The sites could be managed like e-commerce sites. 
When components are uploaded to a repository, their verification certificates could be 
checked so that users could be assured that all of the components in a repository can be 
trusted. We imagine that there should be a central repository for the standard library 
components, but support could be provided to allow anyone to set up their own. The 
repositories would provide dedicated support for the management of different versions of 
each component. The component finder would allow software developers to search 
component repositories for the components they needed. This tool could be integrated into the 
Omnibus IDE and allow a number of repositories to be searched at once. 
A large amount of research has been carried out into the management and retrieval of 
software components. Early systems used primitive techniques such as keyword searches 
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[42], enumerated classification [1], and faceted classification [86]. The following projects 
enhance these basic approaches. CRECOR [61] provides a window-based drag-and-drop GUI 
that supports the location, adaptation, deployment and testing of components. 
ComponentRank [48] uses techniques from Internet search engines to rank components by 
significance when performing searches. Agora [91] adds introspection techniques to Internet 
search engine techniques which allow the type signature interfaces of components to be 
viewed within the search engine. The Semantic-Based Method Retrieval approach [95] uses 
domain knowledge to assist searches. These projects mentioned so far all depend upon the 
developer instigating a search request when they think a useful software component may 
exist. However, a developer may not be aware of the existence of all the different types of 
component and so may not know to instigate a search. To address this, tools like RASCAL 
[67] and CodeBroker [104] monitor the developer’s actions, infer the need for reusable 
components, perform relevant searches in the background, and actively recommend the 
results. 
9.3.5   Other future work 
There are a few remaining areas that we would like to explore further. 
Firstly, we would like to develop a range of specialised specification and verification 
support for a number of specific programming domains. Suitable domains are GUIs, 
databases and parsers. GUIs are essential parts of modern software applications yet have 
received relatively little attention from the formal verification community. We would like to 
develop an assertion-based specification and verification approach that is applicable to GUIs. 
We will embrace the point-and-click approach to GUI development present in IDEs like 
Visual Studio, jBuilder and Eclipse, augmenting it with the specification facilities of an 
assertion-based language, and allowing invariants to be defined over the display widgets. 
Databases could also be formally modelled with the intention of eliminating errors resulting 
in the evaluation of database queries. Parsers are also very applicable to formal verification, 
so we would like to provide specific support for them. 
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We have carried out a number of case studies, the largest one of which is reported in 
chapter 8. We would like to carry out further, commercial-scale case studies to further assess 
our work. 
Finally, our Omnibus IDE is implemented as a stand-alone tool. We would like to 
investigate whether we could integrate the tool into an existing IDE such as Eclipse. 
9.4   Concluding remarks 
I decided to study for a PhD in order to pursue ideas that I had about assertion-based 
verification. The Omnibus language and its supporting tools are a realisation of these ideas. I 
hope that others in the field can find material of worth in my work which can be incorporated 
into their own languages and tools. I believe that we can make an important contribution 
together. 
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Appendix A 
 
Language syntax 
This appendix gives a description of the syntax and informal discussion of the semantics of 
the Omnibus language. 
A.1   Syntax notation 
We use a variation of EBNF (Extended Backus-Naur Form) adapted from ANTLR syntax. 
This section on the syntax notation is adapted from the “ANTLR Reference Manual” [82]. 
Character literals are specified just like in Java. They may contain the usual special 
character escapes recognized by Java ('\b', '\r', '\t', '\n', '\f', '\'', '\\'). 
String literals are sequences of characters enclosed in double quotes. The characters in the 
string may be represented using the same range of characters that are valid in character 
literals. 
The following table summarizes the punctuation used in our syntax descriptions. 
Symbol Description 
(...) subrule 
(...)* closure subrule, i.e. zero or more 
(...)+ positive closure, i.e. subrule one or more 
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(...)? Optional, i.e. zero or one 
| alternative operator 
.. range operator 
~ not operator 
: label operator, rule start 
; rule end 
 
For convenience, in this document we will write keywords as unquoted bold tokens since 
we feel it makes the rules more readable. 
A.2   Lexical form 
A.2.1   Ignored elements 
Whitespace 
Whitespace characters such as spaces, tabs, carriage returns, formfeeds and newlines are 
ignored by the compiler except to separate tokens. 
whitespace : ' ' | '\t' | '\f' | newline; 
 
newline : ('\r' ('\n')? | '\n'); 
Comments 
Omnibus supports Java-style comments, either from “//” until the end of the line or between 
“/*” and “*/”. 
singlelinecomment : "//" (~('\r' | '\n'))* newline; 
 
multilinecomment:  
 “/*” 
  ( '*' ~’/’ 
  | newline 
  | ('*'|'\n'|'\r') 
  )* 
 “*/” ; 
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A.2.2   Special tokens 
Operators 
&& : := , . = ! > >=
 ( { <==> ==> [ < <= - !=
 % + ? ) } ] ; / *
 || 
Keywords 
 abstract also alters as  
 assert assume attribute behaviour
 boolean changes character class
 constraint constructor deny description 
 else elseif ensures exists 
 false for forall foreach
 function if in initially
 integer invariant is isa 
 library maintains model native
 nothing null old operation 
 out package prev private
 protected public requires return
 returns spec static test  
 then to true unreachable
 uses var where which 
 while 
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A.2.3   Identifiers 
Identifiers consist of a letter followed by zero or more letters, digits and underscores. Note 
that identifiers starting with underscores are not permitted; these are reserved for internal use 
by the compiler. 
ident : letter (letter | digit | '_')*; 
 
digit : '0'..'9' ; 
  
letter : 'a'..'z' | 'A'..'Z' ; 
A.2.4   Literals 
Character literals 
Similar to Java, character literals are written between single quote characters and can be an 
ordinary single character or an escaped character. Currently only newline, tab, single quote 
and backslash characters are supported. 
characterliteral : '\'' singlecharacter '\'' ; 
  
singlecharacter : 
    '\\' ('n' | 't' | '\'' | '\\' ) 
    | ~'\\' ; 
String literals 
String literals are written as a sequence of characters written between double quote characters. 
stringliteral : '\"' (~'\"')* '\"' 
Integer literals 
Integer literals simply consist of one or more digits. 
integerliteral : (digit)+; 
A.2.5   Primitive types and expressions 
The Omnibus type system is partitioned into primitive types and objects like Java. Here we 
discuss the primitive types and expressions. 
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Primitive types and literals 
Omnibus supports three primitive types: integer, boolean and character. These 
correspond to the int, boolean and char types in Java. Omnibus does not support the 
shortened byte or short types, the widened long type or the floating point float or 
double types from Java. Numeric overflow of integers is not handled within the static 
verification modules. 
Standard operators 
Five logical operators are provided within the expression language: negation, disjunction, 
conjunction, implication and bi-implication. As in Java, the disjunction, conjunction and 
implication operators are short-circuited, i.e. their second operands are only evaluated if, 
given the value of the first operand, they can affect the value of the expression. The symbols 
‘==>’ and ‘<==>’ are used for implication and bi-implication, respectively. 
Six standard integer operators are provided: addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, 
modulus and minus. Division by zero is handled and an assertion failure results if a divisor 
evaluates to zero. This is checked as part of the static verification process. 
Four relational (or inequality) operators are provided: less than, less than or equal to, 
greater than, and greater than or equal to. 
Equality operators 
In Java, the ‘==’ and ‘!=’ operators are used for equality of primitive values and its negation. 
In Omnibus we use ‘=’ and ‘!=’. The equality operators are overloaded and also used for 
object equality. We will consider the use of the equality operators in this way in section 3.3. 
If .. then .. else .. 
An ‘if .. then .. else ..’ operator is provided within the Omnibus expression 
language. This is a textual form of the ternary ‘?:’ operator from Java. The first operand 
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should provide a boolean condition whose truth determines whether the value taken in the 
then or else clause is used as the value of the expression. The types of the expressions in 
the then and else parts of the expression must be the same. 
Variables 
Variables can be referred to in expressions via their corresponding identifier in the standard 
way. There are different kinds of variables. For example, variables are used for parameters, 
fields, quantifier variables and special variables such as this and result. We will discuss 
each of these as appropriate in the rest of this section. 
Quantifiers 
The Omnibus language supports universal and existential quantifiers within its expression 
language. Quantification expressions consist of a series of variable declarations, restrictions 
over those variables, and an assertion over the variables. For objects, the declared variables 
are interpreted to range over all possible valid values of the specified type, not all allocated 
values of the specified type as they are in JML. Each variable declaration can be directly 
restricted to range over a delimited integer range or the contents of a specified collection. A 
further assertion can be used to restrict the values of the variables that are quantified over 
through a where clause. The assertion provided in a where clause can refer to any of the 
quantified variables. A single assertion is calculated from the restrictions (if present) from the 
variable declarations and where clause. This is then combined with the assertion over the 
variables. In the case of existential quantifiers, the conjunction operator is used. In the case of 
universal quantifiers, the implication operator is used. 
The syntax for quantifier expressions is given below: 
quantifierexpression :  
 (forall | exists) 
    “(“ quantvardeclarations (whererestriction)? “)” “:” 
  expression; 
 
quantvardeclarations :  
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 (quantvardeclaration (“,” quantvardeclaration)*)?; 
 
quantvardeclaration :  
 vardeclaration (quantvarrestriction)?; 
 
quantvarrestriction : 
 rangerestriction | inrestriction; 
 
rangerestriction : 
 “:=” expression to expression; 
 
inrestriction : 
 in expression; 
 
vardeclarations : (vardeclaration (“,” vardeclaration)*)?; 
 
vardeclaration : ident “:” expression; 
 
whererestriction : 
 where expression; 
Evaluation order 
The evaluation order of the previously discussed operators is as follows (from lowest to 
highest precedence): 
Quantifiers 
If expression 
Logical Implication, Logical OR, Logical AND 
Equality operators 
Relational operators 
Addition, Subtraction 
Multiplication, Division, Modulus 
Logical NOT 
Arithmetic negation 
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As in Java, the evaluation order can be overridden by parenthesising sub-expressions. The 
type of a parenthesised expression is the type of the expression contained within the 
parentheses. 
Full expression syntax 
The full syntax of the expression language is given below. 
 
expression : quantifierexpression; 
 
quantifierexpression :  
 (forall | exists) “(“ quantvardeclarations 
(whererestriction)? “)” “:” expression 
 | iffexpression; 
 
iffexpression : impliesexpression ( “<==>” 
impliesexpression)?; 
 
impliesexpression : orexpression ( “==>” orexpression)?; 
 
orexpression : andexpression ( “||” orexpression)?; 
 
andexpression : eqcompareexpression ( “&&” andexpression)?; 
 
eqcompareexpression : compareexpression ( (“=” | “!=”) 
compareexpression)?; 
 
compareexpression : addsubexpression ( (“<” | “>” | “<=” | 
“>=”) addsubexpression)?; 
 
addsubexpression : multdivexpression ( (“+” | “-“) 
addsubexpression)?; 
 
multdivexpression : isasexpression ( (“*” | “/” | “%”) 
isasexpression)?; 
 
isasexpression : notexpression ( (is | as) notexpression)?; 
 
notexpression : (“!”)? negexpression; 
 
negexpression : (“-“)? suffixexpression; 
 
suffixexpression : atomicexpression (“.” 
variableorfunctioncall)*; 
 
atomicexpression : 
 “(“ expression “)” 
 | true | false 
 | integer | boolean | character 
 | ident (actualparameters | actualsquareparameters)?; 
 | old ident (actualparameters)? 
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 | stringliteral | characterliteral | integerliteral 
 | if expression then expression else expression 
 ; 
A.3   Source files 
As in Java, Omnibus applications are made up of a collection of class definitions. Each 
Omnibus class must be defined in a separate source file. A package definition and a number 
of uses clauses may be provided. The syntax of an Omnibus source file is given below. 
file : (packagedef)? (usesclause)* classdecl; 
Package definitions 
A package definition gives the package that this class should be part of. Like C# and unlike 
Java, the package path does not have to match the directory structuring of the source files. No 
terminating semi-colon is needed. 
packagedef : package path; 
 
path : ident (“.” ident)*; 
Uses clauses 
A uses clause is equivalent to a Java import statement. To import all the files in a package, 
the name of the package should simply be specified, without the “.*” suffix used in Java. The 
type checker will report an error if there is not a class or directory with the specified path. 
usesclause : uses path; 
Class definitions 
For presentation purposes, we consider the class definitions in two parts, the class header and 
the class body. 
classdecl : classhead classbody; 
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Class headers 
The headers of Omnibus classes are similar to the headers of Java classes. As with Java 
classes, accessibility and abstract modifiers are provided. If no accessibility is specified, it 
defaults to public. The abstract modifier behaves as in Java, permitting the class to define 
abstract methods and preventing the class from being directly instantiated. 
An Omnibus class can also be declared with either the spec or native modifiers, but 
not both. We refer to a class declared with the spec modifier as a spec class and a class 
declared with the native modifier as a native class. A spec class is a class without an 
implementation. Spec classes can be used to declare the specifications and reason about them 
before proceeding to produce an implementation. Without the spec modifier, the presence of 
non-abstract methods without implementations would result in a type checking error. A spec 
class defines no implementation and so cannot be compiled to bytecode. A type checking 
error will result if an attempt is made to compile a spec class to bytecode. A native class, like 
a spec class, does not have implementations for its methods. However, these classes can be 
used by other non-specification classes. The system assumes that a corresponding native 
bytecode implementation will be provided in the run-time system. Of course, such an 
implementation must be compatible with the principles of the bytecode generated from 
Omnibus classes and should be independently verified to be consistent with the specification 
given in the native Omnibus class. This is similar to the use of non-bytecode implementations 
in Java through Java’s native modifier. 
Like Java 1.5, Omnibus supports generics. In Omnibus, template parameters are 
surrounded by square brackets. The template parameter list, if present, specifies a sequence of 
identifiers to hold generic type parameters. Within the body of the class, variables with these 
names will be introduced holding class values. This allows these identifiers to be used 
wherever a type is expected. 
Inheritance is supported via the isa clause. The keyword isa is used in place of 
extends because the underlying concept of inheritance is slightly different in Omnibus and 
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Java. In Java, inheritance is often used in ways that do not obey the principle of 
substitutability relative to the natural full specifications of correctness. This can lead to 
problems in modular verification. To avoid this problem, Omnibus enforces behavioural 
inheritance, sometimes referred to as the “is a” relationship. A class inherits non-static 
functions and operations from the superclass if they are not redefined in the current class. A 
class inherits all the requirements of its superclass. Where methods are overridden, the 
specifications of the two methods must be consistent as defined later. As of yet, only single 
behavioural inheritance is supported. There is no support for multiple superclasses (like those 
in C++ or Eiffel) or Java-style interfaces. 
Classes may include a description clause which can be used to provide a short description 
of the class. This is similar to a JavaDoc comment and is treated in an analogous manner by 
the Omnibus documentation generator. The description must be given as a String literal. 
classhead : (accessibility)? (abstract)? (spec | native)? 
         class ident (templateparameters)?  
                (isa ident)?  
         (description)? ; 
 
accessibility : (public | protected | private); 
 
templateparameters : [ identifierlist ]; 
 
identifierlist : ident (, ident)*; 
 
description : description text; 
 
text : stringliteral; 
Class bodies 
The body of a class definition consists of a sequence of zero or more member declarations 
which declare attributes, methods or requirements. There three forms of method: functions, 
operations and constructors. Requirements are discussed in section 2.3. 
classbodyelement : 
 attributedecl 
 | functiondecl 
 | constructordecl 
 | operationdecl 
 | requirementdecl 
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 | testdecl; 
Attributes 
Attribute declarations are used to declare the concrete fields used to implement an object. The 
value of the attribute can be accessed within the body of the class via a variable of the same 
name. 
attributedecl : (accessibility)? 
            attribute ident “:” expression 
               (description)?; 
Constructors 
Constructors are used to create instances of classes. An implementation for the constructor 
should be given unless the containing class is declared with the spec or native modifier. 
Omnibus constructors are implemented as class methods and create a new object instance of 
the containing class. They are equivalent in function to Java constructors but are called like 
Java static methods. Unlike Java, there are no default constructors because of the possibility 
of invariants. The specification of constructors is discussed in section 2.2. 
constructordecl : (accessibility)? 
            constructor ident parameters  
               (description)? 
               behaviour 
            (code)?; 
Functions 
Functions accept a number of parameters and calculate a single value to return to the caller 
without any side-effects. Functions can be declared with the static modifier. Static functions, 
like in Java, are used to define class methods. An implementation should be given for each 
static function unless the class is declared with the spec or native modifier. Static 
functions cannot also be declared as abstract. Functions declared without the static 
modifier are standard object methods. Implementations for non-static functions should be 
provided unless the abstract modifier is used or they appear in a spec or native class. The 
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specification and use of the model modifier in function declarations is discussed in section 
2.2. 
functiondecl : (accessibility)? (static | abstract)? 
                 (model)? 
          function ident parameters “:” expression 
            (description)? 
            behaviour 
          (code)?; 
Operations 
Operations are used to manipulate the values of objects. There are two different types of 
operations: simple operations and complex operations. Simple operations are operations 
without any var/out parameters. These are equivalent to functions which return a new object 
that is calculated from the initial object by applying the corresponding manipulation. These 
methods are semantically indistinguishable from functions returning values of the same type 
as the class in which the declaration occurs. This allows them to be used in expressions and 
assertions as if they were functions as well as being used in operation call statements. 
Complex operations are operations which contain at least one var or out parameter. These 
cannot be converted to functions which, by our definition, should calculate a single value 
without side-effects. As such, complex operations cannot be used in expressions. 
operationdecl : (accessibility)? (abstract)? 
          operation ident parameters 
            (description)? 
            behaviour 
          (code)?; 
Parameters 
Parameters consist of a parenthesised set of declarations, optionally preceded by var or out. 
Parameters without a var or out prefix correspond to call-by-constant-value input 
parameters. Omnibus does not permit the values of these parameters to be changed within the 
body of a method. Parameters with a var prefix correspond to call-by-value-result input-
output parameters. The values of these parameters can be changed within the body of a 
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method, and their resulting values will be copied to the input variables after the call 
completes. Parameters with an out prefix are like var parameters except that they are initially 
undefined and have no value passed in. Omnibus only allows var and out parameters to be 
used in conjunction with operations. 
parameters : “(” (declarations)? “)”; 
 
declarations : (declaration (“,” declaration)*)?; 
 
declaration : (var | out)? ident “:” expression; 
Tests 
Omnibus allows unit tests to be defined within a class. These can be used to express the 
intended behaviour of object instances of the current class for specific concrete values. The 
tests are treated like static methods with no parameters and no return value. Test data must be 
constructed within the body of the test, and can then be used to manipulate instances of the 
class and check properties of its behaviour. By default, a test case is verified using the same 
verification policy as the class which contains it. However, a policy clause may be 
provided, specifying an alternative policy to use. 
testdecl : (accessibility)? test ident (policy)? code; 
 
policy : policy text; 
A.4   Classes as types and objects 
In Omnibus, programmers can define their own types through the class definitions discussed 
in the previous section. The methods defined in the class definitions can be used to create, 
query and manipulate instances of the classes which are referred to as objects. 
Classes as types 
Wherever a type is required, a class expression can be provided. Like Java, all the classes that 
are used by a class (i.e. which are imported by uses clauses either directly or are in a package 
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that is imported) are made available through variables with the same name as the class. The 
top-level packages are also made available as variables and can be dereferenced to yield sub-
packages and contained classes. Template parameters can be specified in square brackets. 
Class expressions should be provided as the template parameters. 
classexpression : 
 (ident “.”)* ident 
         (“[“ (expression (“,” expression)*)? “]”)? 
Some examples of class expressions are given below: 
Environment 
omni.lang.String 
Collection[String] 
omni.lang.Collection[omni.lang.String] 
Map[String, Collection[String] ] 
Using Objects 
Objects are created using constructors. Object instances of a class are initially created by 
calling one of the constructor methods of the class. In Omnibus, constructors are named class 
methods and, unlike Java, there is no new operator. When creating an instance of a class with 
some generic parameters, concrete type values should be passed for those parameters in 
square bracketed parameters following the name of the class. An object can be queried by 
calling one of its functions and updated by calling one of its operations. Functions and 
operations are object methods, called using standard dot notation. Method calls can be made 
in expressions using the following method syntax. Constructor calls are made by providing a 
class expression as the first expression. 
objectmemberexpression : 
 expression “.” ident 
     (“(“ (expression (“,” expression)*)? “)”)? ; 
For example, we can calculate the balance of a savings BankAccount which was opened 
with a deposit of 300, had 50 withdrawn and then a further 80 deposited using the following 
expression: 
BankAccount.openSavings(300).withdraw(50).deposit(80) 
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      .balance() 
As in Java, within the body of a class definition, the methods of the current class can also 
be referred to directly. 
functionexpression : 
 ident “(“ (expression (“,” expression)*)? “)” 
| old ident “(“ (expression (“,” expression)*)? “)” 
Special variables 
There are a range of special variables that are available within the Omnibus language. For 
example, the this keyword is used to refer to the instance of the containing class that a 
method is being applied to. The result keyword is used to refer to the value to be returned 
from a function in an ensures clause. The local attributes of a class can also be referred to via 
variables. 
Casting 
As with any statically typed object-oriented language, at times it will be necessary to check 
the run-time class of an object against some other class and perform a cast to convert it to an 
instance of that class. We support both of these functions through is and as operators, 
respectively. These correspond to the instanceof operator and cast expression in Java. 
The is expression returns whether the left operand is an instance of the right operand, i.e. 
is its dynamic class equal to the specified class or a subclass of it. 
isexpression : 
 expression is expression 
The as expression casts the left operand to an object instance of the right operand. 
asexpression : 
 expression as expression 
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A.5   Specifications 
Omnibus specifications are discussed in detail in chapter 2. Here we present the details of the 
syntax of Omnibus behaviour and requirement specifications 
Behaviour specifications 
behaviour: 
 lightbehaviour | fullbehaviour; 
 
lightbehaviour: 
 (requiresclause)? (changesclause)? 
 (ensuresclause)? (whichensuresclause)?; 
 
fullbehaviour: 
 (behaviourlevel)+; 
 
behaviourlevel: 
 (public | protected | private) (model)? (spec)? 
    (requiresclause)? (changesclause)? 
    (ensuresclause)? (whichensuresclause)?; 
 
requiresclause : requires assertion (“,” assertion)*; 
 
changesclause : changes expression (“,” expression)*; 
 
ensuresclause : ensures assertion (“,” assertion)*; 
 
whichensuresclause : which ensures assertion (“,” assertion)*; 
 
assertion : 
 text “:” expression 
 | expression; 
Requirements specifications 
requirementdecl : 
 invariantdecl 
 | constraintdecl 
 | initiallydecl; 
 
invariantdecl : (accessibility)? invariant assertion; 
 
constraintdecl : (accessibility)? constraint assertion; 
 
initiallydecl : (accessibility)? initially assertion; 
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A.6   Implementation language 
A.6.1   Code 
Omnibus implementations consist of a number of statements enclosed by curly brackets. 
code : “{” (statement)* “}”; 
A.6.2   Statements 
The Omnibus implementation language is fairly simple, consisting of 11 statements. 
statement : 
 assignmentstatement | callstatement | declarestatement 
 | assertstatement  | assumestatement | ifstatement 
 | forstatement | foreachstatement | whilestatement 
 | returnstatement | unreachablestatement ; 
Assignment statements 
The assignment statement is used to assign the value of an expression to a variable. 
assignmentstatement: 
 ident “:=” expression ‘;’ ; 
A variable with the specified name must exist, the variable must be assignable (i.e. be an 
attribute in a constructor or operation, local variable, var parameter, out parameter or one of 
the special variables result or this), the expression must be executable (e.g. no 
quantifiers without variable restrictions) and the type of the expression must be acceptable in 
place of the type of the identifier. 
Operation call statements 
There are two types of operation call statement: local operation call statements and object 
operation call statements. Local operation call statements update the current object (this) by 
applying one of the operations from the local class. Object operation call statements update 
the value of a specified object variable by applying an operation to that object. 
callstatement: 
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 ident “(“ (callparameter (“,” callparameter)*)? “)” 
 | ident “.” ident “(“ (callparameter (“,” callparameter)*)? 
“)”) ‘;’; 
The parameters to an operation call statement are either expressions or variable names 
prefixed with var or out, depending on the declaration of the corresponding parameter. 
callparameter : 
 var ident | out ident | expression; 
If no object is specified, there should be a local operation with the specified name and the 
parameters should be acceptable. This check includes checks of the types of the parameters 
and whether they are var/out parameters. For example, if a formal parameter is declared with 
the var modifier then the corresponding actual parameter should also start with the var 
modifier. If an object is specified, a variable with the specified name should exist and should 
be assignable, the type of the variable should be an object, and that object should contain an 
operation with the specified name. We enforce this in an attempt to make whether a parameter 
can be changed more explicit to readers of the calling code. The parameters should also match 
as was described before. 
Declaration statements 
A declaration statement is used to declare a new local variable. The new variable may also be 
given an initial value. 
declarestatement : 
 var ident “:” expression (“:=” expression)? “;”; 
There should not be an existing local variable with the specified name, the expression after 
the colon should be a type. If an initial value is specified then it should be executable and 
should be acceptable as a value of this type. 
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Assert statements 
Assert statements are used to specify assertions that should hold at the point when the 
statement is reached. These assertions will be checked either statically or at run-time to ensure 
they are valid. Like other assertions, the assertion specified can optionally be given a label. 
assertstatement : 
 assert (text “:”)? expression “;”; 
The type of the expression representing the assertion to check should be boolean. If run-
time checking of assert statements is turned on, the assertion should also be executable. 
Assume statements 
Assume statements are also used to specify assertions that should hold at the point when the 
statement is reached. However, unlike assert statements, their assertions are taken by the 
system to be true without further justification. Again, the assertion specified can optionally be 
given a label. 
assumestatement : 
 assume (text “:”)? expression “;”; 
The type of the expression representing the assertion to check should be boolean. If run-
time checking of assume statements is turned on, the assertion should also be executable. 
If statements 
If statements are used to execute one of a number of sections of code depending on the values 
of a number of conditions. 
ifstatement : 
 if “(” expression “)” code 
 (elseif “(” expression “)” code)* 
 (else code)?; 
The type of the conditions should be boolean and they should be executable. 
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While statements 
The while statement is used to execute a block of code repeatedly while a condition evaluates 
to true. Loop invariants can be provided using alters and maintains clauses. 
whilestatement : 
 while “(“ expression “)” 
   ((altersclause)? maintainsclause)? 
  code; 
The loop condition should be a value of type boolean and should be executable. 
Loop invariants 
Loop invariants are specified using alters and maintains clauses. Alters clauses are 
similar to changes clauses, and maintains clauses are similar to ensures clauses. 
While changes clauses can refer to model functions and attributes, alters clauses may 
only refer to attributes. Alters clauses make the specification of invariants easier just as 
changes clauses make the specification of operations easier. 
altersclause : alters ident (“,” ident)*; 
 
maintainsclause : maintains assertion (“,” assertion)*; 
 
assertion : 
 text “:” expression 
 | expression; 
All of the identifiers specified in an alters list should be the names of existing variables 
that are assignable. The expressions specified in each of the assertions in a maintains 
clause should be of type boolean. There are no loop variants in Omnibus. 
For statements 
For statements can be used to iterate over a range of integer values. For statements implicitly 
declare a new local variable. An integer iterator variable is declared with the specified name 
and initialised to the low value. Execution of the loop proceeds while the value of the iterator 
variable is less than or equal to the high value. At the end of each iteration, the iterator 
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variable is incremented. Loop invariants can be provided using alters and maintains 
clauses. If a loop invariant is present and run-time checking of loop invariants is enabled, then 
the invariant is checked before each iteration of the loop body. 
forstatement : 
 for “(“ ident “:=” expression to expression “)” 
   ((altersclause)? maintainsclause)? 
  code; 
As was mentioned, for statements implicitly declare new local variables. As such, there 
should not be an existing local variable with the name specified before the := operator. The 
expressions before and after the to keyword should be integer expressions. 
Foreach statement 
Foreach statements can be used for iterating over the values in a subclass of the 
omni.lang.Iterable class. Again, Foreach statements implicitly declare a new local 
variable. At the start of the loop, an iterator is retrieved from the Iterable object. While 
the iterator has a next element it retrieves the next value, places it in a local variable with the 
same name as the iterator variable, executes the body of the loop, and then removes the next 
element. If a loop invariant is present then the invariant is checked before each iteration of the 
loop body. 
foreachstatement : 
 foreach “(” ident “:” expression in expression “)” 
   ((altersclause)? maintainsclause)? 
  code; 
Since foreach statements also implicitly declare a new local variable, there should not be 
an existing local variable with the name specified before the : operator. The expression 
before the in keyword should be an object type and the expression after the in keyword 
should be an omni.lang.Collection value. Additionally, the second expression should 
be a Collection of instances of the first expression. This is overly restrictive and should 
be replaced with a generic iteration concept. 
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Return statements 
The return statement is used within functions to return a value from the method and halt its 
execution. Each path through the function should end with a return statement. The ensures 
clause of the function should hold at the return statement with the special result variable 
assigned the specified value. 
returnstatement : 
 return expression “;”; 
This statement can only appear in the body of a function. The type of the expression 
should match the return type of the function. 
Unreachable statements 
The unreachable statement is used in place of a return statement when the path through the 
method ending at the statement should never be reached. It is needed to avoid warnings of 
missing return statements in the generated Java that are known to be spurious from the 
method pre-conditions. 
unreachablestatement : 
 unreachable “;”; 
Run-time assertion checks are generated in place of unreachable statements, reporting a 
failure if execution reaches the statement. 
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Appendix B 
 
Modelling types 
The model function specification approach of the Omnibus language is well-suited to the 
specification of modelling types that can be used to describe the rest of a system. These 
provide core specification facilities such as sets, maps and sequences. This appendix describes 
basic versions of the specifications for some modelling types provided in the Omnibus 
standard libraries. We present the public specifications of the classes and describe unit tests to 
ensure the specifications are ESC-compatible. The implementations of the classes are not 
shown although implementations are provided in the standard libraries to allow run-time 
assertion checking of specifications described using modelling types. 
B.1   Collection class 
The omni.lang.Collection class is used to represent a logical set of values. It is a 
parameterised class which can be used to store values of a specific class, referred to internally 
as Element. In this section we present a simplified version of this class. The specification of 
the class is built around a contains function which yields the boolean value true if the 
passed element is in the collection and false otherwise. The class header and contains 
model function are shown below. 
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spec class Collection[Element] { 
 model function contains(elem:Element):boolean 
The empty constructor can be used to construct a collection containing no values. This is 
described by saying that for all elements, the contains function yields false. The 
specification of this operation is shown below. 
 constructor empty() 
  ensures forall (e:Element): !contains(e) 
The add operation is used to add a value to the collection. Its specification is relatively 
straightforward using the Omnibus frame condition logic. The contains model function is 
adjusted so that it yields true for the passed element and whether all other elements are 
contained in the collection is unchanged. To express this we simply state that the model 
function contains is changed for the parameter value e and that the assertion 
contains(e) holds at the end of the operation, i.e. that contains(e) = true. This can 
be done using the following specification. 
 operation add(e:Element) 
  changes contains(e) 
  ensures contains(e) 
The operation could also be specified in Omnibus without the use of the parameterised 
changes clause entry. We could instead specify that the contains function is changed for 
all values (indicated by the lack of a parameter) and then add an additional assertion in the 
ensures clause to manually express the frame condition. This is the approach that would have 
to be used in JML. Such an alternative specification for the add operation is given below. 
 operation add(e:Element)   // Alternative version 
  changes contains 
  ensures contains(e), 
   forall (e2:Element where e != e2): 
    contains(e2) = old contains(e2) 
The remove operation is used to remove a value from the collection. It is similarly 
straightforward to specify in Omnibus. Again, we can specify that the contains model 
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function is changed for the passed value, and this time assert that the contains function 
yields false for that value after the operation. The specification is given below. 
 operation remove(e:Element) 
  changes contains(e) 
  ensures !contains(e) 
Again we could provide an alternative specification with a manual frame condition. 
We need to ensure that the specification we have produced expresses the class we intended 
and that the automated prover can effectively reason about it, i.e. there is ESC-compatibility. 
Both of these things can be checked using test cases. We can write a test case to create and 
manipulate object instances of the class and check that the functions can be proved to have the 
values we would expect. This checks the meaning and ESC-compatibility. The test starts with 
its header, including the policy clause indicating that “ESC” should be used, and the 
declaration of object which will be used in the following code. This code is shown below. 
 test escCompatibilityTest 
  policy “ESC” 
 { 
  var int0:IntegerObject := IntegerObject.withValue(0); 
  var int1:IntegerObject := IntegerObject.withValue(1); 
The empty constructor is then used to construct a new collection. This collection should 
not contain any objects and so it should be possible to prove that the objects int0 and int1 
are not contained in the collection. The tool is able to do this. The code is shown below. 
  var s:Collection[IntegerObject] := 
Collection[IntegerObject].empty(); 
  assert !s.contains(int0); 
  assert !s.contains(int1); 
The add operation is then used to add the object int0. This should result in the int0 
object being contained in the collection after the operation but the int1 object should still 
not be in the collection. The code to test this is shown below. 
  s.add(int0); 
  assert s.contains(int0); 
  assert !s.contains(int1); 
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The add operation is then used again to add the int1 object. This should result in both 
int0 and int1 being contained by the collection. The code to check this is shown below. 
  s.add(int1); 
  assert s.contains(int0); 
  assert s.contains(int1); 
The remove operation is then used to remove int0. The int0 object should then no 
longer be contained in the collection but int1 should still be.  
  s.remove(int0); 
  assert !s.contains(int0); 
  assert s.contains(int1); 
Finally, a deny statement is used to ensure that false cannot be proved. This allows 
contradictions to be detected. 
  deny false; 
 } 
} 
This completes the test and the class which the Omnibus verification tool is able to verify 
successfully. The full specification of the omni.lang.Collection class also contains a 
size model function and methods for comparing and combining collections in different 
ways. 
B.2   Map class 
The omni.lang.Map class is used to represent a mapping of keys to values. It has two type 
parameters, one for the key, Key, and one for the value, Value. In this section we present a 
simplified version of this class. The specification is built around a contains function 
yielding true iff there is a value for the passed key, and a value function which returns the 
value assigned to a specific key. Only values for keys that are contained by the map can be 
retrieved. The class header and model function declarations are shown below. 
spec class Map[Key,Value] { 
 model function contains(key1:Key):boolean 
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 model function value(key2:Key):Value 
  requires contains(key2) 
The empty constructor is similar to that of the Collection class. It asserts that for all keys, 
the contains function evaluates to false after the constructor. This also implies that there 
are no valid parameters for the value model function. 
 constructor empty() 
  ensures forall (k:Key): !contains(k) 
The put operation is used to add a new key-value pair to the map. This can be specified 
by stating that the contains model function is changed for the parameter k and that after 
the operation, contains(k) is true and value(k) is equal to the specified value. The 
value model function does not need to be referred to in the changes clause since no 
values that are valid before and after the operation change (as was discussed in section 3.1.2). 
 operation put(k:Key, v:Value) 
  changes contains(k) 
  ensures contains(k), 
   value(k) = v 
The remove operation is used to remove a key-value pair from the map. Again, the 
contains model function is changed for the specified key value, but this time 
contains(k) is false after the operation. 
 operation remove(k:Key) 
  changes contains(k) 
  ensures !contains(k) 
Again, an ESC-compatibility test can be defined. The preliminaries are the same: 
 test escCompatibilityTest 
  policy “ESC” 
 { 
  var int0:IntegerObject := IntegerObject.withValue(0); 
  var int1:IntegerObject := IntegerObject.withValue(1); 
The test starts by creating a new empty Map of IntegerObject to IntegerObject. 
Both int0 and int1 should not be contained by this map. 
  var m:Map[IntegerObject,IntegerObject] := 
Map[IntegerObject,IntegerObject].empty(); 
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  assert !m.contains(int0); 
  assert !m.contains(int1); 
The put operation is then used to put the key int0 into the map with the value int0. 
From the frame condition, int1 is still not contained by the map. 
  m.put(int0, int0); 
  assert m.contains(int0); 
  assert m.value(int0) = int0; 
  assert !m.contains(int1); 
The put operation can be used again to put the key int1 into the map with the value 
int1. The int0 and int1 objects should now both be contained in the map with the 
appropriate values. 
  m.put(int1, int1); 
  assert m.contains(int0); 
  assert m.value(int0) = int0; 
  assert m.contains(int1); 
  assert m.value(int1) = int1; 
The remove operation can then be used to remove the int0 key from the map. The 
int0 object is then no longer contained in the map but int1 is, with the same value. 
  m.remove(int0); 
  assert !m.contains(int0); 
  assert m.contains(int1); 
  assert m.value(int1) = int1; 
Finally, a deny statement is used to check that there are no contradictions. 
  deny false; 
 } 
} 
This completes the test and the class which is successfully verified. The full specification 
of the omni.lang.Map class also contains a size model function and methods for 
combining maps in different ways. 
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B.3   List class 
The omni.lang.List class is used to represent a sequence of values. It has a single type 
parameter referring to the types of the elements it can contain. In this section we present a 
simplified version of this class. The specification is built around a size function which 
returns the current size of the list and an elementAt function which returns the element 
currently at a specified index in the list. The valid indexes of the list run from 0 up to 
size()-1. An invariant is used to assert that the size of the list is always non-negative. The 
class header and model function and invariant declarations are shown below. 
spec class List[Element] { 
 model function size():integer 
 model function elementAt(ind:integer):Element 
  requires ind >= 0 && ind < size() 
   
 invariant size() >= 0 
This time derived functions are also defined in the specification. The first of these is the 
contains function which yields true iff the specified element is contained in the list. The 
specification asserts that the result of the function is true iff there exists a valid index whose 
element at that index is equal to the specified element. The specification is shown below. 
 function contains(e:Element):boolean 
  ensures result = (exists (i:integer := 0 to size()-1): 
elementAt(i) = e ) 
The empty constructor is used to create an empty list. It can be described by simply 
asserting that the size is equal to zero at the end of the constructor. This implies that elements 
are not accessible at any index. 
 constructor empty() 
  ensures size() = 0 
The add operation is used to add an element to the end of the list. As was described in 
section 3.1.2, we can specify such an operation including the size model function in the 
changes clause, asserting that this is increased by one and asserting that the newly accessible 
index value is equal to the passed element. 
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 operation add(e:Element) 
  changes size 
  ensures size() = old size() + 1, 
   elementAt(size()-1) = e 
The swap operation is used to interchange the values at two indices of the list. This 
specification can exploit the ability to include a model function in the changes clause with 
different parameters. Here, the elementAt model function is asserted to be changed for 
indices j and k. The ensures clause describes the interchange. The specification is shown 
below. 
 operation swap(j:integer, k:integer) 
  requires j >= 0 && j < size(), 
   k >= 0 && k < size() 
  changes elementAt(j), elementAt(k) 
  ensures elementAt(j) = old elementAt(k), 
   elementAt(k) = old elementAt(j) 
The indexOf function is used to return the first index at which a specified element 
occurs in the list or -1 if it is not in the list. This can be specified using an if expression 
asserting that if the specified element is not in the list then -1 is returned. Otherwise a valid 
index with the specified element at that position, and no occurrence of the element before it, is 
returned. 
 function indexOf(e:Element):integer 
  ensures if !contains(e) then 
     result = -1 
    else 
     result >= 0 && result < size() 
     && elementAt(result) = e 
     && !(exists (i:integer where i >= 0 && i < result): 
      elementAt(i) = e ) 
The removeFirstOf operation is used to remove the first occurrence of a specified 
element. This can be specified using quantifiers asserting that the elements previously before 
the first occurrence of the element are unchanged, and those after are shuffled forward one 
place. We will see during the testing of this operation that the full specification is not ESC-
compatible and so a lightweight substitute is provided via a which ensures clause. The 
specification is shown below. 
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 operation removeFirstOf(e:Element) 
  requires size() > 0, contains(e) 
  changes size, elementAt 
  ensures size() = old size() - 1, 
   forall (j:integer := 0 to old indexOf(e) - 1): 
    elementAt(j) = old elementAt(j), 
   forall (k:integer := old indexOf(e) to size()-1): 
    elementAt(k) = old elementAt(k+1) 
  which ensures size() = old size() - 1, 
   forall (e2:Element): 
    if e = e2 then 
     ! contains(e2) 
    else 
     contains(e2) = old contains(e2) 
Again, we use an ESC-compatibility test with the same preliminaries: 
 test escCompatibilityTest 
  policy “ESC” 
 { 
  var int0:IntegerObject := IntegerObject.withValue(0); 
  var int1:IntegerObject := IntegerObject.withValue(1); 
  var int2:IntegerObject := IntegerObject.withValue(2); 
The test starts by creating an empty list and checking that the size is zero and all the 
declared objects are not contained in it. 
  var lst:List[IntegerObject] := 
List[IntegerObject].empty(); 
  assert lst.size() = 0; 
  assert !lst.contains(int0); 
  assert !lst.contains(int1); 
  assert !lst.contains(int2); 
The add operation is then used to add the int0 object to the end of the list. This makes 
the size equal to one and the element at index 0 equal to int0. The int1 and int2 objects 
are still not in the list. 
  lst.add(int0); 
  assert lst.size() = 1; 
  assert lst.elementAt(0) = int0; 
  assert !lst.contains(int1); 
  assert !lst.contains(int2); 
The add operation is then used again to add the int1 object to the end of the list. The 
size of the list is now two with int1 now at index 1 and int0 unchanged at index 0. The 
int2 object is still not contained in the list. 
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  lst.add(int1); 
  assert lst.size() = 2; 
  assert lst.elementAt(1) = int1; 
  assert lst.elementAt(0) = int0; 
  assert !lst.contains(int2); 
The swap operation is then used to swap the elements at indexes 0 and 1, and back again. 
  lst.swap(0, 1); 
  assert lst.size() = 2; 
  assert lst.elementAt(0) = int1; 
  assert lst.elementAt(1) = int0; 
  lst.swap(0, 1); 
  assert lst.size() = 2; 
  assert lst.elementAt(0) = int0; 
  assert lst.elementAt(1) = int1; 
Now the indexOf function is tested. The index of int0 should be 0, the index of int1 
should be 1 and the index of int2 should be -1 because it is not in the list. 
  assert lst.indexOf(int0) = 0; 
  assert lst.indexOf(int1) = 1; 
  assert lst.indexOf(int2) = -1; 
For convenience we now add int2 to the end of the list. 
  lst.add(int2); 
  assert lst.size() = 3; 
  assert lst.elementAt(0) = int0; 
  assert lst.elementAt(1) = int1; 
  assert lst.elementAt(2) = int2; 
Everything to this point is verified successfully by the tool. 
Finally, we attempt to remove the first occurrence of int1. 
  lst.removeFirstOf(int1); 
  assert lst.size() = 2; 
  assert lst.elementAt(0) = int0; // fails 
  assert lst.elementAt(1) = int2; // fails 
The tool is not able to prove the final two assert statements because the specification of 
removeFirstOf is not ESC-compatible. Its complex use of quantifiers is beyond the 
automated prover we use. However, the lightweight substitute does at least allow the elements 
that are contained in a list to be reasoned about after the removeFirstOf operation is 
called although the ordering information is lost. 
APPENDIX B MODELLING TYPES 
 311 
 } 
} 
This completes the test and the class which is successfully verified. The full specification 
of the omni.lang.List class also contains methods for comparing and combining lists in 
different ways. 
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Appendix C 
 
Verification policy definitions 
This appendix defines the configurable options for the verification policy system, and then 
gives the full details of the built-in verification policies. 
C.1   Configurable options for verification policies 
Omnibus verification policies are defined in a hierarchical fashion, each policy being based 
on another policy with some changes. There is a root policy called ‘Blank’ which is at the root 
of all policy hierarchies and has no parent. For example, we define ‘RAC – Unhalting’, a kind 
of RAC that reports assertion failures but then continues, to be based upon the ‘RAC’ policy 
but with the ‘Action on failure’ property set to ‘Report and continue’. This makes it much 
easier to define related policies than if they all had to be configured separately. 
Each policy has its own name and can be saved either within the settings of the IDE 
installation or in the currently open project. A description field keeps track of how the 
verification policy is different from the one it is based upon. 
There is then a range of configurable options which are divided into two groups: run-time 
checking and static verification. Both these groups have a property for whether they are 
enabled and then three sub-groups of properties: general properties, checks and failure 
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reports. Each property has either a boolean Y/N value specified via a check box or a value 
from a list selected via series of option buttons. If run-time checking or static verification is 
disabled then the settings used in that section are not used and that particular form of 
verification is not used for the class. 
A screenshot of the Policy Editor is shown below. 
 
C.1.1   Run-time checking properties 
The details of the run-time checking properties and their corresponding options are given in 
the table below. 
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Group Property Options 
None a. Enabled Y/N 
General b. Action on Failure 1. Terminate execution 
2. Report and continue 
" c. Quantifiers with 
enumerable ranges 
1. Check them 
2. Ignore assertions with them 
" d. Quantifiers without 
enumerable ranges 
1. Report error if found 
2. Report warning if found 
3. Ignore assertions with them 
Checks e. Check requires clauses Y/N 
" f. changes clauses 1. Check if possible, error if not 
2. Check if possible, warn if not 
3. Check if possible, ignore if not 
4. Ignore them 
" g. Check ensures clauses Y/N 
" h. Check requirements Y/N 
" i. Check assert statements Y/N 
" j. assume statements 1. Check them 
2. Generate error if found 
3. Ignore them 
" k. Check loop invariants Y/N 
Failure reports l. Include description Y/N 
" m. Include source Y/N 
" n. Include stack trace Y/N 
" o. Include parameter values Y/N 
" p. Include attribute values Y/N 
" q. Include local variable Y/N 
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values 
" r. Include execution path info Y/N 
C.1.2   Static verification properties 
The details of all the static verification properties and their corresponding options are given in 
the table below. 
Group Property Options 
None a. Enabled Y/N 
General b. Prover 1. Interactive PVS prover 
2. Automated Simplify prover 
" c. Generate PVS lemma files Y/N 
" d. Recursion 1. Check assertions with recursion 
2. Generate error if found 
3. Warn and check 
4. Ignore assertions with recursion 
" e. which ensures clauses 1. Always use 
2. Use when recursion in ensures 
3. Never use 
Checks f. Check requires clauses Y/N 
" g. Check changes clauses Y/N 
" h. Check ensures clauses Y/N 
" i. Requirements 1. Check from behaviour 
2. Check from implementation 
" j. Check assert statements Y/N 
" k. assume statements 1. Check them 
2. Generate error if found 
3. Ignore them 
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" l. Loops without invariants 1. Unravel them 
2. Warn and then unravel them 
3. Generate error if found 
Failure reports m. Include description Y/N 
" n. Include source Y/N 
" o. Include stack trace Y/N 
" p. Include parameter values Y/N 
" q. Include attribute values Y/N 
" r. Include local variable 
values 
Y/N 
" s. Include execution path info Y/N 
C.2   Built-in verification policies 
In this section we give the details of the built-in policies in terms of the properties defined in 
the previous section. First we give the full property settings for the 3 core built-in policies 
(RAC, ESC and FFV) and then we describe customisations of them. 
C.2.1   Properties for RAC, ESC and FFV 
The following tables present the policy settings for the RAC, ESC and FFV approaches. The 
column labels a-r and a-s correspond to the properties defined in C.1.1 and C.1.2, 
respectively. The values in the cells below these column labels correspond to the options from 
the properties which are used for that policy. The values in italics are not relevant for that 
policy because the appropriate form of verification is disabled but is relevant to some policies 
discussed in section C.2.2 which are based on these. 
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Run-time checking properties 
Policy a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r 
RAC Y 1 1 1 Y 1 Y Y Y 1 Y Y Y Y N N N N 
ESC N 1 1 1 Y 1 Y Y Y 1 Y Y Y Y N N N N 
FFV N 1 1 1 Y 1 Y Y Y 1 Y Y Y Y N N N N 
Static verification properties 
Policy a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s 
RAC N 1 Y 1 1 Y Y Y 1 Y 1 1 Y Y Y N N N N 
ESC Y 2 Y 2 1 Y Y Y 2 Y 3 1 Y Y Y N N N N 
FFV Y 1 Y 1 3 Y Y Y 1 Y 2 3 Y Y Y N N N N 
C.2.2   Extensions of RAC, ESC and FFV 
The full policy properties for the 3 core policies were defined in the previous section. In this 
section we describe some other policies that are based upon them. Instead of giving the full 
property details, we simply describe how they differ from the policy which they are based 
upon. 
Policy Based on Property changes 
RAC – Verbose RAC Run-time checking: 
o = Y 
p = Y 
q = Y 
r = Y 
RAC – Unhalting RAC Run-time checking: 
b = 2 
RAC – Minimal Unhalting RAC – Unhalting Run-time checking: 
l = N 
m = N 
n = N 
ESC – Verbose ESC Static verification: 
p = Y 
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q = Y 
r = Y 
s = Y 
ESC with RAC client 
checks 
ESC Run-time checking: 
a = Y 
f = 4 
g = N 
h = N 
i = N 
j = 3 
k = N 
ESC with RAC assume 
checks 
ESC Run-time checking: 
a = Y 
e = N 
f = 4 
g = N 
h = N 
i = N 
k = N 
FFV with RAC client 
checks 
FFV Run-time checking: 
a = Y 
f = 4 
g = N 
h = N 
i = N 
j = 3 
k = N 
FFV with loop unravelling FFV Static verification: 
l = 2 
FFV – Automated FFV Static verification: 
b = 2 
d = 3 
e = 2 
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Appendix D 
 
Symbolic execution example 
 
This appendix will work through the symbolic execution of a sorting implementation. The 
algorithm used is insertion sort [99]. The algorithm is implemented as a static function which 
accepts a List parameter and returns a sorted version of the List. Some simple correctness 
annotations are provided in an ensures clause. These express that the resulting List should 
be sorted and that the size of the input and output lists should be the same. The 
implementation involves the use of nested while loops. We consider the use of the ESC 
approach which involves the loop unravelling technique. 
D.1   A sorting example 
The source of the example is given below. This example has previously been presented [97] 
where the use of RAC, ESC and FFV to verify it was discussed.  
 1: public class Sorter { 
 2:  public static function insertSort(inList:List):List 
 3:   ensures "The returned List is sorted": 
 4:       forall (i:integer := 1 to result.size()-1): 
 5:      result.elementAt(i) >= result.elementAt(i-1), 
 6:   "The size of the sorted List is the same as the size of 
the input List": 
APPENDIX D SYMBOLIC EXECUTION EXAMPLE 
 320 
 7:     result.size() = inList.size() 
 8:  { 
 9:   var a:List := inList; 
10:   var m:integer := 1; 
11:   while (m < a.size()) { 
12:    var key:integer := a.elementAt(m); 
13:    var l:integer := m-1; 
14:    while (l >= 0 && l < a.size() 
15:      && a.elementAt(l) >= key) { 
16:     a.set(l+1,a.elementAt(l)); 
17:     l := l-1; 
18:    } 
19:    a.set(l+1,key); 
20:    m := m+1; 
21:   } 
22:   return a; 
23:  } 
24: } 
D.2   The symbolic execution process 
The symbolic execution of this example begins with the processing of the Sorter class and 
the loading of the top-level packages, local and imported classes and local methods. The 
members, here only a single static function, are then processed. 
The state of the symbolic executor consists of 3 components: the program counter, the path 
condition, and the current values for each variable. Initially, the program counter is the header 
of the function (line 2), the path condition is empty and there are no local variables. 
Program Counter: 
 2: public static function insertSort(inList:List):List 
Path Condition: 
 true 
Variables: 
 None 
We then start processing the static function. New variables are declared for the parameters 
and reassigned arbitrary values. The typing information of the new symbol is recorded in the 
path condition. The program counter advances to the start of the code, ready for symbolic 
execution of the implementation. 
Program Counter: 
 8: { 
Path Condition: 
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 {inList_0:List} 
Variables: 
 inList: inList_0 
The first statements are two declarations, shown below: 
 9:   var a:List := inList; 
10:   var m:integer := 1; 
These declare new local variables and assign them values. The a variable is assigned the 
current value of the inList parameter which is the symbol inList_0. The m variable is 
assigned the literal value 1. The program counter then advances to line 11. 
Program Counter: 
 11:  while (m < a.size()) { 
Path Condition: 
 {inList_0:List} 
Variables: 
 inList: inList_0 
 a: inList_0 
 m: 1 
The first while statement, shown below, is then reached. 
11:   while (m < a.size()) { 
This involves two branches. In the first, the condition is assumed to be false when the loop 
is first reached and the code following the loop is executed. In the second, the condition is 
assumed to be true when the loop is first reached, the body of the loop is executed and then 
the condition is assumed to be false after this iteration. 
Branch 1 of while loop at line 11 (no iterations) 
For branch 1, the condition is assumed to be false. This involves the evaluation of the 
negation of the loop condition being added to the path condition. Flow then moves to the 
statement immediately after the loop, the return statement. 
Program Counter: 
 22:  return a; 
Path Condition: 
 {inList_0:List}, 
 !(1 < inList_0.size()) 
Variables: 
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 inList: inList_0 
 a: inList_0 
 m: 1 
The symbolic execution of the return statement first involves the declaration of a 
result variable which is assigned the evaluated of the expression to be returned. The post-
conditions are then checked. This generates VCs that the path condition implies each ensures 
clause. 
VC #1: 
 {inList_0:List} 
 && !(1 < inList_0.size()) 
==> 
  forall (i:integer := 1 to inList_0.size()-1): 
  inList_0.elementAt(i) >= inList_0.elementAt(i-1) 
 
VC #2: 
 {inList_0:List} 
 && !(1 < inList_0.size()) 
==> 
  inList_0.size() = inList_0.size() 
This completes the symbolic execution of this branch as indicated by the terminate 
primitive in the symbolic execution rule of the return statement. 
Branch 2 of while loop at line 11 (one iteration) 
In branch 2, we consider the execution of one iteration of the body of the while loop. We 
start by assuming that the loop condition is true. So we know that inList_0.size() is 
greater than 1. 
Program Counter: 
 12:   var key:integer := a.elementAt(m); 
Path Condition: 
 {inList_0:List}, 
 1 < inList_0.size() 
Variables: 
 inList: inList_0 
 a: inList_0 
 m: 1 
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We now reach the two declaration statements. These add new local variables and assign 
them values derived from the existing variables. 
12:    var key:integer := a.elementAt(m); 
13:    var l:integer := m-1; 
The statement at line 12 involves a call of the elementAt function which contains a pre-
condition. This generates a VC that this pre-condition is met. 
VC #3: 
 {inList_0:List} 
 && 1 < inList_0.size() 
==> 
  inList_0.elementAt_pre(1) 
After symbolic execution of these statements, the state of the symbolic executor is as 
follows: 
Program Counter: 
 14:   while (l >= 0 && l < a.size() 
 15:     && a.elementAt(l) >= key) { 
Path Condition: 
 {inList_0:List}, 
 1 < inList_0.size() 
Variables: 
 inList: inList_0 
 a: inList_0 
 m: 1 
 key: inList_0.elementAt(1) 
 l: 1-1 
We now reach the while loop. As described in the symbolic execution rule for while 
loops, the first stage is to check any pre-conditions in the loop condition. The elementAt 
function call requires such a check. 
VC #4: 
 {inList_0:List} 
 && 1 < inList_0.size() 
==> 
  inList_0.elementAt_pre(1-1) 
We can now consider the separate branches of the symbolic execution of the while loop: 
one for no iterations of the loop body and one for a single iteration of the loop body. 
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Branch 1 of while loop at line 14 (no iterations) 
For branch 1, the condition is assumed to be false. This involves the evaluation of the 
negation of the loop condition being added to the path condition. Flow then moves to the 
statement immediately after the loop, the call of the set operation. 
Program Counter: 
 19:   a.set(l+1,key); 
Path Condition: 
 {inList_0:List}, 
 1 < inList_0.size(), 
 !(0 >= 0 && 0 < inList_0.size() 
   && inList_0.elementAt(0) >= inList_0.elementAt(1)) 
Variables: 
 inList: inList_0 
 a: inList_0 
 m: 1 
 key: inList_0.elementAt(1) 
 l: 0 
The loop is immediately followed by two statements: a call of the set operation and an 
assignment to increment the value of m by one. 
19:    a.set(l+1,key); 
20:    m := m+1; 
The set operation has a pre-condition that the passed index is valid. A VC is generated to 
check this. 
VC #5: 
 {inList_0:List} 
 && 1 < inList_0.size() 
 && !(0 >= 0 && 0 < inList_0.size() 
   && inList_0.elementAt(0) >= inList_0.elementAt(1)) 
==> 
  inList_0.set_pre(0+1, inList_elementAt(1)) 
The statements on lines 19 and 20 can then be executed with the following consequences 
for the state of the symbolic executor. The program counter moves to the statement after the 
loop, the return statement. 
Program Counter: 
 22:  return a; 
Path Condition: 
 {inList_0:List}, 
 1 < inList_0.size(), 
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 !(0 >= 0 && 0 < inList_0.size() 
   && inList_0.elementAt(0) >= inList_0.elementAt(1)) 
Variables: 
 inList: inList_0 
 a: inList_0.set(0+1, inList_0.elementAt(1)) 
 m: 1+1 
 key: inList_0.elementAt(1) 
 l: 0 
VCs are then generated for the checks of the ensures clauses at the return statement. 
VC #6: 
 {inList_0:List} 
 && 1 < inList_0.size() 
 && !(0 >= 0 && 0 < inList_0.size() 
   && inList_0.elementAt(0) >= inList_0.elementAt(1)) 
==> 
  forall (i:integer := 1 to 
     inList_0.set(1, inList_0.elementAt(1)).size()-1): 
  inList_0.set(1,inList_0.elementAt(1)).elementAt(i) 
  >= inList_0.set(1,inList_0.elementAt(1)).elementAt(i-1) 
 
VC #7: 
 {inList_0:List} 
 && 1 < inList_0.size() 
 && !(0 >= 0 && 0 < inList_0.size() 
   && inList_0.elementAt(0) >= inList_0.elementAt(1)) 
==> 
  inList_0.set(1,inList_0.elementAt(1)).size() 
  = inList_0.size() 
This completes this branch. 
Branch 2 of while loop at line 14 (one iteration) 
In branch 2, we consider the execution of one iteration of the body of the while loop. We 
start by assuming that the loop condition is true. 
Program Counter: 
 16:    a.set(l+1,a.elementAt(l)); 
Path Condition: 
 {inList_0:List}, 
 1 < inList_0.size(), 
 0 >= 0 && 0 < inList_0.size() 
   && inList_0.elementAt(0) >= inList_0.elementAt(1) 
Variables: 
 inList: inList_0 
 a: inList_0 
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 m: 1 
 key: inList_0.elementAt(1) 
 l: 0 
Flow then moves to the statements in the body of the loop. These are another call of the 
set operation and an assignment to decrement l by one. 
16:     a.set(l+1,a.elementAt(l)); 
17:     l := l-1; 
The statement at line 16 involves calls of the elementAt function and set operation, 
both of which have pre-conditions. This generates two VCs: 
VC #8: 
 {inList_0:List} 
 && 1 < inList_0.size() 
 && 0 >= 0 && 0 < inList_0.size() 
   && inList_0.elementAt(0) >= inList_0.elementAt(1) 
==> 
  inList_0.elementAt_pre(0) 
 
VC #9: 
 {inList_0:List} 
 && 1 < inList_0.size() 
 && 0 >= 0 && 0 < inList_0.size() 
   && inList_0.elementAt(0) >= inList_0.elementAt(1) 
==> 
  inList_0.set_pre(0+1, inList_0.elementAt(0)) 
The statements at lines 16 and 17 can then be symbolically executed with the following 
consequences for the state of the symbolic executor. The program counter moves back to the 
header of the loop at line 14. 
Program Counter: 
 14:   while (l >= 0 && l < a.size() 
 15:     && a.elementAt(l) >= key) { 
Path Condition: 
 {inList_0:List}, 
 1 < inList_0.size(), 
 0 >= 0 && 0 < inList_0.size() 
   && inList_0.elementAt(0) >= inList_0.elementAt(1) 
Variables: 
 inList: inList_0 
 a: inList_0.set(1, inList_0.elementAt(0)) 
 m: 1 
 key: inList_0.elementAt(1) 
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 l: 0-1 
The pre-conditions of the method calls in the loop condition are then re-checked. The call 
of the elementAt function in line 15 generates another VC, shown below. The last two 
conjuncts of the path condition are derived from the evaluation order. The elementAt 
function will only be evaluated (and hence its pre-condition have to hold) if the first conjuncts 
of the loop condition are true. Since there is a contradiction (-1 >= 0) in the path condition 
for the VC, it is okay that the pre-condition of the elementAt function is not satisfied. 
VC #10: 
 {inList_0:List} 
 && 1 < inList_0.size() 
 && 0 >= 0 && 0 < inList_0.size() 
   && inList_0.elementAt(0) >= inList_0.elementAt(1) 
 && -1 >= 0 
 && -1 < inList_0.set(1, inList_0.elementAt(0)).size() 
==> 
  inList_0.set(1, inList_0.elementAt(0)).elementAt_pre(-1) 
The loop condition is then assumed to be false to complete the single iteration and the 
program counter advances to the statement immediately after the loop. 
Program Counter: 
 19:   a.set(l+1,key); 
Path Condition: 
 {inList_0:List}, 
 1 < inList_0.size(), 
 0 >= 0 && 0 < inList_0.size() 
   && inList_0.elementAt(0) >= inList_0.elementAt(1), 
 !(-1 >= 0 
   && -1 < inList_0.set(1, inList_0.elementAt(0)).size() 
   && inList_0.set(1, inList_0.elementAt(0)) 
                    .elementAt(-1) 
      >= inList_0.elementAt(1)) 
Variables: 
 inList: inList_0 
 a: inList_0.set(1, inList_0.elementAt(0)) 
 m: 1 
 key: inList_0.elementAt(1) 
 l: -1 
The next two statements are another call of the set operation and an assignment to 
increment m by one. 
19:    a.set(l+1,key); 
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20:    m := m+1; 
The set operation call at line 19 involves the generation of another VC: 
VC #11: 
 {inList_0:List} 
 && 1 < inList_0.size() 
 && 0 >= 0 && 0 < inList_0.size() 
   && inList_0.elementAt(0) >= inList_0.elementAt(1) 
 && !(-1 >= 0 
   && -1 < inList_0.set(1, inList_0.elementAt(0)).size() 
   && inList_0.set(1, inList_0.elementAt(0)) 
                    .elementAt(-1) 
      >= inList_0.elementAt(1)) 
==> 
  inList_0.set(1, inList_0.elementAt(0)).set_pre(0, 
                  inList_0.elementAt(1) 
The statements at lines 19 and 20 can then be symbolically executed with the following 
consequences for the state of the symbolic executor. The program counter then moves back to 
the header of the loop at line 11. 
Program Counter: 
 11:  while (m < a.size()) { 
Path Condition: 
 {inList_0:List}, 
 1 < inList_0.size(), 
 0 >= 0 && 0 < inList_0.size() 
   && inList_0.elementAt(0) >= inList_0.elementAt(1), 
 !(-1 >= 0 
   && -1 < inList_0.set(1, inList_0.elementAt(0)).size() 
   && inList_0.set(1, inList_0.elementAt(0)) 
                    .elementAt(-1) 
      >= inList_0.elementAt(1)) 
Variables: 
 inList: inList_0 
 a: inList_0.set(1, inList_0.elementAt(0)).set(0, 
                  inList_0.elementAt(1) 
 m: 1+1 
 key: inList_0.elementAt(1) 
 l: -1 
The loop condition of this loop is then also assumed to be false to complete its single 
iteration and the program counter advances to the return statement following the loop. 
Program Counter: 
 22:  return a; 
Path Condition: 
 {inList_0:List}, 
 1 < inList_0.size(), 
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 0 >= 0 && 0 < inList_0.size() 
   && inList_0.elementAt(0) >= inList_0.elementAt(1), 
 !(-1 >= 0 
   && -1 < inList_0.set(1, inList_0.elementAt(0)).size() 
   && inList_0.set(1, inList_0.elementAt(0)) 
                    .elementAt(-1) 
      >= inList_0.elementAt(1)) 
Variables: 
 inList: inList_0 
 a: inList_0.set(1, inList_0.elementAt(0)).set(0, 
                  inList_0.elementAt(1) 
 m: 1+1 
 key: inList_0.elementAt(1) 
 l: -1 
VCs are then generated for the checks of the ensures clauses at the return statement. 
VC #12: 
 {inList_0:List} 
 && 1 < inList_0.size() 
 && !(0 >= 0 && 0 < inList_0.size() 
   && inList_0.elementAt(0) >= inList_0.elementAt(1)) 
==> 
  forall (i:integer := 1 to 
     inList_0.set(1, inList_0.elementAt(0)) 
          .set(0, inList_0.elementAt(1).size()-1): 
  inList_0.set(1, inList_0.elementAt(0)) 
        .set(0, inList_0.elementAt(1).elementAt(i) 
  >= inList_0.set(1, inList_0.elementAt(0)) 
        .set(0, inList_0.elementAt(1).elementAt(i-1) 
 
VC #13: 
 {inList_0:List} 
 && 1 < inList_0.size() 
 && !(0 >= 0 && 0 < inList_0.size() 
   && inList_0.elementAt(0) >= inList_0.elementAt(1)) 
==> 
  inList_0.set(1, inList_0.elementAt(0)) 
       .set(0, inList_0.elementAt(1).size() 
  = inList_0.size() 
This completes this branch and the symbolic execution of the example. 
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Appendix E 
 
An interactive PVS proof 
This appendix works through the details of the proof of a particular VC using PVS. The VC is 
from the full formal verification of the library project discussed in chapter 8. 
E.1   Relevant Omnibus source code 
We consider a proof for the following registerMember operation. 
public operation registerMember(name:Name, ad1:String, 
ad2:String, pCode:String, telNo:integer, isAdult:boolean, 
isStaff:boolean) 
 changes members 
 ensures members() = old members().add( 
   Member.newMember(old getNewMemberNo(), 
     name, ad1, ad2, pCode, 
     telNo, isAdult, isStaff)) 
We will prove that it satisfies the memberNosInMembersUnique invariant. 
public invariant memberNosInMembersUnique: 
 forall (m:Member in members()): 
  forall (m2:Member in members()): 
   m.memberNo() != m2.memberNo() || m = m2 
These definitions make use of two local methods: the members model function and the 
getNewMemberNo function. 
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public model function members():Collection[Member] 
 
public function getNewMemberNo():integer 
 ensures !(exists (m:Member in members()): 
        m.memberNo() = result) 
The newMember constructor of the Member class is used to construct the new Member 
to add to the members collection. 
public class Member { 
 public model function memberNo():integer 
 public model function name():Name 
 ... 
  
 public constructor newMember(memNo:integer, na:Name, 
ad1:String, ad2:String, pCode:String, tNo:integer, 
isAd:boolean, isSta:boolean) 
  ensures memberNo() = memNo, 
   name() = na, 
   ... 
 ... 
} 
The members model function of Lib holds a Collection object for which a 
simplified specification is given below: 
public class Collection[Element] isa Iterable[Element] { 
 public model function contains(e2:Element):boolean 
 
 public operation add(e:Element) 
  changes contains(e) 
  ensures contains(e) 
 ... 
} 
The post-condition of the add function includes the assertion that all elements other than 
e remain unchanged as implied by the changes clause. 
E.2   Generated PVS 
The verification process starts with the selection of ‘Interactive FFV’ as the verification 
process to use for the Lib class. On selecting ‘Verify Project’, the project is translated into 
the generic logic and then PVS. The axioms file containing the formalisation of the 
specifications of the project and used libraries is 6718 lines long. There is then a series of 
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obligation files and default proof attempts for each file in the project which is to be verified 
using PVS. The obligations file for the Lib class is 2337 lines long and contains 231 VCs. 
The VC we are concerned with is VC number 67 which is shown below. 
 % VC #67: 
 %     Source file: C:\Program 
Files\eclipse\workspace\OmnibusIDE\myprojects\Impl4-
ffv\Lib.obs 
 %     Line number: 160 
 %     Method: registerMember 
 %     Name:   Check the public behaviour of the 
registerMember operation satisfies the public invariant 
at line 23 
 vc_67: CONJECTURE 
  (FORALL (old_this:v_Lib), (name:v_Name), 
      (ad1:v_omni_lang_String), 
      (ad2:v_omni_lang_String), 
       (pCode:v_omni_lang_String), (telNo:int), 
      (isAdult:bool), (isStaff:bool), (this:Lib): 
    (Lib_registerMember_pub_post(old_this, name, ad1, 
                ad2, pCode, telNo, isAdult, 
                isStaff, this) 
    IMPLIES Lib_invariant_3(this)) 
  ) 
The VC is expressed using the function symbols defining the post-condition of the method 
and the invariant. Lib_registerMember_pub_post is declared and then specified as 
follows: 
Lib_registerMember_pub_post(old_this:v_Lib, name:v_Name, 
ad1:v_omni_lang_String, ad2:v_omni_lang_String, 
pCode:v_omni_lang_String, telNo:int, isAdult:bool, 
isStaff:bool, this:Lib):bool 
 
Lib_registerMember_pub_post_ax: AXIOM 
 (FORALL (old_this:v_Lib), (name:v_Name), 
        (ad1:v_omni_lang_String), 
        (ad2:v_omni_lang_String), 
        (pCode:v_omni_lang_String), (telNo:int), 
        (isAdult:bool), (isStaff:bool), (this:Lib): 
   (Lib_registerMember_pub_post(old_this, name, ad1, ad2, 
                 pCode, telNo, isAdult, 
                 isStaff, this) 
  = ((((Lib_loans(old_this) = Lib_loans(this)) AND 
     (Lib_copies(old_this) = Lib_copies(this))) AND  
     (Lib_cards(old_this) = Lib_cards(this))) AND  
     (Lib_members(this) = 
      omni_lang_Collection_add(Lib_members(old_this), 
       Member_newMember(Lib_getNewMemberNo(old_this), 
               name, ad1, ad2, pCode, telNo, 
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               isAdult, isStaff))))) 
 ) 
AUTO_REWRITE+ Lib_registerMember_pub_post_ax 
Lib_invariant_3 is declared and then specified as follows: 
Lib_invariant_3(this:Lib):bool 
 
Lib_invariant_3_ax: AXIOM 
 (FORALL (this:Lib): 
   (Lib_invariant_3(this) =  
    (FORALL (m:v_Member): 
     (omni_lang_Iterable_contains(Lib_members(this), m) 
    IMPLIES (FORALL (m2:v_Member): 
     (omni_lang_Iterable_contains(Lib_members(this), m2) 
     IMPLIES  
      ((Member_memberNo(m) /= Member_memberNo(m2)) 
      OR (m = m2))) 
     )) 
   )) 
 ) 
AUTO_REWRITE+ Lib_invariant_3_ax 
E.3   Details of the proof process 
To start the proof process, we start PVS, open the Lib obligations file, move to VC 67 and 
select ‘prove’. The initial proof status is shown below: 
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The proof then proceeds by skolemising and flattening to give us the following VC in 
terms of the introduced skolem constants. 
 
Next we get the predicate for the validity of old_this!1 using typepred. This gives 
us the knowledge that Lib_invariant_3 holds over old_this!1. We then re-write the 
two instances of Lib_invariant_3 (over this!1 and old_this!1) using 
Lib_invariant_3_ax and do the same thing for Lib_registerMember_pub_post 
using Lib_registerMember_pub_post_ax. This gives us the following: 
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We can then flatten [-2] and use the ‘Lib_members(this!1) = ...’ part to 
rewrite Lib_members(this!1) in [1] in terms of Lib_members(old_this!1). 
This gives us: 
 
We can then use Lib_getNewMemberNo_pub_ax to give us the knowledge that there 
is no existing Member in members with this memberNo. The negation is removed and the 
assertion is placed as the antecedent numbered {1} shown below. 
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Next we skolemize and flatten the nested quantifiers in [2] which gives us arbitrary 
skolem symbols m!1 and m2!1 which we know are both contained in ‘this.members()’ 
and we must prove are either equal or have different memberNos. 
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Now we can use omni_lang_Collection_add_pub_ax to give us the specification 
for the add method which we can then use to determine whether the new members 
collection contains elements from whether the old members collection did. The two 
additional pieces of knowledge this gives us are as follows: 
 
[-2] tells us that the new members collection contains the newly constructed Member. 
[-1] tells us that for all members other than the newly constructed Member, the new 
members collection contains the Member if the old collection contained the Member. 
We have two Members, m!1 and m2!1, which we know are contained in the new 
members collection, and we have two rules, [-1] and [-2] for evaluating these. Each of 
m!1 and m2!1 can be rewritten using either of these rules. Thus we have three different 
cases: 
1. Both are equal to the new Member 
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2. One of m!1 and m2!1 is equal to the new Member 
3. Neither is equal to the new Member 
Both are equal to the new Member 
The easiest case is where both m!1 and m2!1 are equal to the new Member. In this case, we 
have the additional knowledge that: 
 
Recall that we are trying to prove that either m!1 and m2!1 are equal or that they have 
different memberNos. Well, this additional knowledge is sufficient to trivially prove that 
m!1 and m2!1 are equal. 
One of m!1 and m2!1 is equal to the new Member 
There are two symmetric subcases for this case. Either (a) m!1 is equal to the new Member 
and m2!1 is not or (b) m2!1 is equal to the new Member and m!1 is not. Here we will only 
discuss the proof of case (a) but the same general technique can be used to prove case (b). 
The case analysis gives us two pieces of knowledge. The sequent that m!1 is equal to the 
new Member: 
 
And the antecedent that m2!1 is not. 
 
We can start by instantiating the quantifier describing that Members other than the new 
Member are contained in members, with m2!1. This gives us the knowledge that m2!1 is 
in the new members if it was in the old members. 
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Then we can use Member_newMember_pub_ax to deduce that the memberNo of the 
new Member is getNewMemberNo(old_this!1). The sequent this gives is: 
 
The specification of the getNewMemberNo function earlier gave us the following proof 
goal: 
 
We can now instantiate this with m2!1. To prove the resulting assertion we must prove 
both parts of the conjunction. We can prove that the old members collection contained 
m2!1, which we can do from the facts that we know the new collection contains m2!1 and 
that we know the old collection contains m2!1 iff the new one does. We can also prove that 
MemberNo(m2!1) is equal to Lib_getNewMemberNo(old_this!1) from the fact 
that we know Member_memberNo(m!1) = Member_memberNo(m2!1), m!1 equals 
the new Member, and the memberNo of the new Member is 
Lib_getNewMemberNo(old_this!1). The relevant parts of the conjecture are shown 
below: 
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Neither is equal to the new Member 
The final case is that neither m!1 or m2!1 are equal to the new Member. This knowledge is 
represented by the following antecedents: 
 
We can instantiate the quantifier which describes that Members other than the new 
Member are contained in members with both m!1 and m2!1, in turn. This gives us the 
knowledge that both m!1 and m2!1 are in the new members if they were in the old 
members. The corresponding sequents are: 
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We already have the knowledge that m!1 and m2!1 are in the new members collection, 
and from [-1] and [-2] we now know that they were in the old members collection. 
Thus, we can use the truth of the invariant over old_this, already loaded in [-4], to 
deduce that m!1 and m2!1 are either equal or have different memberNos. 
 
 
This completes the proof of the VC. 
 
The entire proof consists of 104 steps and also involves a number of side-conditions. 
 
 
 
